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Abstract 
Twelve experiments investigated how children and adults interpret verbal probabilities (e.g., 
it is likely). The experiments were designed to determine if and when children and adults use 
the directionality or the likelihood of verbal probabilities. In Experiments 1a and 1b, I showed 
that children use only the directionality of verbal probabilities to make decisions. However, they 
dismiss it when speakers are malevolent. In Experiment 2a, adults showed that they do not 
consider only the directionality or the likelihood when making decisions. Rather response times 
suggested that adults are sensitive to the potential conflict between the two features. In 
Experiment 2b, I showed that, given an unlimited time to decide, adults can show less 
preference for the positive directionality. However in Experiment 3a, I found that in 
conversational context, adults prefer the positive directionality even when given more time to 
decide. In Experiment 3b, adults used the directionality in different ways according to speakers’ 
intentions. In contrast with children in Experiment 1b, they preferred the negative directionality 
when the speaker was malevolent, rather than dismissed the directionality overall. In 
Experiments 4a to 4e, counter to expectations, I did not find that speakers using more precise 
format to communicate probabilities are judged more responsible based on their predictions’ 
accuracy. Instead the results suggest that listeners reward predictions that suggest that 
speakers wish for the best outcome for listeners. Finally in Experiment 5, I found that the 
preference for receiving more precise probabilistic information is contingent on speakers’ 
expertise. These results together support a pragmatic account of verbal probabilities. The 
directionality of verbal probabilities is a pragmatic cue that influences decision making by 
shaping listeners’ assumptions. 
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 1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Life is inherently risky. People face uncertainty at any time, for events from the lightest (will 
that girl’s pistachio ice-cream taste as good as expected?) to the most severe (will hurricane 
Sandy hit a town?). Understanding risk therefore seems to be a skill particularly important to 
human beings. However, while toddlers can evaluate likelihood accurately based on the 
information found in their environment (Téglás, Girotto, Gonzalez & Bonatti, 2007), adults are 
well known for their poor performance when evaluating likelihood based on communicated 
information, even in numerical terms (e.g., Peters et al., 2006). This can be seen in the recently 
growing number of popular science books trying to inform about risk (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2002). As 
one cannot have experience of every possible situation, risk perception cannot be fully 
understood without understanding how communicated risk information is interpreted. 
A particular format of communicating risk information is verbal probabilities (e.g., It is 
likely). Verbal probabilities are phrases communicating a degree of certainty, possibility or 
obligation of an event by a modal adjective (e.g., likely, uncertain) or a verbal form (e.g., may + 
verb). They are embedded in utterances expressing the probability of an event as in It is likely 
that x will occur. The modal term can be combined with a modifier (e.g., few, strongly) which 
will increase or decrease the degree of certainty expressed by the verbal probability (e.g., It is 
highly likely that x is true). This grammatical structure of verbal probabilities, based on a head 
(the modal term) and a potential modifier gives wide flexibility, so that there is a rich variety of 
verbal probabilities that can be produced and used. For example, Reagan, Mosteller and Youtz 
(1989) mentioned encountering 282 different verbal probabilities while reviewing 37 studies. 
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This thesis aims to examine how children and adults understand risk when it is 
communicated through the medium of verbal probabilities, and with a particular focus on the 
conversational features of verbal probabilities. I therefore present a brief discussion of 
probabilities, the difference between numerical and verbal probabilities, and normative and 
descriptive probabilistic reasoning. I then review literature on the understanding of verbal 
probabilities, first in adults, and then in children. Finally I argue in favour of the development of 
a pragmatics account of verbal probabilities. 
1.1. Probabilities and probabilistic reasoning 
1.1.1. Probability, likelihood, chance, odds, risk 
According to the Collins English Thesaurus (2012), probability, likelihood, chance and odds 
are synonyms. Indeed, Oxford Dictionaries Online (2012) defines probability as ‘the quality or 
state of being probable; the extent to which something is likely to happen or to be the case’, 
and likelihood as ‘the state or fact of [something] being likely; probability’. Odds are ‘the 
chances of likelihood of something happening or being the case’ (Oxford Dictionaries Online). 
Chance is defined as ‘a possibility of something happening’, but also, as a mass noun, as 
restricted to positively valenced events (‘the probability of something desirable happening’; 
Oxford Dictionaries Online). Although it is not defined as a synonym of the previous terms, risk 
mirrors the term chance in being defined (as singular mass noun) as ‘the possibility that 
something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen’ (Oxford Dictionaries Online). 
The term probability is however also defined further as a mathematical term, representing 
‘the extent to which an event is likely to occur, measured by the ratio of the favourable cases to 
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the whole number of cases possible’ (Oxford Dictionaries Online, 2012). In this it fits both what 
Baron (2008) referred to as the frequency theory of probability and the logical theory of 
probability. Under the frequency theory, the probability of an event can be estimated using the 
known frequencies of the event: for example, one can estimate the probability of having an 
accident on the M6 on a Sunday evening by comparing the number of accidents which had 
occurred on the M6 on Sunday evenings, to the number of vehicles which had driven on the M6 
on Sundays evenings. Under the logical theory of probability, one can estimate a probability by 
using a number of mathematical rules. For example, to estimate the probability of obtaining two 
six when rolling two dices, one has to use the conjunctive rule, where the probability of a 
conjunction of events is equal to the product of the respective probabilities of each event. 
The logical theory of probability can be used only if one can know that the different 
possibilities are logically equivalent. That is the number of possibilities is known and these 
possibilities are known to have equivalent probabilities. For example, in (non-biased) card 
games, the number of different cards is set up from the start and each is known to have only 
one occurrence. In the frequency theory of probability, one does not need to know the number 
of possibilities, nor the frequency of each. It is enough to know the frequency of the considered 
possibility, and the total number of occurrences. If one knows the number of car accidents in 
the United Kingdom and the total number of transport accidents in the United Kingdom, one 
does not need to know the number of truck or motorbike accidents to estimate a frequentist 
probability. 
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Following Savage (1954), Baron (2008) referred to a third theory of probability, the personal 
theory. In the personal perspective, the estimated probability is not drawn from an objective 
calculation, but from a personal judgement (Savage). Therefore, ‘a probability judgement can be 
based on any of one’s beliefs and knowledge, including knowledge about frequencies or about 
the set of logical possibilities, but including other knowledge as well’ (Baron, p. 109). The 
personal theory of probability is thus inclusive of subjectively estimated probabilities, impacted 
by the different beliefs of each individual, but also of objectively estimated probabilities. For 
example, a lecturer could tell a student that he has a 40% chance to pass the test, although the 
pass base rate is usually 70%. This is because the lecturer also takes into account the poor 
record of attendance of the student. If the student had a high attendance, the lecturer might 
have told him that his chance of passing was 80%.  
This work is focused on the use of probabilities as communicated by others, mainly without 
using numbers. People cannot reach an estimate by applying mathematical rules or based on 
frequencies, using communicated probabilities. They can only subjectively estimate the 
probability. Therefore in this thesis, reference to the term probability would always be in the 
personal probability framework. Thus, for clarity purposes, I will limit the use of the word 
probability (the only one of the synonyms which has a mathematical definition) to situations 
where an objective estimate can be reached using frequencies or logic. When I will refer to a 
probability estimate falling under the personal view, I will prefer the term likelihood 
judgements. 
1.1.2. Normative and descriptive theories of probabilities 
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Under the frequency theory and the logical theory of probabilities, probability estimates can 
be correct or incorrect. There is a norm, defined by the application of mathematical rules 
(logical theory), or by the understanding of frequencies (frequency theory). Thus, normative 
theories of probabilities are concerned with the ‘ought’ of reasoning (Elqayam & Evans, 2011), 
and one’s performance can be checked against the norm. Descriptive theories of probabilities 
are concerned with the ‘is’ (Elqayam & Evans), that is how people understand and use 
probabilities. 
In the case of verbal probabilities, a strict norm cannot be reached through the logical or the 
frequency theory of probabilities. This thesis therefore can only provide a descriptive account of 
verbal probabilities. However I shall argue later that verbal probabilities can still call for a 
normative answer, albeit broader. Further, as De Neys (2012) highlighted, one can refer to a 
normative answer without being prescriptive. A normative answer can be simply used as a 
benchmark. In the context of reasoning and decision making, this can provide points of 
reference which make it easier to present a descriptive account (Stupple & Ball, 2011). In this 
thesis I will thus sometimes refer to the normative answer (or most often, the correct answer) 
to help in presenting my descriptive account of verbal probabilities. 
1.1.3. Irrationality: the dual model of reasoning and decision making 
Piaget and Inhelder (1951) proposed that probabilistic reasoning is possible from 11-12 
years old: ‘A fundamental set of operational schemas which is also made possible by formal 
operations is the probabilistic notions which result from the assimilation of chance by those 
operations’ (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966, p. 112; own translation). In the Piagetian theory, early 
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adolescence is part of the last stage of development, the formal operations stage. Also, in this 
theory, most individuals develop to this final stage. This entails that most individuals should be 
able to reason probabilistically. 
However the seminal work of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) highlighted that 
most adults do not reason correctly when using probabilities or when judging likelihood. For 
example, the conjunctive rule in logical probabilities requires that the conjunction of two events 
cannot be more likely than any of the two events. However, it can be that the conjunction of 
two events is more representative of the known or stereotyped environment than any one of 
the two events. In that case, people judge this conjunction as more likely than one of the two 
events composing it (conjunction fallacy; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
Another bias identified by the Prospect Theory is the tendency to judge likelihood based on 
the availability of an exemplar in memory (availability heuristic; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). For 
example, if one is considering whether it is more likely to die in a transport accident or of a fall 
in England or Wales, one might think it is the former. The answer, based on the frequencies for 
2010, would be that, in fact, a person based in England or Wales is more likely to die of a fall 
(Office National for Statistics, 2011). However, transports accidents are more likely to be 
reported in the news than falls (as they are more disruptive of the public life), making their 
exemplars readily available. 
Reasoning biases highlight a gap between the rules of reasoning and reasoning as applied in 
daily life by lay people. The rule-based solution, that is the norm, is not always applied, 
suggesting that a normative theory of reasoning (including probabilistic) alone cannot account 
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for the empirical evidence. Dual-process theories have therefore been proposed (e.g., 
Kahneman, 2003) to explain adults’ failures to attend to the norms of reasoning and decision-
making. Under the dual-process frame, people are thought to use either one of two systems of 
reasoning. System 1 is an intuitive system of reasoning and decision making, relying mainly on 
the use of heuristics. System 2 is the reasoning system, relying on the use of rules. While System 
1 is automatic, and thus fast and requiring little cognitive resources, System 2 operates in a 
controlled way, hence is slow and cognitively costly (Kahneman, 2003). 
As showed in Evans’ review (2008), there is considerable empirical evidence to support a 
dual-process account of reasoning and decision-making. However, Evans argued later (2010) 
that while the definition of System 1 and System 2 thinking implies different cognitive 
mechanisms, evidence is scarce, if not contradictory, for different cognitive architectures being 
involved in the two different types of thinking. In fact as Evans (2010) pointed out, imaging 
evidence suggests that more than two systems could be involved (see Goel, 2008). He proposed 
using a terminology of ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ reasoning instead (Evans, 2010). In this terminology, 
‘System 1 and 2 really correspond to two families of systems that have the Type 1 and 2 
characteristics’ (p. 316). Referring to type rather than system allows therefore accounting for 
the lack of evidence of precisely two different systems and the possibility that multiple systems 
are involved. Thus, in this thesis I will follow Evans (2010) and refer to Type 1 and Type 2 when 
referring to dual-process thinking.  
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1.1.4. Probabilities as communicated: verbal vs. numerical probabilities 
When decision-makers need to judge subjective probabilities, they can observe the 
environment and/or use their own knowledge. For example, if a couple wants to judge the 
likelihood of failure of different contraceptive methods before choosing one, they can sample 
their environment for the frequencies of pregnancies they know to be due to a contraception 
failure. They can also use what they remember of the information provided to them in high 
school, in biology or sex education classes, should they have received some. If they do not 
remember, a quick internet search will provide them with the probability of success of the 
different methods, most probably in percentages, i.e. in numerical format. However they might 
find it quicker and simpler to ask a health professional for this information, rather than search 
for it. If they ask a health professional they are more likely to be provided with this information 
in a verbal rather than numerical format, through the medium of verbal probabilities (Erev & 
Cohen, 1990). 
Erev and Cohen (1990) found that although students preferred to place a bet based on a 
numerical probability, sports commentators preferred to give their predictions as verbal 
probabilities. Self-report methods highlighted the so-called Communication Mode Preference 
paradox: a third of people prefer to receive numerical probabilities but to give verbal 
probabilities (Wallsten, Budescu, Zwick & Kemp, 1993, for an English-speaking population; Xu, 
Ye & Li, 2008, for a Chinese-speaking population). In fact, the overall preference for receiving 
numerical probabilities (disregarding their preference for giving numerical or verbal 
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probabilities) was found in two thirds of each sample. Whereas two thirds of each sample 
preferred to give verbal probabilities (whichever their preference for receiving). 
Wallsten et al. (1993) reported data suggesting that the Communication Mode Preference 
paradox relied on the perception that verbal probabilities are easier to use and more natural 
than numerical probabilities. In contrast, numerical probabilities were perceived as more 
precise than verbal probabilities. This is consistent with the recent appearance of probability as 
mathematical concept (from the correspondence between Pascal and de Fermat, c. 1650-60; 
Hacking, 1975), on the scale of human evolution. According to Gigerenzer (e.g., 1998), this late 
phylogenetic appearance entails that frequencies are the natural format for the human species 
to process probabilistic information. That is, it is easier to process frequencies than percentages 
because the human mind has evolved to do so. Moreover, while likely, certain and possible 
appeared in the English language circa 1300, and probable in the late 14th Century, probability 
was first used in its mathematical sense in 1718 (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2012). This could 
suggest that verbal probabilities feel more natural because they are more established in the 
daily language thanks to their earlier appearance. 
Beyth-Marom (1982) proposed that numerical probabilities are avoided to stop forecasts 
from being judged on their accuracy. This explanation is not incompatible with the claim that 
verbal probabilities are more natural. One could prefer verbal probabilities because they feel 
more natural and consequently have the benefit that one’s accuracy is not evaluated. However, 
this explanation was ruled out by Erev and Cohen (1990). After asking four experts to produce 
verbal and numerical predictions, Erev and Cohen asked them to predict which of the verbal or 
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numerical prediction would bring more money to gamblers. Experts received money for 
answering correctly to this question, either as flat rate or as incentive. The reward format had 
no effect on the preferences shown by the experts. That is, the experts produced verbal 
probabilities more often, disregarding the reward condition. This suggests that an incentive to 
be accurate does not reduce the preference for producing verbal probabilities. Thus verbal 
probabilities, according to Erev and Cohen, are not chosen because they allow speakers to cover 
their inaccuracies. However, that speakers are not influenced by rewards based on accuracy is 
not exactly the same thing as speakers being judged less responsible for using a verbal 
probability. That is, judgements of accuracy and judgements of responsibility might not overlap. 
In Chapter 5, I will come back to this possibility to test it indirectly, exploring how receivers 
judge speakers as responsible when using different formats to predict uncertain information. 
Searching language corpora also supports that receiving probabilistic information in a verbal 
format is likely in everyday life. For example, the Corpus of Contemporary American English 
(Davies, 2008-2012) found likely, possible, certain to all be in the 1,000 most frequent words 
(625th, 460th and 578th, respectively). In the British National Corpus (Leech, Rayson & Wilson, 
2001), those three modal adjectives are in the top 500 words, possible occuring as frequently as 
long, likely as often as real and certain as often as difficult. A month of British news offers 
17,300 occurrences of the verbal probability it is likely, and 24,900 occurrences of it is possible 
(search run on Google News UK, for one month upwards November, 11th, 2012). 
Even in childhood, verbal probabilities are encountered early. For example, in a corpus of 
French vocabulary found in primary school handbooks (Lété, Sprenger-Charolles & Colé, 2004), 
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possible occurred as often as neighbour. It seems therefore that daily life provides a lot of 
opportunities to judge likelihood and make decisions based on verbal probabilities rather than 
numerical, both for adults and for children. Actually, since children are not taught about 
numerical probabilities until the end of primary school, they may even receive verbal 
probabilities to a higher extent than adults, even if only the simplest or most common phrases 
(e.g., it is likely). 
1.2. Judging the likelihood of verbal probabilities 
1.2.1. The problem of equivalence between verbal and numerical probabilities 
Lichtenstein and Newman (1967) described the likelihood meaning of a wide range of verbal 
probabilities. Lichtenstein and Newman asked participants to translate 41 verbal probabilities 
into a likelihood from .01 to .99. The translations given by their sample were consistent for each 
verbal probability. However, Lichtenstein and Newman noticed that Cohen, Dearnley and 
Hansel (1958) reported very different translations in their study of three verbal probabilities. 
For example, likely was translated as lower in Cohen et al. than in Lichtenstein and Newman, but 
the reverse was true of improbable. Following Lichtenstein and Newman’s study, most studies 
consisted of participants translating verbal probabilities into likelihood, via 0 to 1 or 0 to 100 
scales. This has been done with general samples (e.g., McGlone & Reed, 1998), expert samples 
(e.g., Beyth-Marom, 1982) and patient samples (e.g., cancer patients: Sutherland & al., 1991). In 
other studies, participants were simply asked to rank the verbal probabilities in order of 
likelihood (Reyna, 1981). What was observed in these translation studies is paradoxical. The 
likelihood assigned to each verbal probability remained more or less stable between studies, i.e. 
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there was little variability between different groups of participants. This could lead to the 
conclusion that verbal probabilities each have a numerical equivalent. But what could also be 
noticed from these studies is a great variability within each group of participants. So even if on 
average likelihood translations of verbal probabilities are stable, the interindividual variability 
may prevent one being sure of being understood when communicating uncertainty verbally.  
This observation from translation studies led several authors (e.g., Wallsten, Budescu, 
Rapoport, Zwick, & Forsyth, 1986) to characterize verbal probabilities by their vagueness. Nakao 
and Axelrod (1983) even advised that use of verbal probabilities should be abolished in medical 
risk communication. Less extremely, several authors (e.g., Hamm, 1991) have suggested 
specifying a list, as a lexicon, which would guide the use of verbal probabilities. Considering the 
late appearance of probabilistic reasoning in the human phylogeny, this ‘vagueness’ may not be 
surprising however. If adults have not evolved to use probabilistic concepts (e.g., Gigerenzer, 
1998), they should not be expected to be able to use those concepts in order to translate verbal 
probabilities that they might otherwise use with ease in their natural language. It is also well 
documented that the understanding of the numerical probability scale is incorrect in the general 
population: adults overestimate small probabilities and underestimate large ones (e.g., 
Gonzales & Wu, 1999). This can be observed when an increase from 5% to 10% is judged as 
larger than an increase from 40% to 45% (Quattrone & Tversky, 1988). Conversely an increase 
from 90% to 95% is judged as smaller than an increase from 40% to 45%. It suggests that the 
representation of the probability scale is not linear, with equal intervals, but rather has the 
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shape of an inverted S. This could lead people to have difficulties in using linear probability 
scales when translating verbal probabilities, creating variability in the results.  
One could even argue that asking people to translate language used since the Middle-Ages 
with concepts which have appeared afterwards is looking at the problem from the wrong side. 
That is, since verbal probabilities were in use before mathematical probabilities, how they are 
understood is unlikely to have been shaped by the appearance of the logical theory of 
probabilities. On this view, having to translate verbal probabilities into mathematical language 
may not be natural, which prevents us from acquiring fine grained and stable translations. This 
is not to say that verbal probabilities cannot elicit subjective probability judgements, but rather 
than they are not a mirror to numerical probabilities, as seems to be assumed in translation 
studies. This is supported by Windschitl and Wells (1996), who found that verbal probabilities 
elicit intuitive reasoning, prone to context effects (characteristic of Type 1), while numerical 
probabilities elicit rule-based reasoning (characteristic of Type 2). In their words, ‘people who 
have been asked to provide a numerical uncertainty estimate think differently about the 
presented information than those who have been asked to provide verbal uncertainty 
estimates’ (p. 358). 
I want to argue that verbal probabilities are only vague if they are considered as 
communicating numerical information. As just highlighted, their use of verbal probabilities in 
natural language might in fact be unambiguous, and speakers might perfectly understand each 
other, even if they do not translate what is said in equivalent numerical probabilities. Providing 
a pragmatic account, I will suggest that verbal probabilities have foremost an argumentative 
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function (Anscombre & Ducrot, 1983), and that the interpretation of this function is 
unambiguous, as shall be showed later in this chapter. 
1.2.2. A numerical solution to the vagueness of verbal probabilities: the membership function 
To address the problem of defining numerical equivalences for verbal probabilities, Wallsten 
and colleagues (e.g., Wallsten et al., 1986; Dhami & Wallsten, 2005) tried to characterize verbal 
probabilities in a less strict way than translation studies. In Wallsten et al., for example, 
participants used spinners to indicate what were the lowest and the highest probabilities for 
which they might use a verbal probability. The range defined by this first answer was divided in 
a maximum of seven intervals (it could need to be fewer intervals to avoid having intervals 
smaller than .02). For example if a participant had first defined that it is likely was at the lowest 
.40 and at the highest .75, the range would be divided in seven intervals of .05. it is likely could 
be thus associated with .40, .45… up to .75. For each probability obtained in this way, 
participant then judged how much it was appropriately described by the initial verbal 
probability. That is, participants indicated a range of probabilities associated to one particular 
verbal probability. Within that range, they indicated how much each probability point was 
appropriately described by the verbal probability. Verbal probabilities can then be characterized 
by membership functions. 
In a membership function, a verbal probability is represented by the range of numerical 
probabilities it can be translated into, rather than by a single numerical probability. 
Furthermore, each point of the range is characterized by a level of adequacy with the verbal 
probability, so that a membership function represents graphically the distribution of 
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probabilistic meaning of the expression (see Figure 1 for an example). This theoretical 
development not only took into account the numerical vagueness of verbal probabilities, but 
also allowed Wallsten et al to include the interindividual variability, allowing more overlap 
between two people’s numerical translations of a verbal probability. 
1.3. Verbal probabilities are language: pragmatics and argumentative function 
1.3.1. Verbal probabilities and locus of uncertainty 
Shortly after the membership function development allowed the numerical vagueness of 
verbal probabilities to be taken into account, Teigen (1988) proposed that verbal probabilities 
entail more than a numerical equivalence. Teigen extended Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) 
proposition to distinguish between internal and external uncertainty, and Hacking’s (1975) 
distinction between epistemic and aleatory probabilities, to the case of verbal probabilities. 
What Hacking referred to as epistemic and Kahneman and Tversky as internal is the uncertainty 
 
 
Figure 1: Hypothetical membership functions for two probability terms (from Wallsten & al., 1986) 
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that reflects the degree of knowledge or belief of an individual. Aleatory, or external, 
uncertainty relies on the state of the world, that is the distribution of events in the world. Under 
Teigen’s account, I am certain and It is certain refer respectively to internal and external 
uncertainty. When using the internal verbal probability I am certain, uncertainty is cognitive 
(epistemic), that is speakers refer to their own state of knowledge. When using the external 
verbal probability It is certain, speakers refer to the uncertainty that resides in the physical 
world. 
This distinction is generally supported by a preference for betting when uncertainty is 
internal (although when imagining a hypothetical betting scenario, preference is for external 
uncertainty; e.g., Robinson, Pendle, Rowley, Beck & McColgan, 2009). Research into the 
different interpretations that can be made from internal and external verbal probabilities has 
been recently developed (see e.g., Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Juanchich, Teigen & Gourdon, 2011). 
Although results are still preliminary, Juanchich et al. found that external verbal probabilities are 
more likely to be interpreted as indicating that the speaker used statistical information to draw 
the prediction; they are also interpreted as being more informative. In this thesis however, this 
aspect of verbal probabilities will not be explored, and in all upcoming experiments, the verbal 
probabilities will only be external (e.g., It is…, There is…). 
1.3.2. Verbal probabilities and directionality 
In 1988, Teigen also proposed that verbal probabilities should be distinguished based on 
their directionality. The concept of directionality was drawn from psycholinguistic work on 
quantifiers (e.g., Moxey & Sanford, 1986), and can sometimes also be called polarity (e.g., 
 17 
 
Sanford & Moxey, 2003; in this thesis I will refer only to directionality for consistency). 
Directionality of a quantifier or a verbal probability is dichotomous, being either positive (e.g., it 
is likely) or negative (e.g., it is unlikely). Being so, it focuses the listener’s or the reader’s 
attention on the occurrence of an uncertain event (if positive) or on its non-occurrence (if 
negative). The positive or negative directionality of a verbal probability can be established 
through a continuation task (Teigen & Brun, 1995). Participants are given predictions that 
include verbal probabilities, for example, It is very likely that Tom will get a 1st on his exam. 
These statements must then be completed with a reason to justify them. A positive 
directionality (as in the example) elicits the production of reasons in favour of the uncertain 
event (e.g., because he has worked hard all term to complete the example statement). This is 
thought to be because it focuses on the occurrence of the uncertain event. Conversely, a 
negative directionality elicits reasons adverse to the uncertain event, since it focuses on its non-
occurrence; for example, It is unlikely that Joe will get a 1st on his exam will most often be 
completed by reasons such as because he missed a lot of classes. 
According to Moxey and Sanford (2000), directionality supports an argumentative function 
of language (e.g., Anscombre & Ducrot, 1983). According to the argumentative theory of 
language, every statement aims to inform but is also an argumentation, and its structure frames 
the inferences that can be drawn from the statement (Anscombre, 1989). The results found by 
Teigen and Brun (1995) with the continuation task were consistent with such a perspective. 
When presented with a positive directionality, participants proposed reasons in favour of the 
uncertain event (pro-reasons); when presented with a negative directionality, they proposed 
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reasons against the uncertain event (con-reasons). For the majority of verbal probabilities, all 
the participants provided only pro-reasons, or only con-reasons, illustrating how much the 
perspective of language can frame inferences. Furthermore, directionality leads to framing 
effects in the interpretation of verbal probabilities (Teigen & Brun, 1999). A positive (there is 
some possibility) and a negative verbal probabilities (it is quite uncertain) were judged by a first 
group of participants as yielding similar translations in numerical probabilities (30-35 %). A 
second group of participants then decided to recommend or not a headache treatment, 
introduced either by There is some possibility or by It is quite uncertain. Those participants 
recommended taking the headache treatment more often when presented with the positive 
verbal probability (There is some possibility). 
In light of these studies, considering verbal probabilities as only expressing a quantity 
appears as a restricted view, in that natural language expressions of quantity also convey 
information about perspective (Sanford & Moxey, 2003). Consistent with this view, they can 
also convey information about the source of information (see section 1.3.1). By choosing a 
directionality, speakers indicate a perspective which they wish to be taken over the other. They 
signal what they think is important, and this information might be critical for listeners to make 
appropriate decisions. 
Moxey and Sanford (2000) even suggested that it may be why people prefer to use verbal 
probabilities or quantity statements over numerical ones. Verbal probabilities potentially 
protect speakers from being held responsible by their numerical vagueness (Beyth-Marom, 
1982), and they feel more natural (Wallsten et al., 1993). But also, verbal probabilities or 
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quantity statements allow speakers to try to orient the attention of their addressees where they 
wish to, and to hint at the nature of the information they used to make their prediction 
(Juanchich et al., 2010). 
Budescu, Karelitz and Wallsten (2003) have, however, argued that directionality is only a 
secondary feature of verbal probabilities, which relies on the level of chance. That is, verbal 
probabilities with low likelihood have a negative directionality, and verbal probabilities with a 
high likelihood have a positive directionality. Yet, Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009) observed 
that some negative verbal probabilities could be judged as meaning a higher likelihood than 
would be some positive ones. For example, French-speaking adult participants in this study 
produced likelihood judgements of 57% for It is not absolutely sure (Il n’est pas totalement sûr), 
but of 45% for There is a little chance (Il y a une petite chance). Gourdon and Villejoubert argued 
that directionality should be considered as a pragmatic cue, indicating the communicative 
intentions of the speaker. They also suggested introducing social factors such as speaker’s 
benevolence to test this possibility, which I do in Chapters 2 (in childhood) and 4 (in adulthood). 
Further evidence can be found to support a pragmatic account of verbal probabilities. 
Juanchich, Teigen and Villejoubert (2010) investigated the choice of verbal probabilities in a 
conversation after a first verbal probability was uttered to express the likelihood of guilt of a 
suspect. Participants were given the newly revised likelihood of guilt and had to choose 
between a positive and a negative verbal probability to express it. They found that participants 
chose positive verbal probabilities when the likelihood had been revised upwards. When it had 
been revised downwards, they chose negative verbal probabilities. 
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More recently, Juanchich, Sirota and Butler (2012) showed that verbal probabilities are the 
most often interpreted as hedging devices, using vagueness to protect speakers from listeners 
blaming them, or to protect listeners from a bad news. For example, participants read verbal 
probabilities before choosing a conversational interpretation among three (the speaker wants 
to communicate uncertainty; the speaker does not want to deliver the news too harshly; the 
speaker wants to be cautious in case the prediction would be incorrect). If the uncertain event 
was positive, participants most often said that the speaker wanted to be cautious in case the 
prediction turned out to be wrong; if the uncertain event was negative, participants most often 
said that the speaker was avoiding delivering bad news too harshly. 
1.4. Interpretation of verbal probabilities in childhood 
Despite the prevalence of uncertainty communication in everyday life (Lété, Sprenger-
Charolles & Colé, 2004), very few studies have investigated the interpretation of verbal 
probabilities in childhood (but see, for exceptions, Moore, Pure & Furrow, 1990; Mullet & Rivet, 
1991; Watson & Moritz, 2003; Gourdon & Villejoubert, 2009). Moore et al. found that children 
as young as 5 years old are able to distinguish between two verbal probabilities to make an 
appropriate choice. Children had to decide which box (of two) to choose, after receiving two 
predictions (e.g., it’s probably in the blue box and It’s maybe in the red box). Their scores were 
compared to what the majority of the sample chose to do. This showed a development of 
understanding of verbal probabilities between 3 and 5 years old, children more reliably 
choosing the appropriate box from 5 years old. 
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However, Mullet and Rivet (1991; see also Watson and Moritz, 2003) observed that older 
children distinguished the different levels of numerical value carried by verbal probabilities less 
well compared to adolescents. More precisely, Mullet and Rivet found that 9-year-olds could 
distinguish clearly between only five positions on a likelihood judgement scale. As Moore et al. 
used only three different verbal probabilities, these different results are not incompatible; 
comprehension of verbal probabilities could be considered as starting early with simple 
expressions and developing towards discrimination of more complex ones. Indeed, Moore et al. 
used single-word verbal probabilities, i.e., non-modified modal terms only (e.g., possibly), which 
are probably simpler than verbal probabilities made of a modal term and a modifier (e.g., it is 
quite likely). 
Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009) raised a concern regarding the directional nature of verbal 
probabilities. None of the three first studies considered directionality as a factor potentially 
influencing the comprehension of verbal probabilities. In the case of Moore et al. (1990), the 
authors not only used simple verbal probabilities, but ones with a positive directionality. It 
cannot be sure therefore if children would have shown the same early understanding of verbal 
probabilities, should have they been of negative directionality. In the two other studies, both 
directionalities were used, such that it cannot be sure that the latter development of the 
understanding of verbal probabilities is not confounded with the different directionalities being 
used. It is possible that children in these two studies have performed better on the positive 
verbal probabilities, but this is not possible to know given the designs. 
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However, consistent with Gourdon and Villejoubert’s results, studies of the understanding 
of quantifiers by children found that children display an early sensitivity to the argumentative 
function of language. That is, they display an understanding that the language is subjective and 
can be interpreted differently based on the context. Champaud and Bassano (1987) found that 
6-year-olds could already take in consideration directionality of quantifiers. Children were 
presented with statements such as I have barely 6 beads (J’ai à peine 6 perles) or I am barely 
reaching the green line (J’arrive à peine au trait vert). Children had to identify the speaker who 
uttered the sentence, in an array of dolls with boxes containing different amount of beads, or in 
an array of dolls against a wall with different coloured lines drawn on. This was to test their 
understanding of the informative function of the statements. Children were then asked what 
the speaker meant, to test their understanding of the argumentative function. This was tested 
with closed questions, such as Does he mean that he is tall enough, or not tall enough? (Est-ce 
qu’il pense qu’il est assez grand ou pas assez grand?). In the argumentative task, children 
performed similarly to adults as early as 6 years old, displaying an understanding of the negative 
directionality. 
Finally, the different results observed by Moore et al. (1990) on the one hand, and Mullet 
and Rivet (1991) and Watson and Moritz (2003) on the other hand could also be explained in 
part by the different task used by Moore et al.. While children had to judge likelihood using 
probability scales in the two other studies, in Moore et al. they had to make a choice regarding a 
verbal probability. Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009) asked 8–year-olds and adults both to make 
likelihood judgements on probability scales and to make decisions based on verbal probabilities. 
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For example, participants were presented with four different verbal probabilities predicting the 
likelihood of a treasure being inside a treasure chest. The verbal probabilities were chosen to 
reflect either a high or a low likelihood, and had a positive or a negative directionality. Thus 
children could judge likelihood and make decisions based on directionality only, on likelihood 
only, or an interaction of both. Children displayed patterns of answers similar to adults in the 
decision-making task, with choices reflecting both the likelihood and directionality. However in 
their likelihood judgements, they only took into account the directionality of verbal 
probabilities. Gourdon and Villejoubert argued that this difference was due to the decision-
making task bearing more concrete consequences (while the likelihood judgement remains only 
an evaluation), with mistakes entailing punishment. 
Moore et al. (1990), and Mullet and Rivet (1991) have used respectively a decision-making 
task, and a likelihood judgement task. This could explain, following Gourdon and Villejoubert’s 
(2009) claim, why they found different ages at which the discrimination between levels of 
likelihood appears. 
1.5. Overview and outline of the current experimental work 
In the review of the literature presented in this chapter, I have outlined that verbal 
probabilities are not a strict mirror of numerical probabilities. Verbal probabilities can elicit 
subjective probabilities, but this does not necessarily imply that they are a representation of 
numerical probabilities. Even if they are a representation of numerical probabilities, because 
they are language-based, they fulfil argumentative functions (e.g., they focus one’s perspective 
on a particular aspect of a situation; e.g., Teigen & Brun, 1999) and further informative 
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functions (e.g., they support inferences regarding the source of information of the speaker; 
Juanchich, Teigen & Gourdon, 2010). Verbal probabilities are also often considered as hedging 
devices (e.g., Juanchich, Sirota & Butler, 2012), in which cases the likelihood judgements they 
elicit is different than if they are considered as informative devices. These different studies, 
taken together, seem to suggest that verbal probabilities are a pragmatic tool, in that they are 
interpreted in context (e.g., need for politeness) and signal an argumentation by their 
directionality. This thesis therefore aims to give an account of verbal probabilities that is driven 
by a pragmatic interpretation. 
In Chapter 2, I will aim to develop further the account of verbal probabilities in childhood 
(Chapter 2), in light of a pragmatic account. Drawing on Gourdon and Villejoubert’s work (2009), 
I will first investigate how English-speaking children understand verbal probabilities. The 
pragmatic account will be then tested by looking at how the intention of a speaker can interact 
with directionality of verbal probabilities (Chapter 2 and Chapter 4). That children use only 
directionality when judging the likelihood of verbal probabilities (Gourdon & Villejoubert) could 
suggest that directionality bears less cognitive demands. Therefore Chapter 3 will try to 
disentangle the respective processing demands of directionality and of likelihood in verbal 
probabilities. Finally, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will draw on the suggestion of Beyth-Marom 
(1982) to try and explain indirectly the Communication Mode Preference paradox (Erev & 
Cohen, 1990). Chapter 5 will investigate if judgements of the responsibility of forecasters are 
different when the forecaster has used a verbal or a numerical verbal probability. Chapter 6 will 
investigate if the preference for receiving numerical probabilities depends on speakers’ 
 25 
 
expertise; in a Gricean pragmatic account, an expert is expected to know more, and therefore 
should be expected to use a more precise mode to communicate probabilities. 
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CHAPTER 2: CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF VERBAL PROBABILITIES 
2.1. Introduction 
Imagine that an 8-year-old boy wants to invite a friend to go to the park with him during the 
week-end. Before inviting him he asks his parents whether it will rain. Should they answer (1) or 
(2)? 
(1) There is a 20% chance that it will rain. 
(2) There is a small chance that it will rain. 
In many countries an 8-year-old has not yet been taught about numerical probabilities 
(percentages and frequencies). However, a corpora study of French language used in primary 
school handbooks (Lété, Sprenger-Charolles & Colé, 2004) revealed that children are confronted 
with uncertainty words as early as first grade: for example, possible occurs as often as neighbour 
in first grade handbooks. What is more, according to the preference paradox (e.g., Erev & 
Cohen, 1990), adults are likely to prefer to use the verbal probability (There is a small chance) 
rather than the numerical probability to communicate uncertainty.  
Besides understanding what his parents mean by There is a small chance, the boy will also 
have to decide if he should invite his friend on the basis of this statement. Children, like adults, 
have to make decisions daily. To do so they can rely either on experience or on information 
communicated to them. Since adults are likely to communicate uncertainty to children using 
verbal probabilities (Erev & Cohen, 1990), the study of children’s decision-making activities 
would benefit from knowledge of how they understand verbal probabilities and make decisions 
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on this basis. Yet, very few studies have investigated the comprehension and use of verbal 
probabilities in childhood (exceptions are Moore, Pure & Furrow, 1990; Mullet & Rivet, 1991; 
Watson & Moritz, 2003; Gourdon & Villejoubert, 2009). Furthermore only two of those studies 
(Moore & al., 1990; Gourdon & Villejoubert, 2009) investigated decision-making. 
Moore et al. (1990) found that children as young as 5 years old are able to distinguish 
between higher and lower likelihoods of verbal probabilities to make an appropriate decision. 
For example, when choosing between a blue box that maybe contained a candy and a red box 
that probably contained one, 5- to 6-year-olds appropriately picked the ‘probable’ box. Mullet 
and Rivet (1991) found development continuing into late childhood with older children 
distinguishing the levels of likelihood carried by verbal probabilities less well than adolescents. 
More precisely, Mullet and Rivet (1991) established that 9-year-olds could distinguish clearly 
between only five positions on a probability judgement scale. In this study, 9-year-olds and 15-
year-olds were given 12 expressions of probability and judged them on a probability scale. 
While the older children could discriminated most judged expressions (that is, placed them on 
different points of the probability scale), the 9-year-olds only placed the expressions on 5 
different points of the probability scale. For example, 15-year olds placed on average nearly 
certain and small chance on different points of the scale, the younger group’ judgements of the 
two expressions overlapped. 
Watson and Moritz (2003) surveyed a sample of school children from Australian Grade 6 to 
Grade 11 (presumably 10-11- to 15-16-year-olds, although this was not mentioned by the 
researchers). They presented them with seven verbal probabilities and a percentage expression, 
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and asked them to translate them on a probability scale. The verbal probabilities were 
translated with variability, with the exception of the percentage expression and impossible. 
They also scored how precisely and appropriately students evaluated each expression. They 
found improvement between Grade 8 and 9, and between Grade 9 and 10. Their level of 
evaluation scoring method valued translations within a smaller range; for example translating 
impossible as less than 10% was scored as an advanced evaluation, but translating it only as less 
than 25% was scored as basic evaluation. The scoring method also valued answers consistent 
with the expected ranking of the verbal probabilities. Although the level of evaluation of 
students developed with age, only half of the older groups displayed Comprehensive Evaluation 
(the highest level of evaluation in their scoring system). That is only half of older students were 
showing fine translations and consistence in the ranking of the verbal probabilities. 
A few differences between these three studies are important to note. In Watson and Moritz 
(2003), the low verbal probabilities were derived from modals that are frequent in daily 
language (unlikely, impossible, in doubt). But the high verbal probabilities were informal (e.g., no 
worries), and it could even be argued that they were not exactly verbal probabilities (e.g., 
looking good). Mullet and Rivet (1991) used nine verbal probabilities, based on frequent modal 
words (e.g., likely, chances). They also used three verbal expressions of frequency (e.g., a-one-
in-four chance). Finally Moore et al. (1990) used only three different verbal probabilities 
(maybe, probably, possibly). Moreover, Moore et al. used single-worded verbal probabilities, i.e. 
non-modified modal terms only (e.g. possibly). These differences in materials might suggest that 
the different results are not incompatible. The comprehension of verbal probabilities could 
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therefore be considered as starting early with simple expressions (Moore et al.) to develop 
slowly towards distinction of more complex (Mullet and Rivet) and informal (Watson and 
Moritz) ones. Furthermore the early abilities observed by Moore et al. (1990), and later 
competence reported in Mullet and Rivet (1991) and Watson and Moritz (2003), may also result 
from the types of tasks used. The latter required children to make likelihood judgements on 
scales, whereas Moore et al. asked them to make a choice regarding a verbal probability. 
Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009) asked participants to do both: judge probabilities on scale and 
to make decisions based on verbal probabilities. 
Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009) also observed that none of these studies considered 
directionality as a factor potentially influencing the comprehension of verbal probabilities. In 
the case of Moore et al., the authors used only positive verbal probabilities. In the two other 
cases, both directionalities were used, but not investigated systematically. In fact in Watson and 
Moritz it was possibly a confounded variable as all the low verbal probabilities had a negative 
directionality while most of the high ones had a positive directionality. This is one aspect of 
children’s understanding that I will investigate in this study, expanding on Gourdon and 
Villejoubert’s work. In their study, they manipulated factorially directionality and likelihood of 
verbal probabilities. Thus, they presented children and adults with low verbal probabilities of 
positive directionality, low verbal probabilities of negative directionality, high verbal 
probabilities of positive directionality, and high verbal probabilities of negative directionality. In 
their study, French-speaking 8-year-olds behaved very similarly to adults when making 
decisions. That is they decided based both on directionality and on the likelihood: they chose to 
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open a chest more often for positive high verbal probabilities, followed by negative high verbal 
probabilities, positive low verbal probabilities, and negative low verbal probabilities. However, 
when judging the likelihood of the different verbal probabilities, they seemed to perform more 
poorly, using only directionality. Higher likelihood judgements were given to positive high verbal 
probabilities, followed by positive low verbal probabilities, negative high verbal probabilities, 
and negative low verbal probabilities. 
In Gourdon and Villejoubert’s (2009) study, the discrepancy between children’s decision-
making and translation performance could be explained by the paradigm, where the order of 
the tasks was kept fixed, with the likelihood judgement always coming first. What is more, 
children and adults were presented with the verbal probabilities twice for each judgement, first 
in a training task meant to allow calibration of their judgement, and then in the experimental 
task. This could explain the difference in performance on the two tasks. In order to understand 
how children interpret and make decisions based on verbal probabilities it is important that task 
order is controlled. 
To sum up, developmental studies had varied in the tasks presented to children. In studies 
showing younger success, children made decisions, whereas in those that older children found 
difficult they were asked to translate the verbal probabilities. Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009) 
tried to contrast these two measures, but task order was not controlled. Furthermore, Gourdon 
and Villejoubert’s findings need to be replicated in English to ensure the findings are 
generalizable. Gourdon and Villejoubert also studied only one age group. Therefore in my 
studies I expanded the age range downwards to look for developmental change. However, as 
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the focus was on the development of the sensitivity of directionality, which was already showed 
in 8-year-olds in Gourdon and Villejoubert, I did no extend the age range upwards. Finally, in 
Gourdon and Villejoubert, expressions were selected form the literature but not piloted. As a 
result, the high and the low expressions were judged differently also by adults (29% to 45% for 
low expressions, 57% to 71% for high expressions), which introduced a potential confound. In 
this chapter, piloted data will be used to avoid this. 
If Gourdon and Villejoubert’s (2009) results were not an artefact of task order or language, 
then I should observe similar performance by 8-year-olds in my study. That is, 8-year-olds 
should use directionality only when judging likelihood, but use both directionality and the 
likelihood to make decisions. To further validate this finding I also added in an expected value 
judgement. I would expect the judgements made here to follow the same pattern as for the 
decision-making measure. That is, expected value judgement would be higher for positive high 
verbal probabilities, followed by negative high verbal probabilities, positive low verbal 
probabilities, and negative low verbal probabilities. This is because the expected value 
judgement is supposed to be the product of the likelihood of an event and of its utility. In 
behavioural economics theory, utility is ‘the state of being useful, profitable, or beneficial’ 
(Oxford Online Dictionary, 2013). By taking into account the utility, the expected value 
judgement considers the consequences of a decision and it has been proposed that thinking 
about the consequences is what makes children sensitive to the likelihood (Gourdon & 
Villejoubert, 2009). 
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2.2. Experiment 1a 
2.2.1. Method 
2.2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-three 7- to 8-year-olds (mean age= 7;8; range= 7;3-8;2; 11 girls) and 24 8- to 9-year-
olds (mean age= 8;8; range= 8;4-9;2; 15 girls) participated. They were enrolled in a community 
primary school of a multiethnic and working class area of Birmingham (UK). Participants 
received a sticker in exchange for their participation. 
2.2.1.2. Materials 
I chose verbal probabilities based on a pilot study conducted with Psychology 
undergraduates of the University of Birmingham, UK (N = 38). These participants received 
course credits in exchange for their participation. They judged 33 expressions (see Appendix I, 
p. 209) according to their likelihood (answering to the question What is the probability that the 
event will happen? on an 11 point scale) and according to their plausibility (answering to the 
question How plausible is it to hear this expression? on an 11 point scale). I then chose 
expressions in order to manipulate the likelihood and directionality in a 2x2 within design, so 
that there was a similar range likelihood within each level of directionality (both positive and 
negative phrases had either low likelihood = 35-37% or high likelihood = 53-55%). The 
expressions having highest plausibility ratings were then preferred. The four expressions chosen 
to be used can be seen in Table 1. 
Four different scenarios were then built around common childhood events (see Appendix II, 
p. 210). In each of these children were given uncertain information via one of the verbal  
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Table 1 
Verbal Probabilities Used in Experiments 1a and 1b 
  low likelihood high likelihood 
positive verbal probability There are a few chances There is some possibility 
negative verbal probability It is a little unlikely It is not entirely certain 
 
probabilities, which were counterbalanced across the four scenarios. Therefore, each 
child received all four scenarios, with all four verbal probabilities, albeit not in the same  
combinations. Each verbal probability was judged on three measures: to assess the likelihood 
(When the clue says [VP], how much do you think that this means that the treasure is in the 
chest?), the expected value (How happy do you think you would be if you [uncertain choice]?) 
and decision-making (If you were him/her, what would you choose to do?). The order of these 
questions was counterbalanced between children (i.e., an individual always heard the measures 
in the same order, to avoid confusion, but the order varied between participants). 
A training task (see Appendix II, p.210 ) was built based on the treasure hunt scenario used 
by Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009). This scenario was used three times, with two anchoring 
verbal probabilities (It is absolutely sure and It is impossible) and one of medium likelihood (It is 
not certain) to learn to use the scales. The order of the questions in the training task matched 
the order in the experimental task (see Appendix III, p. 213, for an example of how the scenarios 
and questions were presented to participants). Children were not provided feedback over the 
training trials. 
 34 
 
The training and the experimental tasks were presented in a booklet. Each page of the 
booklet contained one scenario and the three tasks (likelihood judgement, expected value 
judgement and decision making; counterbalanced), amounting to seven scenarios. On the top of 
each page there was a picture illustrating the specific scenario of the page (e.g., a treasure chest 
for the training scenarios involving a treasure hunt). An example of a scenario page is provided 
in Appendix III (p. 213). 
2.2.1.3. Procedure 
Each participant took part individually, in a quiet area of the school. The scenarios booklet 
was placed between the experimenter and the participant so the participant could follow while 
the experimenter read through the scenarios. The experimenter first read participants the 
following statement: ‘Here are some stories about children of your age. After I read them to 
you, you are going to play some little games about these stories.’ Then the experimenter read 
each scenario and each question one by one to the participant, making sure that the participant 
was meanwhile following on the booklet. After each question, participants answered 
themselves, in the booklet, with a tick on a scale (likelihood and expected value judgements) or 
in a box (decision-making). When all scenarios had been read, children received a sticker as a 
reward. 
2.2.2. Results 
2.2.2.1. Likelihood judgement 
Mean likelihood judgements are presented in Figure 2. A 2x2x2 mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted with directionality (positive or negative) and likelihood (high or low) as 
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within-subject factors and age (7 or 8 years old) as a between-subject factor. A main effect of 
directionality was found: positive expressions were judged as significantly higher (M = 63.35, 
SD = 29.12) than negative ones (M = 47.53, SD = 29.43), F(1,45) = 6.87, p = .012, η2p= .13. 
No main effect of likelihood was found, F(1,45) = 1.79, p = .188. There was no effect of age 
either, F(1,45) < 1, p = .843. No reliable interaction was observed between directionality and age 
 
 
a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
 denotes a significant difference from chance level (50; one-sample t-tests with Bonferroni 
correction, α = 0.017) 
Figure 2: Mean Likelihood Judgement as a Function of Age, Directionality and Likelihood (Experiment 1a) 
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or between directionality and likelihood, F(1,45) = 2.00, p = .164 and F(1,45) = 1.03, 
p = .315 respectively. Finally there was no interaction either between directionality, likelihood 
and age, F(1,45) < 1, p = .338. 
2.2.2.2. Expected value judgement 
Mean expected value judgements are presented in Figure 3. The same 2x2x2 mixed ANOVA 
as for likelihood judgements was applied. There was no effect of directionality, but a  
 
a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
 denotes a significant difference from chance level (50; one-sample t-tests with Bonferroni 
correction, α = 0.017) 
Figure 3: Mean Expected Value Judgement as a Function of Age, Directionality and Likelihood 
(Experiment 1a) 
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trend, F(1,44) = 3.17, p = .082, η2p= .07: positive expressions elicited higher expected 
value judgements (M = 56.06, SD = 29.12) than negative ones (M = 42.11, SD = 29.43). There 
was no effect of likelihood, F(1,44) = 1.03, p = .317, or of age, F(1,44) = 2.41, p = .128. 
No reliable interaction was observed between directionality and age, between directionality 
and likelihood, and between age and likelihood, F(1,44) < 1, p = .582, F(1,44) < 1, p = .571 and 
F(1,44) < 1, p = .623 respectively. Finally there was no interaction between  
 
 
 denotes a significant difference from chance level (0.5; one-sample t-tests with 
Bonferroni correction, α = 0.017) 
Figure 4: Proportion of Risky Choices as a Function of Age, Directionality and Likelihood (Experiment 1a) 
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directionality, likelihood and age, F(1,44) < 1, p = .498. 
2.2.2.3. Decision-making 
Proportions of risky choices (i.e. choosing the uncertain proposition vs. the certain one) are 
presented in Figure 4. A 2x2x2 mixed General Estimating Equation for probit regression was 
conducted with directionality (positive or negative) and likelihood (high or low) as within-factors 
and age as between-subjects factor (7 or 8 years old).  
I found no main effect of directionality, likelihood or age, Generalized Score 2(1) < 1, 
p = .416, Generalized Score 2(1) < 1, p = .397 and Generalized Score 2(1) < 1, p = .449 
respectively. There was no interaction between directionality and likelihood, Generalized Score 
2(1) < 1, p = .400, between directionality and age, Generalized Score 2(1) = 1.34, p = .247, or 
between likelihood and age, Generalized Score 2(1) < 1, p = .632. Finally, there was no 
interaction either between directionality, likelihood and age, Generalized Score 2(1) < 1, 
p = .422. 
2.2.3. Discussion 
Children have been found to be sensitive to the likelihood of verbal probabilities from an 
early age if asked to make a decision (Moore & al., 1990). When asked to make only a likelihood 
judgement, sensitivity to likelihood was found at 8 to 9 years old (Gourdon & Villejoubert, 
2009), and developing from there (Mullet & Rivet, 1991; Watson & Moritz, 2003). In Experiment 
1a, I set out to replicate Gourdon & Villejoubert’s findings in an English-speaking sample, but 
critically, by counterbalancing the task order. I found that my English sample of 7- and 8-year-
olds was not influenced by the likelihood when making decisions, which contrasts with the 
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English-speaking sample in Moore et al. (1990) and the French-speaking sample in Gourdon and 
Villejoubert (2009). This might be explained by the fact that Moore et al. used only simple 
verbal probabilities (with only a probability word and no modifier), while I used more complex 
expressions as can be encountered in everyday language. Perhaps more importantly, I improved 
on the methodology of Gourdon and Villejoubert by counterbalancing the trials and choosing 
the expressions on piloted data. This seems to have affected performance and resulted in 
decreased success on the decision-making measure. In Gourdon and Villejoubert, decision-
making was influenced by both the likelihood and directionality, showing patterns of answers 
similar to adults’. In this experiment, decision-making was found not to be influenced by either 
directionality or likelihood. 
The 7- and 8-year-olds in this experiment also showed no effect of the likelihood when 
judging probabilities, in contrast with Mullet and Rivet (1991) and Watson and Moritz (2003). 
However they showed an effect of directionality, judging likelihood as higher for positive verbal 
probabilities, and as lower for negative verbal probabilities, regardless of their likelihood. This 
suggests that, as advanced by Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009), the results in Mullet and Rivet 
and Watson and Moritz may have resulted from a confounded variable between the likelihood 
and directionality, which was not taken into account in the previous studies. Children can 
interpret verbal probabilities from 7 years old, but they do so relying on shallow dimensions 
such as directionality, rather than relying on the likelihood. 
Like Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009) I found that children were sensitive to directionality. 
Indeed, I found no interaction with age and so conclude that this sensitivity emerges from at 
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least 7 years old. However, this sensitivity was not consistent across the three measures: 
likelihood, expected value and decision making, unlike in Gourdon and Villejoubert. Where they 
found an effect of directionality throughout all tasks (likelihood judgement, expected value 
judgement and decision making), I only found it in the likelihood judgement task, with a trend in 
the expected value task. This suggests that the order of the tasks, fixed in Gourdon and 
Villejoubert with likelihood judgement first, resulted in children being primed to rely on 
directionality and likelihood across the other measures. However, I not only controlled for the 
order of the tasks but also used a variety of scenarios to achieve a higher ecological validity. 
Thus each scenario had specific consequences, which might have introduced some variability in 
the utility of the uncertain choice. For example, the consequences of missing out on birthday 
cake are perhaps less severe than the consequences of being late at school (or the reverse may 
be true!). Therefore the utility of the risky option (risking having no cake left and risking being 
late at school) may have been different in themselves, cancelling out any effect of directionality 
and/or the likelihood.  
The clearest finding from Experiment 1a was that 7- and 8-year-olds seem to be affected by 
directionality of verbal probabilities. I investigated this further in a follow up study by modifying 
my task to make it more in line with Gourdon and Villejoubert’s original task (2009). Several 
improvements to the materials were also made: scenarios and questions were presented in the 
same way as in this first study but the verbal probabilities were highlighted by the use of a bold 
font and repeated in every question to avoid unnecessary memory load. Only one scenario was 
used, following Gourdon and Villejoubert, to avoid that different utilities affected results. 
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However, I maintained my strategy of counterbalancing the measures to make sure any effect 
on expected value judgement and decision making was not due to an order effect and/or 
training. 
Along with my attempts to reconcile my findings with those of Gourdon and Villejoubert 
(2009), in Experiment 1b I also investigated the influence of social context on children’s handling 
of verbal probability. Gourdon and Villejoubert argued that directionality should be considered 
as a pragmatic cue, indicating speakers’ intentions, and suggested introducing social factors 
such as speakers’ benevolence to test this possibility. Thus, in Experiment 1b, there were two 
speakers with different and clearly identified intentions. 
Mascaro and Sperber (2009) found that children can use the intention of a speaker as early 
as 4 years old. When informed that the speaker was lying, children reliably chose the option 
opposite to the one suggested by the speaker. Therefore in Experiment 1b, children may be 
expected to use speakers’ intentions (benevolence or malevolence) in their judgements and 
decision making. My assumption is that a positive directionality used by a benevolent speaker 
should lead to higher judgements and more risky choices, but, used by a malevolent speaker, it 
should lead to lower judgements and less risky choices. A negative directionality should lead to 
lower judgements and less risky choices if used by a benevolent speaker, but to higher 
judgements and more risky choices if used by a malevolent speaker. 
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2.3. Experiment 1b 
2.3.1. Method 
2.3.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-four 7- to 8-year-olds (mean age= 8;4; range= 7;11-8;10; 1 7- to 8-years old, but of 
unknown exact age; 12 girls) and 24 8- to 9-year-olds (mean age= 8;10; range= 8;11-9;8; 16 girls) 
took part in the experiment. They were all enrolled in a faith primary school of a multiethnic 
area of Birmingham (UK), and of diverse socio-economic backgrounds. Participants received two 
stickers in exchange for their participation. 
2.3.1.2. Materials 
The verbal probabilities were the same as in Experiment 1a (see Appendix II, p. 210). I 
manipulated the likelihood and directionality in a 2x2 within-subjects design, such that phrases 
in each directionality condition had a similar likelihood (positive and negative low 
likelihood = 35-37%; positive and negative high likelihood = 53-55%). As in Experiment 1a, the 
training phase presented participants with two anchoring verbal probabilities (It is absolutely 
sure and It is impossible) and one of medium likelihood (It is not certain). 
A single scenario was used, both in the training and the experimental phase. It involved a 
treasure hunt, introduced as followed: ‘Three friends are playing a game with lots of treasure 
chests which could contain a treasure or a trap. Each friend has first to find a clue to help him or 
her decide if the chest should be opened.’ 
As in Experiment 1a, each verbal probability was judged three times, to assess the likelihood 
judgement, the expected value judgement and the decision making. However, in order to 
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reduce the demands on memory, the verbal probability was repeated in each question and 
written in bold, as in the following examples: ‘When the clue says it is not certain that the 
treasure is in the chest, how much do you think that this means that the treasure is in the 
chest?’ (likelihood judgement); ‘As it is not certain that the treasure is in the chest, how happy 
do you think Sophie will be if she chooses to open the chest?’ (expected value judgement); ‘As it 
is not certain that the treasure is in the chest, if you were Sophie, what would you choose to 
do?’ (decision making). The order of the questions was counterbalanced between children (and 
kept constant within pairs of training and experimental phases). I also counterbalanced the 
order of the verbal probabilities. 
The four verbal probabilities were presented as uttered both by a benevolent speaker (Peter 
Pan) and by a malevolent speaker (Captain Hook). Half of the participants in each group age 
received the block with the benevolent speaker first, while the other half received the block 
with the malevolent speaker first. To make transparent the intentions of each speaker, the 
following information was given before the benevolent block: ‘We are going to play the game 
with some other children, but now, Peter Pan is giving them the clues about each chest. Peter 
Pan is trying his best to help these children.’ Before the malevolent block, participants were told 
‘[N]ow, Captain Hook is giving them the clues about each chest. Captain Hook secretly wishes he 
could keep the treasure for himself.’ 
As in Experiment 1a, all the scenarios were presented in a single booklet, with one page for 
each scenario and its subsequent tasks. Each page also presented a picture linked to the 
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scenario. That is, there was a treasure chest in all cases (the scenarios all being about a treasure 
hunt). 
2.3.1.3. Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the procedure of Experiment 1a. 
2.3.2. Results 
2.3.2.1. Likelihood judgement 
Mean likelihood judgements are presented in Figure 5. A 2x2x2x2 mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted with speaker, directionality (positive or negative) and likelihood (high 
or low) as within-factors, and age as between-factor (7-8 years old or 8-9 years old). 
There was a main effect of directionality, F(1, 46) = 17.04, p < .001, η2p = .27. Positive verbal 
probabilities were judged as meaning significantly higher (M = 61.62, SD = 18.93) than negative 
verbal probabilities (M = 47.21, SD = 21.48). There was no main effect of speaker, F(1, 46) < 1, 
p = .614, or of likelihood, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .582, or of age, F(1, 46) = 1.76, p = .191. 
There was an interaction between directionality and speaker, F(1, 46) = 6.21, p = .016, 
η2p = .12. When the speaker was benevolent (Peter Pan), positive verbal probabilities were 
judged as significantly higher (M = 64.79, SD = 23.53) than negative verbal probabilities 
(M = 42.81, SD = 24.92), t(47) = 4.53, p <.001, r = .41. But when the speaker was malevolent 
(Captain Hook), positive verbal probabilities were judged similarly (M = 58.44, SD = 21.52) to 
negative verbal probabilities (M = 51.62, SD = 27.46), t(47) = 1.52, p = .134 (Bonferroni 
correction; α = .025).  
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There was no difference between the benevolent and the malevolent speaker when 
verbal probabilities were positive, t(47) = 1.75, p = .086, or when they were negative, 
t(47) = 2.14, p = .038 (Bonferroni correction; α = .025). 
There was no interaction between directionality and age, F(1, 46) = 2.12, p = .152, between 
directionality and likelihood, F(1, 46) = 2.00, p = .164, between speaker and age, F(1, 46) < 1,  
 
 
a error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
 denotes a significant difference from chance level (50; one-sample t-tests with Bonferroni 
correction, α = 0.008) 
Figure 5: Mean Likelihood Judgement as a Function of Age, Directionality, Likelihood and Speaker’s 
Intention (Experiment 1b) 
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p = .739, between speaker and likelihood, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .441, or between likelihood and age, 
F(1, 46) = 3.20, p = .080. There was no interaction between directionality, likelihood and 
speaker, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .575, between directionality, speaker and age, F(1, 46) = 1.42, p = .240, 
between directionality, likelihood and age, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .356, and between speaker, 
likelihood and age, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .946. There was finally no interaction between speaker, 
directionality, likelihood and age, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .676. 
2.3.2.2. Expected value judgement 
Mean expected value judgements are presented in Figure 6. The same 2x2x2x2 mixed 
ANOVA as for likelihood judgements was applied. There was a main effect of directionality, 
F(1, 46) = 23.31, p < .001, η2p = .34. Positive verbal probabilities were judged as significantly 
higher in likelihood (M = 6.55, SD = 1.91) than negative verbal probabilities (M = 4.68, 
SD = 2.22). There was no effect of speaker, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .370. There was no effect of the 
likelihood, F(1, 46) = 3.28, p = .078. There was no main effect of age, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .448. 
There was an interaction between directionality and speaker, F(1, 46) = 7.09, p = .011, 
η2p = .13. When the speaker was benevolent (Peter Pan), positive verbal probabilities yielded 
higher expected values (M = 6.79, SD = 2.27) than negative verbal probabilities (M = 4.19, 
SD = 2.43), t(47) = 5.86, p < .001, r = .48. But when the speaker was malevolent (Captain Hook), 
positive verbal probabilities did not yield higher expected values (M = 6.31, SD = 2.44) to 
negative verbal probabilities (M = 5.17, SD = 2.75), t(47) = 2.21, p = .032 (Bonferroni correction; 
α = .025). For negative verbal probabilities, Peter Pan yielded lower expected value judgements 
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than Captain Hook, t(47) = 2.65, p = .011, r = .19. This was not the case for positive verbal 
probabilities, t(47) = 1.21, p = .234 (Bonferroni correction; α = .025). 
There was no interaction between directionality and age, F(1, 46) = 2.96, p = .092, between 
directionality and likelihood, F(1, 46) = 3.06, p = .087, between speaker and age, F(1, 46) < 1, 
p = .955, between speaker and likelihood, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .847, or between likelihood and age,  
 
 
a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
 denotes a significant difference from chance level (50; one-sample t-tests with Bonferroni 
correction, α = 0.008) 
Figure 6: Mean Expected Value Judgement as a Function of Age, Directionality, Likelihood and Speaker’s 
Intention (Experiment 1b) 
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F(1, 46) < 1, p = .945. There was no interaction between directionality, likelihood and speaker, 
F(1, 46) < 1, p > .999, between directionality, speaker and age, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .600, between 
directionality, likelihood and age, F(1, 46) = 1.44, p = .236, and between speaker, likelihood and 
age, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .484. There was finally no interaction between speaker, directionality, 
likelihood and age, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .841. 
2.3.2.3. Decision-making 
Proportions of risky choices (i.e. choosing to open the chest) are presented in Figure 7. A 
2x2x2x2 mixed General Estimating Equation for probit regression was conducted with 
directionality (positive or negative), likelihood (high or low) and speaker (benevolent or 
malevolent) as within-factors and age (7-8 years old or 8-9 years old) as between-factor. 
There was a main effect of directionality, Generalized Score 2(1) = 14.16, p < .001. 
Children were more likely to make a risky choice (i.e. open the chest) on hearing a positive 
verbal probability (76%) than a negative verbal probability (53%), OR = 0.39. There was also a 
main effect of age, Generalized Score 2(1) = 4.75, p = .029. The 8- to 9-year-olds decided to take 
the risky option more often (70%) than the 7- to 8–year-olds (58%), OR = 0.44. 
There was no effect of likelihood or of speaker, Generalized Score 2(1) = 1.04, p = .307 and 
Generalized Score 2(1) < 1, p = .920, respectively. There was no interaction between age and 
speaker, Generalized Score 2(1) = 1.07, p = .300, between age and directionality Generalized 
Score 2(1) < 1, p = .424, or between age and likelihood, Generalized Score 2(1) = 1.53, p = .217. 
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 denotes a significant difference from chance level (0.50; one-sample t-tests with 
Bonferroni correction, α = 0.008) 
Figure 7: Proportion of Risky Choices as a Function of Age, Directionality, Likelihood and Speaker’s 
Intention (Experiment 1b) 
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proportion of risky choices between the malevolent speaker (71%) and the benevolent speaker 
(80%), when the directionality was positive, 2(1) = 2.28, p = .131. 
There was no interaction between likelihood and speaker, Generalized Score 2(1) < 1, 
p = .448, or between likelihood and directionality, Generalized Score 2(1) = 3.18, p = .075. 
Finally, there was no interaction between age, speaker and directionality, Generalized Score 
2(1) < 1, p = .991, between age, speaker and likelihood, Generalized Score 2(1) < 1, p = .899, 
between age, directionality and likelihood, Generalized Score 2(1) = 2.29, p = .130, or between 
speaker, directionality and likelihood, and Generalized Score 2(1) < 1, p = .864. There was no 
interaction between age, speaker, directionality and likelihood, Generalized Score 2(1) < 1, 
p = .828. 
2.3.3. Discussion 
Following Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009), I tested the possibility that directionality of 
verbal probabilities had the function of pragmatic cue, indicating a speaker’s intention. Mascaro 
and Sperber (2009) found that children were able to take speakers’ intention into account. That 
is, when a malevolent speaker told them to open one box (out of two), children would chose to 
open the other box, as young as 4 years old. I therefore speculated that children’s judgements 
and decision making would reflect both directionality and speakers’ intention: a benevolent 
speaker would yield the usual higher judgements and more frequent risky choices observed 
with positive verbal probabilities; a malevolent speaker would yield the reversed pattern (higher 
judgements and more frequent risky choices observed with negative verbal probabilities). 
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Experiment 1b also attempted to account for differences between the results of Gourdon 
and Villejoubert (2009), and the results of Experiment 1a. In Gourdon and Villejoubert 8-year-
olds judged likelihood based on directionality, but made decisions based on both directionality 
and the likelihood of verbal probabilities. I suggested that this could have been an artefact of 
the fixed order used in Gourdon and Villejoubert (always likelihood judgements first), as well as 
of the training phase provided on the items used in the experimental task. Experiment 1a 
therefore counterbalanced the order of the task and provided training with different items than 
the experimental ones. There I found an effect of directionality on the likelihood judgement, 
similar to the results of Gourdon and Villejoubert. However, directionality showed only a trend 
in the expected value judgement and had no effect on decision making. It was then proposed 
that using different scenarios might have introduced a confounding factor. Therefore 
Experiment 1b aimed also at replicating Experiment 1a but controlling for the scenarios. 
The results of Experiment 1b can be summarized in two parts. First, there was a consistent 
effect of directionality. As in Experiment 1a when making likelihood judgements, positive verbal 
probabilities led to higher judgements, and negative ones to lower judgements. Consistent with 
the trend in Experiment 1a, directionality also had an effect on expected value judgements in 
Experiment 1b. Finally contrasting with Experiment 1a, the decision making task also showed an 
effect of directionality (showing a higher frequency of risky decisions with positive verbal 
probabilities than with negative ones). This effect of directionality is consistent with Gourdon 
and Villejoubert’s results (2009), and supports my suggestion that Experiment 1a failed to 
replicate this effect because it did not use scenarios with similar utility. Most importantly, I 
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replicated this effect of directionality even when counterbalancing the different measures (i.e., 
unlike Gourdon and Villejoubert). The effect of directionality appears to be consistent across 
different measures of children’s understanding of verbal probabilities. 
Second, I also consistently found an interaction of directionality with speakers’ intentions. 
When a benevolent speaker was the communicator, directionality yielded the same effect as in 
Experiment 1a where positive verbal probabilities led to higher judgements and proportions of 
risky choices than negative verbal probabilities. However, when the speaker was malevolent, 
directionality had a reduced effect in the three tasks. This is only partially in line with my 
expectations. In line with Mascaro and Sperber (2009), one might expect that speaker’s 
malevolence should lead to a reversal of the judgements and decision making. If the speaker is 
trying to frame your decision in the wrong direction, s/he needs to know the actual answer. 
Therefore this speaker’s statement can be used to infer the correct answer. However in this 
experiment, children acted as if the malevolent speaker was incompetent or unreliable, showing 
no preference for either directionality, as they would if choosing at random. 
I also found a number of trends in Experiment 1b suggesting an emergence of understanding 
of the likelihood in verbal probabilities. Older children (8 to 9 years old) tended to be more 
correct in their likelihood judgements, reflecting the likelihood of the expressions. In judging 
expected values and making decisions, older children tended to integrate the likelihood with 
directionality; they also showed sensitivity to the likelihood alone when judging the expected 
value. This is consistent with Gourdon and Villejoubert’s results (2009), and supports the 
possibility that using different scenarios in Experiment 1a may have introduced a confound 
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variable and may explain why I failed to replicate Gourdon and Villejoubert there. Finally the 
effect of directionality was moderated by age in the expected value task, with only the older 
children displaying it.  
2.4. General discussion 
Scarce empirical research in children’s understanding of verbal probabilities has proved 
difficult to integrate as studies have used either decision tasks and simple expressions (Moore & 
al., 1990) or likelihood judgement tasks and more complex expressions (Mullet & Rivet, 1991; 
Watson & Moritz, 2003). More critically most of those previous studies had not taken into 
account directionality of verbal probabilities. Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009) did, but their 
paradigm did not test the verbal probabilities in a pilot, did not control for order effects and 
might have provided too much training. After Gourdon and Villejoubert, in Experiments 1a and 
1b I used both likelihood judgement tasks and decision making tasks. As in their paper, I also 
systematically considered both directionality and the likelihood of verbal probabilities. In line 
with Gourdon and Villejoubert, I found that likelihood judgements and expected value 
judgements displayed only an effect of directionality. Interpreting directionality of verbal 
probabilities appears to be easier for children than interpreting likelihood, suggesting that its 
interpretation requires less cognitive resources. In contrast with Gourdon and Villejoubert 
however, I also found that children’s decision making showed only an effect of directionality, 
not of likelihood. 
That I found only an effect of directionality on likelihood judgements, expected value 
judgements and decision-making can be related to the counterbalancing of the task order in 
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both my experiments. It suggests that the fixed order of the tasks in Gourdon and Villejoubert 
could explain why they found an effect of likelihood on decision making. But it also suggests 
that the early sensitivity to directionality was not an order artefact. It is noteworthy that this 
effect was found in French-speaking children in Gourdon and Villejoubert and in English-
speaking children in my experiments. 
Secondly, I drew on Mascaro and Sperber’s work (2009), suggesting that information 
delivered by malevolent speakers is considered cautiously and used by young children to draw 
inferences about the state of the world. In particular, I sought to bring support to my 
assumption that directionality has a pragmatic function, in that it communicates the intention of 
a speaker. I only found partial support for this assumption: children’s use of directionality 
changed according to the intention of the speaker, but not in the strictly reversed manner I 
expected. Instead, children seemed to neglect directionality when the speaker was malevolent, 
contrasting with Mascaro and Sperber’s results. However in Mascaro and Sperber the task was 
potentially less cognitively demanding as it was displayed through the use of puppets and actual 
boxes. In my tasks, characters and possibilities were imagined. The language was also more 
elaborate in my task, due to the use of verbal probabilities. This added a dimension of 
uncertainty that was not present in Mascaro and Sperber’s task. It is therefore possible that the 
children only failed to use directionality when the speaker was malevolent because this would 
need more resources. 
Further research should be conducted in an adult population with a similar paradigm. In a 
pragmatic account of verbal probabilities, directionality has been suggested to serve a function 
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of signalling to listeners about what the speaker knows or wished. In this interpretation, a 
malevolent speaker would instead use directionality to cue the listener towards the incorrect 
answer (that he wants you to pick). For this the speaker needs to know what the correct answer 
is. Therefore, one could consider the chosen directionality in light of their knowledge of the 
speaker’s intention to find out the correct answer. But if directionality is not considered as a 
usual cue of the correct answer, it cannot be used either as a reversed cue of the correct 
answer. Then the only choice is to decide randomly. Therefore, if my assumption regarding the 
pragmatic function of directionality is correct, adults should demonstrate a full reversal of their 
use of directionality, with a preference for the negative directionality when the speaker is 
malevolent.  
The two experiments I conducted here explored the understanding of verbal probabilities in 
7- to 9-year-olds. I found some trends of use of the likelihood, as if children were developing 
their ability to use it. But it is clear that the age range of my studies is too limited to draw a 
developmental picture. Further research should aim to investigate more fully the development 
of the understanding of verbal probabilities, both at an earlier and at an older age. In the former 
case, it would aim to identify when children start using directionality, and in the latter one, to 
identify when the likelihood is reliably used in judgements and decision making. 
I suggested that directionality is a shallow dimension of verbal probabilities, relying on fewer 
cognitive resources. Further research should specifically target the cognitive demands of the 
two dimensions of verbal probabilities, for example by measuring response time. If 
directionality was found to require fewer cognitive resources (e.g., as shown by shorter 
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response times to decide only on the basis of directionality), it could explain why children first 
base their judgements and decisions only on directionality (e.g., Gourdon and Villejoubert, 
2009). Furthermore, less cognitive demands from directionality could also explain why adults 
show a consistent preference for positive verbal probabilities (e.g., Teigen and Brun, 1999). As 
many decisions are made under time pressure, or at least under the impression of time 
pressure, adults might chose the option that requires the less cognitive resources in order to 
decide faster. This would also extend Windschitl and Wells’ (1996) work, who showed that 
verbal probabilities elicit Type 1 reasoning (fast, heuristic-based, cognitively less demanding), 
while numerical probabilities elicit Type 2 reasoning (slow, rule-based, demanding on cognitive 
resources). In fact, it could be that verbal probabilities elicit Type 1 reasoning only when 
cognitive resources are scarce (e.g., under time pressure). 
Those results have implications for mathematics education. For example in the current 
British curriculum, teenagers are introduced to a few verbal probabilities and instructed what is 
each expression’s likelihood equivalent (through a life example, e.g., a 50% chance is the chance 
to get a head if one flips a coin). However the curriculum uses negative verbal probabilities for 
low likelihood and positive ones for high likelihood (BBC, 2012; see Appendix IV, p. 214). Given 
that children already show a preference for the positive directionality, such a choice of verbal 
probabilities entails the risk of reinforcing the association between positive/negative 
directionality and high/low likelihood (respectively). This may further reinforce the preference 
displayed both by children and by adults for positive directionality, exposing them more to 
framing. 
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In this chapter I showed that 7- to 9-year-old children consistently display a use of 
directionality in verbal probabilities, but did not consistently use the likelihood. I accounted for 
these results in terms of cognitive demands, assuming that directionality imposes less of such 
demands. Further I showed that directionality is used by children only when the speaker is 
deemed benevolent. This partially supported that directionality fulfils a pragmatic function in 
verbal probabilities, where it communicates speakers’ intention. 
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CHAPTER 3: OVERCOMING THE FRAMING EFFECT WHEN MAKING DECISIONS 
BASED ON VERBAL PROBABILITIES: HAVING MORE TIME IS HELPFUL BUT NOT 
ENOUGH. 
3.1. Introduction 
Everyone who has taken a plane knows what to do if there is a water landing. They also 
know that this event has a low chance of happening. The safety announcements regarding this 
special case are very often introduced as follows: ‘In the unlikely event of (…)’. This choice of 
phrasing is surprising, though, if you consider that unlikely is generally considered to mean 
between a 10% and 30% chance of occurrence (e.g., Budescu, Karelitz, & Wallsten, 2003). One 
may wonder why air companies choose to mislead passengers by overestimating the actual risk. 
In fact, using negative probability words such as unlikely allows speakers to do two things: first 
they communicate about the chance, in this case very low, that the plane lands on water; 
second, and maybe more importantly, they drive people’s attention to the non-occurrence of 
this event (Teigen, 1988; Teigen & Brun, 1995). Air companies can therefore hope not to make 
the possibility of a water landing too salient. This attention-driving property is referred to as 
directionality. Directionality, i.e. the positive or negative quality of a probability word or a 
quantifier, leads to framing effects in judgement and decision making. For example A few people 
survived (positive quantifier) is judged as better than Few people survived (negative quantifier; 
Sanford, Fay, Stewart, & Moxey, 2002). In this paper I investigated this framing effect in the case 
of verbal probabilities (e.g., There is a chance, It is unlikely): specifically I set out to identify the 
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relative processing costs of the different dimensions of verbal probabilities and to explore the 
conditions that can help to reduce the framing effect resulting from directionality.  
Verbal probabilities are typically composed of a modal adjective (e.g., likely, uncertain) or a 
probability noun (e.g., chances), to which a modifier (e.g., quite, a few) can be added. Therefore 
speakers can choose among a large number of combinations (e.g., There are a few chances, It is 
slightly unlikely) when they need to communicate uncertainty. To investigate the quantitative 
meaning carried by verbal probabilities, Lichtenstein and Newman (1967) asked participants to 
translate 41 expressions into probabilities (from 0 to 1). Mean translations ranged from .06 to 
.89, covering most of the probabilistic range. It is noteworthy that for some expressions the 
spread of individual participants’ responses also covered the range of probabilities: for example 
participants estimated possible to convey a likelihood between .01 and .99. After Lichtenstein 
and Newman’s paper, studies on verbal probabilities focused primarily on the likelihood people 
attribute to such expressions (e.g., Reyna, 1981; Dhami & Wallsten, 2005). A pattern emerged 
from those translation studies. On the one hand, verbal probabilities are translated in a stable 
way across studies. Unlikely, for example, has a mean translation between 10 and 20%. On the 
other hand, every study found interindividual variability. That is, verbal probabilities are 
characterised by such vagueness that when speakers use them to communicate risk, they 
cannot be sure that listeners understand it in the same way as themselves.  
Teigen (1988) suggested that verbal probabilities express more than just a simple likelihood. 
In particular, he found that different directionalities led to different judgements of ‘wrongness’: 
if it turned out that the uncertain event occurred, a statement using a verbal probability with 
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negative directionality (i.e., a negative verbal probability) was deemed less appropriate than 
one using a verbal probability with positive directionality (i.e., a positive verbal probability); 
conversely, if the uncertain event did not occur, a statement using a positive verbal probability 
was judged less appropriate than one using a negative verbal probability. Directionality focuses 
a listener’s attention on the occurrence of the event in question (when the verbal probability is 
positive, e.g., It is likely that I will come tonight), or on its non-occurrence (when it is negative, 
e.g., It is not entirely certain that I will come tonight). This orientation of attentional focus was 
observed in a continuation task (Teigen & Brun, 1995). Participants completed sentences about 
uncertain events described by a verbal probability. When the verbal probability was positive 
(e.g., It is likely that Adam will pass his exam), participants tended to complete the sentence 
with a reason supporting the occurrence of the uncertain event (i.e. a pro reason; e.g. because 
he worked hard for it). When the verbal probability was negative (e.g., It is not certain that 
Adam will pass his exam), they chose more often a reason in line with the non-occurrence of the 
event (i.e. a con reason; e.g. because he skipped a lot of classes). Directionality has also been 
shown to frame decision-making. Teigen and Brun (1999) observed that intentions to use a drug 
were higher if its chances of efficiency were given by a positive verbal probability than if they 
were given by a negative one despite another group of participants translating the two verbal 
probabilities as having similar likelihood. 
According to Budescu et al. (2003), people prefer options given by positive verbal 
probabilities because they are interpreted as conveying high likelihoods whereas negative ones 
convey low likelihoods (indifferently for positive and negative events). Thus, they claimed that 
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the preference for positive verbal probabilities merely reflects a preference for higher 
probabilities. However, Teigen and Brun (1999) suggested that through directionality, verbal 
probabilities deliver ‘a consistent message, with clear implications for inferential judgments’ 
(p. 185). The implication in the example of the drug choice is that the speaker wants the listener 
to choose the one described by a positive verbal probability and that is why s/he drives the 
listener’s attention to the drug’s efficiency. Therefore the incongruence between judgements of 
likelihood and the influence of directionality on decision making can be resolved if listeners infer 
speakers’ intention, i.e. I implicate pragmatics: the aspects of meaning that depend on the 
speaker, the addressee and/or the context and could not be reached based on semantics only. 
There are two central principles to pragmatics (see e.g., Wilson & Sperber, 2004). First, by the 
act of communicating a speaker implies to the listener that what is said is relevant (and 
therefore worth processing). In the case of verbal probabilities, including information about 
directionality should be seen as a relevant clue to build inferences on. Second, the listener 
should ‘[f]ollow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the utterance (and in 
particular in resolving ambiguities…)’ (Sperber & Noveck, 2004, p.6-7). Therefore the framing 
effect of directionality may result from the related performance costs. It might be that 
directionality influences our decisions because it requires no more, and perhaps fewer, 
cognitive resources than interpreting the likelihood of verbal probabilities. 
Studies investigating how children judge verbal probabilities support the idea that 
directionality is less costly to process than the likelihood. Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009) and 
myself in Chapter 2 observed that when 8-year-olds judged the likelihood of an outcome 
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described by a verbal probability they used only directionality, ignoring the likelihood: children 
judged positive verbal probabilities as expressing a higher chance than negative ones, regardless 
of the likelihood these expressions represented. Processing directionality appears to be easier 
than interpreting likelihood for children, and a similar pattern may persist in adulthood.  
In the two studies I report here, participants made a choice between two verbal 
probabilities. In previous studies (e.g. Teigen & Brun, 1999), participants were presented with 
either a positive or a negative verbal probability, in a between-subjects design, and asked if they 
would recommend that the character in a medical scenario takes a drug. There are plenty of 
daily situations when a single uncertain event is described to you by a verbal probability, based 
on which you then decide to take the chance or not. But there are also many situations when 
two uncertain possibilities are offered, both described by a verbal probability. For example, one 
could be presented with two different choices of medical treatment, and informed of each 
treatment’s likelihood of success. Giving participants two verbal probabilities might reduce 
framing effects. The comparison may allow listeners to identify when two verbal probabilities 
actually have the same likelihood. They may also identify when a negative verbal probability 
actually expresses a higher likelihood than a positive one, resulting in less frequent framing 
effects due to directionality. 
Furthermore, giving participants two verbal probabilities in my studies meant I could create 
conditions where decisions needed to be based only on directionality or only on the likelihood, 
to identify their respective processing costs (through measure of response time). In the task 
participants saw two treasure chests, each of which was described as perhaps containing gold 
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coins, using a verbal probability. Verbal probabilities could differ in directionality 
(positive/negative) and likelihood (high/low). Participants had to decide on a single chest to 
open. When the likelihood of the two descriptions was similar and directionality was the only 
thing that differed, I expected participants to choose the positive verbal probability more often, 
as people prefer options given with positive verbal probabilities (Teigen & Brun, 1999). 
Moreover, if directionality needs fewer cognitive resources to be processed than likelihood, 
I speculated that participants may rely on it inappropriately. Thus, they may choose the positive 
verbal probability even if directionality contradicts the likelihood (e.g., positive verbal 
probability conveying a low likelihood). People prefer to use positive verbal probabilities for 
high likelihoods and negative ones for low likelihoods (Budescu et al., 2003). Thus, they may 
also choose the positive verbal probability over the negative to a greater extent when both have 
a high likelihood. Regarding response time, I expected that making decisions between two 
uncertain events predicted by verbal probabilities might be quicker when directionality is the 
only thing to rely on (i.e. when the likelihood is equivalent), than when the likelihood is the only 
thing to base their decisions on (i.e. when directionality is the same).  
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3.2. Experiment 2a 
3.2.1. Method 
3.2.1.1. Participants 
Nineteen Psychology students from a UK high school (mean age = 17 years and 4 months 
(17;4); range = 17;0 - 17;10; 15 females) took part in the experiment as part of their psychology 
curriculum. 
3.2.1.2. Materials 
Four categories of verbal probabilities combining directionality and likelihood were used: 
high likelihood conveyed with a positive directionality; low likelihood conveyed with a positive 
directionality; high likelihood conveyed with a negative directionality; low likelihood conveyed 
with a negative directionality (see the 12 expressions in Table 2).  
Directionality of each verbal probability was established as either positive or negative 
primarily based on previous research by Teigen and Brun (1995), Budescu et al. (2003), and 
Honda and Yamagishi (2009). Directionality of nine verbal probabilities that were not used in 
previous studies was determined by directionality of their modal word (e.g., unlikely), combined 
with the presence or absence of a negative modifier(s), or of a negation. For example, few 
chances was categorized as negative based on the negative directionality of few (Sanford et al., 
2002), which modified the directionality of chance (positive; Teigen & Brun, 2003). Or the 
directionality of not absolutely certain was determined as negative, because of the addition of 
the negation not to an otherwise positive phrase (Teigen & Brun, 1995). The likelihood of the 
verbal probabilities was categorized either as high or low also based on data collected as a pilot 
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for Experiment 1a. High verbal probabilities all translated above 50% and low ones all translated 
below 25%. Of course, as one would expect, when directionality and likelihood were both 
considered, these combined to affect likelihood judgements (e.g., positive high verbal 
probabilities were judged as expressing a higher likelihood than negative high verbal 
probabilities). This is consistent with research by Teigen and Brun (1999), who found verbal 
probabilities were judged as expressing equivalent likelihood in a pilot study, but used 
differently in the context of giving advice. It is this effect that I sought to disentangle here by 
looking at the processing costs.  
Pairing each of the four categories with each other I constituted six comparison conditions. 
In the positive condition (positive expressions with high likelihood vs. positive expressions with 
low likelihood) and the negative one (negative expressions with high likelihood vs. negative 
expressions with low likelihood), directionality was controlled and a decision could be made 
only according to the likelihood. In the high condition (positive expressions with high likelihood 
vs. negative expressions with high likelihood) and the low one (positive expressions with low 
likelihood vs. negative expressions with low likelihood), the likelihood was controlled and a 
decision could be made only according to directionality. In the congruent and the incongruent 
condition, both dimensions were different, reinforcing each other (congruent condition: positive 
expressions with high likelihood vs. negative expressions with low likelihood) or contradicting 
each other (incongruent condition: negative expressions with high likelihood vs. positive 
expressions with low likelihood).  
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Nine pairs were created within each comparison condition. Pairs were presented with 
pictures of two identical treasure chests. The outcome the verbal probabilities referred to was 
kept constant (i.e. there are some coins in the chest). 
3.2.1.3. Procedure 
Each participant took part individually in a quiet room. The task was implemented on a 
computer via E-Prime and ran across two blocks of trials (A and B). In Block A, all the possible 
pairs of verbal probabilities were presented in one order (e.g., almost certain on the left and not 
guaranteed on the right). In Block B, the order within the pairs was reversed to avoid any 
unexpected effect of the side of presentation (e.g., almost certain on the right and not 
guaranteed on the left). Half the participants started with Block A followed by Block B, the other 
half starting with Block B followed by Block A. Furthermore the two blocks were presented a 
second time, in the same order, so that participants took part in four blocks of trials (A-B-A-B or 
B-A-B-A).  
The following instructions were given to the participants: 
‘You are going to be presented pairs of treasure chests. In each pair only one chest 
contains some gold coins. Plus opening the empty one would make you lose the entire 
game. To help you deciding which chest you should open, some hints will be given. 
Sometimes the two hints will seem very similar to you but they are actually always different 
within each pair. For each pair you will have to say if you want to open the left chest or the 
right one. You will have 5 seconds by pair to make this decision.’  
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Each trial was introduced by a fixation cross and lasted for a maximum of 5 seconds. 
Although the participants were instructed that losing a single trial would make them loose the 
entire game, they did not receive feedback after each trial. This would have created a learning 
effect which was not the focus of this experiment, and would also have entailed the risk of 
demotivating participants before the end of the experiment. A training block was first 
administered to familiarize participants with the time limit: eight pairs of verbal probabilities 
were presented to participants twice each, once in one order and once in the reversed order; 
those pairs were different from the experimental ones (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
Verbal Probabilities Used in Experiments 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b 
  low likelihood high likelihood 
ex
p
er
im
en
ta
l i
te
m
s 
positive verbal probabilities 
There is a small possibility 
There are a few chances 
There is a very poor chance 
It is very possible 
It is almost certain 
It is very likely 
negative verbal probabilities 
It is almost impossible 
There are few chances 
It is very unlikely 
It is not absolutely certain 
It is not guaranteed 
It is a little unlikely 
tr
ai
n
in
g 
it
e
m
s 
positive verbal probabilities There is a poor chance 
It is not doubtful 
It is quite likely 
It is probable 
It is rather certain 
negative verbal probabilities It is quite unlikely 
It is a little doubtful 
It is not definite 
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Following the training block, participants completed the four blocks of experimental trials. I 
recorded which box the participant chose to open on each trial. I also recorded the time elapsed 
between the presentation of the stimuli and the response. 
3.2.2. Results 
Each individual verbal probability was included in nine different pairs, and each pair of 
phrases was compared four times in each experiment (in each of two blocks which were 
presented twice). Thus participants were presented with each verbal probability 36 times. The 
phrases I used differed in how familiar they might be to my participants and also in their 
absolute length. I reasoned that if either of these features were driving any experimental effects 
they should reduce over time as all the items became more familiar within the context of the 
experiment. Therefore I conducted my analyses twice, the second time including the 
experimental order (first or second half of the trials, each half including Block A and Block B, 
therefore two presentations of each phrase) as additional factor.  
3.2.2.1. Accuracy 
Accuracy was defined as choosing the chest with the higher likelihood of containing gold 
coins. In order to test if the accuracy of choice was affected by directionality, I compared the 
performance between the incongruent and congruent conditions, as well as between the 
positive and negative conditions. For each trial, participants received a score of 0 (incorrect) or 1 
(correct) for their choice. Those scores were averaged so that in each condition, each 
participant could have an accuracy score between 0 and 1. Mean proportions of accurate 
answers are shown in Figure 8. 
 69 
 
  a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
Figure 8: Mean Proportion of Accurate Answers as Function of the Comparison Condition and the Time 
Condition (Experiment 2b) 
 
ran a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the comparison condition 
(incongruent, negative, positive or congruent) as within-participant factor. There was a main 
effect of comparison condition both for subjects, F1(3,54) = 148.70, p < .001, η
2
p = .89 (lower 
bound adjustment), and for items, F2(3,31) = 9.46, p < .001, η
2
p = .48. Accuracy was greatest in 
the congruent condition, followed by positive, negative and then incongruent. I investigated 
statistical differences between the conditions in post hoc tests. 
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Planned repeated contrasts were applied with a Bonferroni correction (for 3 tests, α = .017), 
comparing each pair of means that were closest in accuracy. Accuracy in the incongruent 
condition (M = 0.46, SD = 0.14) was significantly lower than in the negative condition (M = 0.61, 
SD = 0.12), F1(1,18) = 29.82, p < .001, η
2
p = .62. Accuracy in the negative condition was 
significantly lower than in the positive condition (M = 0.88, SD = 0.11), F1(1,18) = 138.36, 
p < .001, η2p = .89. Accuracy in the positive condition was significantly lower than in the 
congruent condition (M = 0.92, SD = 0.09), F1(1,18) = 7.16, p = .015, η
2
p = .29. 
A second analysis was conducted taking into account the experimental order. The main 
effect of comparison condition remained for subjects and for items (lowest F = 9.46, highest 
p < .001). There was no effect of the experimental order, for subjects or items, and there was no 
interaction between the comparison condition and the experimental order, for subjects or for 
items (highest F = 1.70, lowest p = .178). There was no suggestion that increasing familiarity 
with items over the course of the experiment affected the results.  
3.2.2.2. Directionality 
To check if participants preferred the option described by the positive verbal probability 
when there was no correct answer (low and high conditions), I compared the choices made 
under those conditions to chance level. For each trial participants received a score of 0 
(negative expression) or 1 (positive expression) for their choices. Those scores were averaged so 
that for each condition where directionality was a relevant measure, each participant had a 
score between 0 and 1, representing the proportion of trials where they chose the positive 
expression. Therefore chance level was set as 0.5. One-sample t-tests indicated that participants 
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chose the outcome described by a positive verbal probability significantly more often than 
chance: in the low condition (M = 0.64, SD = 0.12), t(18) = 4.81, p < .001, r = .50; in the high 
condition (M = 0.91, SD = 0.12), t(18) = 14.81, p < .001, r = .86. However one-sample t-tests run 
for items found this preference for the outcome described by a positive verbal probability only 
in the high condition, t(10) = 50.16, p < .001, r < .99. In the low condition, there was no such 
difference, t(5) = 1.10, p = .320. 
I also ran a paired samples t-test which indicated that when there was no correct answer, 
the extent of the preference for the positive probability differed according to the comparison 
condition: participants chose the outcome described by a positive verbal probability significantly 
more often under the high condition than under the low condition, t(18) = 8.343, p < .001, 
r = .75. The equivalent analysis by items found, however, no difference between the low and the 
high condition in the preference for the outcome described by a positive verbal probability, 
t(5.041) = 2.12, p = .087 (equal variances not assumed). 
I also ran a 2x2 ANOVA analysis to check there was no effect of the order in which the items 
were presented, with comparison condition and experimental order as factors. I found a main 
effect of comparison condition both for subjects, F1(1,18) = 66.79, p < .001, η
2
p = .79, and for 
items, F2(1,15) = 8.61, p = .010, η
2
p = .37. There was no effect of experimental order for subjects 
or for items, and there was no interaction between comparison condition and experimental 
order for subjects or for items (all F < 1, lowest p = .782). 
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3.2.2.3. Response time 
I compared response times under each condition to check if participants were quicker when 
it was possible to answer using only directionality (low, high, congruent and incongruent 
conditions) than when there was no difference in directionality and a choice could be based 
only the likelihood had to be considered (positive and negative conditions). The medians of each 
participant’s response time in each condition were used instead of their means, in order to deal 
with outliers without losing data points. This method does not affect the α level more than any 
other method used for cleaning outliers (Ratcliff, 1993). Means of median response times in 
each comparison condition are presented in Figure 9. I ran a repeated-measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with the comparison condition (incongruent, low, negative, high, positive or 
congruent) as within-participant factor. An effect of comparison condition on the response time 
was confirmed, for both subjects, F1(5,90) = 16.11, p < .001, η
2
p = .47, and items, F2(5,46) = 8.84, 
p < .001, η2p = .49. 
Planned repeated contrasts (order of conditions: incongruent, negative, low, positive, high, 
congruent) comparing adjacent response times (with a Bonferroni correction for 5 tests, α = .01) 
found a marginally significant difference between the negative and high conditions, 
F1(1,18) = 6.51, p = .02, η
2
p = .27. Therefore I ran post-hoc special contrasts to compare each of 
the incongruent, low and negative conditions to each of the high, positive and congruent 
conditions. Those contrasts indicated that under the low condition, the response time was 
conditions. Those contrasts indicated that under the low condition, the response time was 
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a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
Figure 9: Mean  Response Time in the Comparison Conditions (Experiment 2a) 
 
significantly longer than the high, the positive and the congruent conditions (see Table 3 for F 
and p values). Under the incongruent and the negative conditions, the response time was 
significantly longer than the positive and the congruent conditions, but not than the high 
condition. 
The same analysis was conducted taking into account the experimental order. The main 
effect of comparison condition remained identical for subjects and for items (lowest F = 8.84, 
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highest p < .001 ). There was also a main effect of experimental order both for subjects, 
F1(1,18) =42.14, p < .001, η
2
p = .70, and for items, F2(1,46) = 114.88, p < .001, η
2
p = .71. As may 
be expected, participants answered faster in the second half than in the first one. However, 
there was no interaction between comparison condition and experimental order, for subjects or 
for items (all F < 1, lowest p = .584). 
Finally, I also ran additional analyses using only response times from successful trials (i.e. 
trials in which participants chose the chest with the highest likelihood of containing the coins) in 
the positive, negative, incongruent and congruent conditions. (There was not a correct answer 
in the high and low conditions.) I again found a similar main effect of the comparison condition, 
F1(3,54) = 12.6, p < .001, η
2
p = .41. 
 
Table 3 
Post-Hoc Special Contrasts on the Response Time (Experiment 2a) 
compared conditions F values p values η2p 
low vs. high 24.5  < .001a .58 
low vs. positive 37.69  < .001a .68 
low vs. congruent 59.02  < .001a .77 
incongruent vs. high 9.82 .0057 .35 
incongruent vs. positive 19.79  < .001a .52 
incongruent vs. congruent 31.51  < .001a .64 
negative vs. high 6.51 .02 .27 
negative vs. positive 23.12 < .001a .56 
negative vs. congruent 19.73 < .001a .52 
a
 significant after Bonferroni correction (for 9 tests, α = .0056)  
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3.2.3. Discussion 
As expected, when the verbal probabilities differed in directionality, participants were 
influenced by directionality. When verbal probabilities were incongruent, this led them to 
choose the chest with the lower likelihood (described by a positive directionality) to contain 
gold coins half of the time, whereas when the verbal probabilities were congruent, they chose 
the correct answer (the chest with the highest probability) most of the time. In the low and high 
conditions, in which there was no correct answer, relying on directionality led participants to 
choose the chest described by a positive verbal probability more often than chance (even if to a 
lesser extent in the low condition). On the other hand, response time showed a different 
pattern from my hypothesis. I expected participants to need more time in both the negative and 
positive conditions (as participants needed to use the likelihood to make a decision). In fact, the 
negative, incongruent and low conditions all needed more time than the high, positive and 
congruent conditions.  
The unexpected longer response time in the low condition could result from the task 
constraints. According to the instructions there was always one chest containing the gold coins 
and therefore the two verbal probabilities should have added up to approximately 1. But in the 
low condition their sum was always much less than 1. Thus, the longer response time could 
reflect participants being sensitive to violations of probability laws. However, the same violation 
occurred in the high conditions (where the two verbal probabilities would sum to be greater 
than 1) and nevertheless participants did not take longer to respond. Sensitivity to violations of 
probability laws is unlikely to explain the longer response time in the low condition. 
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Instead, I suggest that the longer response time observed in the incongruent and low 
conditions indicates some sensitivity to inconsistency. In the incongruent condition, the 
likelihood was contradicted by directionality. In the low condition, the likelihood was 
inconsistent with the task goal (find some treasure). To detect those two types of inconsistency, 
participants needed to consider both the likelihood and directionality. Therefore, even when 
directionality differs and could be used as heuristic to make a decision, people take both 
dimensions into account. This suggests that the framing effect of directionality cannot be 
explained by people considering only directionality solely because of its ease of processing. 
As in previous studies, participants showed a preference for positive phrases both in the low 
and the high conditions (although to a lesser extent in the low condition). However, unlike 
previous studies, my participants had two verbal probabilities to compare. The preference for 
positive verbal probabilities shown in previous studies (e.g., Teigen & Brun, 1999) therefore 
cannot be explained by the fact that participants heard only one verbal probability and could 
not realize its likelihood was similar to another one. Instead the framing effect seems to be a 
strong property of directionality.  
In Experiment 2a, participants had a limited time (5 seconds) to make their decisions. In the 
second experiment I investigated whether giving people unlimited time to make their decisions 
affected the framing effect of directionality. I expected that giving more time to participants 
would allow them to overcome their preference for positive phrases. I also expected that in the 
incongruent condition, where the accuracy was poor, performance would improve. 
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3.3. Experiment 2b 
3.3.1. Method 
3.3.1.1. Participants 
Twenty Psychology students (mean age= 19.20; range= 18-26; 19 women) at university of 
Birmingham (UK) took part in this experiment in exchange for course credit. 
3.3.1.2. Materials 
The materials were the same as in Experiment 2a. 
3.3.1.3. Procedure 
Each participant was tested individually. The task was the same as in Experiment 2a except 
that participants made decisions under two time conditions: in the limited-time condition, each 
trial lasted 5 seconds; in the unlimited-time condition, participants could take all the time they 
needed. As in Experiment 2a, every participant first completed a training block (see Table 2). 
The training block was completed under the time condition the participant would be presented 
with first (half the participants did the limited-time condition for the first two blocks and the 
other half did the unlimited-time one for the first two blocks). 
In the limited-time condition, participants received the same instructions as in Experiment 
2a. In the unlimited-time condition, instead of ‘You will have 5 seconds by pair to make this 
decision.’, the instructions read ‘You can take all the time you need to make this decision.’  
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3.3.2. Results 
As in Experiment 2a, I conducted secondary analyses, adding in an experimental order factor 
(first half of trials vs. second half of trials) to confirm whether familiarity or length of phrases in 
the pairs influenced performance. These are reported after the main analyses. 
3.3.2.1. Accuracy 
In order to test if participants were more accurate when they had more time to make a 
decision, I compared the performance on the four conditions where a correct answer existed 
(positive, negative, incongruent and congruent conditions), under the two time conditions. As in 
Experiment 2a, the accuracy score could range from 0 to 1. Mean proportions of accurate 
answers according to the comparison condition (when accuracy is a relevant measure) and the 
time condition are presented in Figure 10. 
A 4 (comparison condition: incongruent, negative, positive or congruent) by 2 (time 
condition: limited or unlimited) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a 
main effect of comparison condition on accuracy both for subjects, F1(1,19) = 95.6, p < .001, 
η2p = .83 (lower bound adjustment), and items, F2(3,32) = 11.74, p < .001, η
2
p = .52. Planned 
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a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
Figure 10: Mean Proportion of Accurate Answers as Function of the Comparison Condition and the Time 
Condition (Experiment 2b) 
 
repeated contrasts indicated that accuracy in the incongruent condition was significantly lower 
than in the negative condition, F1(1,19) = 59.87, p < .001, η
2
p = .76. Accuracy in the incongruent 
condition was significantly lower than in the negative condition, F1(1,19) = 59.87, p < .001, 
η2p = .76. Accuracy in the negative condition was significantly lower than in the positive 
condition, F1(1,19) = 50.42, p < .001, η
2
p = .73. Accuracy in the positive condition was 
significantly lower than in the congruent condition, F1(1,19) = 41.92, p < .001, η
2
p = .69. 
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The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of time condition: accuracy was significantly lower 
under limited time than under unlimited time both for subjects, F1(1,19) = 6.72, p = .018, 
2p = .26, and for items, F2(1,32) = 13.72, p = .001, η
2
p = .30. There was no interaction between 
comparison condition and time condition both for subjects, F1(3,57) < 1, p = .790, and for items, 
F2(3,32) < 1, p = .746. 
A second analysis was conducted taking into account the experimental order. The main 
effects of comparison condition and of time condition remained the same for subjects and for 
items (lowest F = 6.72, highest p = .018). As in the previous analysis, there was no interaction 
between comparison condition and time condition (highest F < 1, lowest p = .746). There was no 
effect of experimental order for subjects, F1(1,19) < 1, p = .508, but there was one for items, 
F2(1,32) = 9.43, p = .004, η
2
p = .23. Across all conditions, participants were more accurate in the 
second half than in the first half, as would be expected with practice. 
There was an interaction between time condition and experimental order for subjects, 
F1(1,19) = 4.46, p = .048, η
2
p = .19, but not for items, F2(1,32) < 1, p = .337. Across all comparison 
conditions, participants were more accurate under unlimited time than under limited time only 
in the first half, t(19) = 3.38, p = .003, r = .26. By the second half, there was no significant 
difference in accuracy between the unlimited time condition and the limited condition, 
t(19) = 0.767, p = .452. 
However, there was no interaction between experimental order and comparison condition 
both for subjects, F1(3,57) = 1.06, p = .316 (lower bound adjustment), and for items, F2(3,32) < 1, 
p = .415. Finally, there was no interaction between time condition, experimental order and 
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comparison condition, both for subjects, F1(3,57) < 1, p = .527 (lower bound adjustment), and 
for items, F2(3,32) < 1, p = .528. The effect of the comparison condition was not moderated by 
the progression in the task. 
3.3.2.2. Directionality 
I compared the choices made under the two time conditions and under the two conditions 
with no correct answer (low and high conditions) in order to check if participants’ preference for 
the option presented with the positive verbal probability could be reduced by having more time 
to make a decision. As in Experiment 1, participants received 0 for each negative expression and 
1 for each positive expression chosen, and these were averaged to give a score between 0 and 
1. Mean proportions of choices of the positive verbal probabilities in the high and low 
conditions, by time condition, are presented Figure 11. 
A 2 (comparison condition: low or high) by 2 (time condition: limited or unlimited) repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a main effect of comparison condition on the 
preference for positive verbal probabilities: participants chose the outcome presented with a 
positive verbal probability significantly more often under the high condition than under the low 
condition both for subjects, F1(1,19) = 33.93, p < .001, 
2
p = .64, and for items, F2(1,16) = 4.54, 
p = .049, 2p = .22. 
The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of time condition: participants chose the outcome 
presented with a positive verbal probability significantly more often under limited time than 
under unlimited time both for subjects, F1(1,19) = 247.81, p < .001, 
2
p = .93, and for items, 
F2(1,16) = 35.81, p < .001, 
2
p = .69. 
 82 
 
 
a error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
Figure 11: Mean Proportion of Choices in Favour of the Positive Directionality as Function of the 
Comparison Condition and the Time Condition (Experiment 2b) 
 
There was an interaction between comparison condition and time condition both for 
subjects, F1(1,19) = 25.14, p < .001, 
2
p = .57, and for items, F2(1,16) = 7.36, p = .015, 
2
p = .32. 
Under limited time participants chose the outcome described by a positive verbal probability 
more often in the high condition than in the low condition, t(19) = 13.01, p < .001, r = .89. This 
was not the case under unlimited time, t(19) < 0.13, p = .90. 
I also ran one-sample t-tests which indicated that under limited time participants chose the 
outcome described by a positive verbal probability significantly more often than chance, both in 
the low and high conditions, t(19) = 10.41, p < .001, r = .76 and t(19) = 34.86, p < .001, r = .97 
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respectively; this was not the case under unlimited time, t(19) = 1.30, p = .21 and t(19) = 1.00 
p = .33 respectively. However one-sample t-tests run for items found a preference for the 
outcome described by a positive verbal probability only in the high condition under limited time, 
t(8) = 44.28, p < .001, r < .99. In the high condition under unlimited time and in the low 
condition, under both limited and unlimited time, there was no preference for the outcome 
described by a positive verbal probability, t(8) = 1.17, p = .274, t(8) = 1.72, p = .125 and 
t(8) = 1.04, p = .329 respectively. 
Finally, I also ran another ANOVA (with comparison condition and time condition as factors) 
taking also into account the experimental order. I found a similar main effect of comparison 
condition and of time condition, both for subjects and for items (lowest F = 4.54, highest p = 
.049). I also found a similar interaction between comparison condition and time condition, both 
for subjects and for items (lowest F = 7.36, highest p = .015).  
There was no effect of experimental order, both for subjects, F1(1,19) < 1, p = .762, and for 
items, F2(1,16) < 1, p = .713. There was no interaction between experimental order and 
comparison condition both for subjects, F1(1,19) = 1.20, p = .288, and for items, F2(1,16) = 1.98, 
p = .179. There was no interaction either between time condition and experimental order, both 
for subjects, F1(1,19) < 1, p = .746, and for items, F2(1,16) < 1, p = .737. Finally, there was no 
interaction between time condition, experimental order and comparison condition, both for 
subjects, F1(1,19) < 1, p = .788, and for items, F2(1,16) < 1, p = .801. The effect of the comparison 
condition was not moderated by the progression in the task. 
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3.3.2.3. Response time 
In order to investigate if making more accurate decisions and choices less biased towards 
the positive directionality was accompanied by taking more time to respond, I compared 
response times under the two time conditions and under each comparison condition (low, high, 
positive, negative, congruent and incongruent). I used the medians of each participant in each 
condition. Means of median response times according to the comparison and time conditions 
are presented Figure 12.  
A 6 (comparison condition: incongruent, low, negative, high, positive or congruent) by 2 
(time condition: limited or unlimited) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed 
a main effect of comparison condition on the response time both for subjects, F1(5,95) = 27.82, 
p < .001, η2p = .59 (lower bound adjustment), and for items, F2(5,48) = 13.06, p < .001, η
2
p = .58. 
Planned repeated contrasts (order of conditions: incongruent, negative, low, positive, high, 
congruent) found only the negative and high conditions to be significantly different, 
F1(1,19) = 24.92, p < .001, η
2
p = .57. Therefore I ran a post-hoc special contrast which confirmed 
that response time was longer under the low, incongruent and negative conditions, compared 
to the high, positive and congruent conditions (see Table 4 for F and p values). 
The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of time condition. As would be expected, response 
time was significantly longer under unlimited time than under limited time both for subjects, 
F1(1,19) = 13.65, p = .002, 
2
p = .42, and for items, F2(1,48) = 76.74, p < .001, η
2
p = .62. 
The ANOVA finally revealed an interaction between comparison condition and time 
condition, marginally significant for subjects, F1(5,95) = 3.29, p = .086, 
2
p = .15 (lower bound 
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a error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
Figure 12: Mean Response Time (in msec.) as Function of the Comparison Condition and the Time 
Condition (Experiment 2b) 
 
adjustment), and significant for items, F2(5,48) = 3.04, p = .018, η
2
p = .24. Paired samples t-tests 
were applied with a Bonferroni correction (for 6 tests, α = .0083). The response time was 
significantly longer under unlimited time than under limited time in the low condition, 
t(19) = 4.41, p < .001, r = .40, the incongruent condition, t(19) = 4.21, p < .001, r = .442, and the 
high condition, t(19) = 3.29, p = .004, r = .32. The difference between unlimited and limited time 
was not significant in the positive condition, t(19) = 2.38, p = .028, and the congruent condition, 
t(19) = 2.82, p = .011, and the negative condition, t(19) = 2.91, p = .009. 
2266 2237 2196 1794 1807 1845 
2955 2995 2851 
2254 2233 2166 
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
3500 
Low Incongruent Negative High Positive Congruent 
re
sp
o
n
se
 t
im
e
 (
in
 m
se
c.
) 
Limited Time Unlimited Time 
 86 
 
I ran two separate ANOVAs with the comparison condition (incongruent, low, negative, 
high, positive or congruent) as within-participant factor, respectively under limited time and 
unlimited time. An effect of comparison condition on the response time was confirmed both 
under limited time, F1(5,95) = 28.51, p < .001, η
2
p = .60 (lower bound adjustment) and 
F2(5,48) = 21.16, p < .001, η
2
p = .69, and unlimited time, F1(1,95) = 16.24, p = .001, η
2
p = .46  
(lower bound adjustment) and F2(5,48) = 8.45, p < .001, η
2
p = .47. Both under limited and 
unlimited conditions, planned repeated contrasts applied with a Bonferroni correction (for 5  
 
Table 4 
Post-Hoc Special Contrasts on the Response Time (Experiment 2b) 
compared conditions F values p values η2p 
low vs. high 41.26 < .001a .70 
low vs. positive 29.34 < .001a .62 
low vs. congruent 41.97 < .001a .70 
incongruent vs. high 68.66 < .001a .79 
incongruent vs. positive 38.2 < .001a .68 
incongruent vs. congruent 51.8 < .001a .74 
negative vs. high 27.97 < .001a .61 
negative vs. positive 31.48 < .001a .64 
negative vs. congruent 34.78 < .001a .66 
a
 significant after Bonferroni correction (for 9 tests, α = .0056) 
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tests, α = .01) found only the negative and high conditions to be different, F1(1,19) = 73.46, 
p < .001, η2p = .79 and F1(1,19) = 12.73, p = .002, η
2
p = .40 respectively.  
A second analysis was conducted taking into account the experimental order. I found similar 
main effects of comparison condition and of time condition for subjects and for items (lowest 
F = 13.06, highest p = .002). I also found an identical interaction between comparison condition 
and time condition marginally significant for subjects and significant for items (lowest F = 3.04, 
highest p = .086). 
There was a main effect of experimental order both for subjects, F1(1,19) = 40.26, p < .001, 
η2p = .68, and for items, F2(1,48) = 134.42, p < .001, η
2
p = .74. There was also an interaction 
between time condition and experimental order both for subjects, F1(1,19) = 14.67, p = .001, 
η2p = .44, and for items, F2(1,48) = 53.32, p < .001, η
2
p = .53. Participants’ response time was 
shorter under limited time than under unlimited time in the first half, t(19) = 4.04, p = .001, 
r = .47. In the second half, there was no difference between limited time and unlimited time, 
t(19) = 2.36, p = .029, r = .21 (Bonferroni correction, α = .025). In both conditions, as may be 
expected with practice, participants’ response times were shorter in the second half of the 
experiment than in the first half, t(19) = 2.77, p = .012, r = .18 for limited time and t(19) = 5.58, 
p < .001, r = .39 for unlimited time (Bonferroni correction, α = .025). 
There was no interaction between experimental order and comparison condition both for 
subjects, F1(5,95) = 2.16, p = .065, η
2
p = .10 (lower bound adjustment), and for items, 
F2(5,48) = 1.75, p = .142. Finally, there was no interaction between time condition, experimental 
order and comparison condition for subjects, F1(5,95) = 2.19, p = .155 (lower bound 
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adjustment), but there was for items, F2(5,48) = 2.88, p = .024, η
2
p = .23. The interaction 
between the time condition and the comparison condition was significant in the first half, 
F2(5,48) = 3.56, p = .008, η
2
p = .27, but not in the second half, F2(5,48) = 1.13, p = .356. 
Additional analyses run using only successful trials yielded similar results, with a main effect 
of comparison condition and of time condition, and an interaction of time and comparison 
conditions (lowest F = 3.34, highest p = .003).  
3.3.3. Discussion 
Overall, I observed the same patterns of accuracy and response time as in Experiment 1. 
Even when given unlimited time, participants were more accurate in the positive and the 
congruent conditions than in the negative and the incongruent conditions. However, an overall 
improvement of accuracy was observed under unlimited time. Both under limited and unlimited 
time, the performance in the incongruent condition was consistent with people’s preference for 
positive verbal probabilities (e.g. Teigen & Brun, 1999). Participants failed to choose the correct 
answer described by a negative verbal probability on half of the trials. This goes against a 
performance cost account of the framing effect of directionality. If this effect was only due to 
directionality being easier to process, having more time should result in greater accuracy. That 
is, in the incongruent condition participants should have been more likely to choose the 
negative verbal probability over the positive one. However, in the low and high conditions, 
participants showed a preference for the positive verbal probabilities only under limited time. 
When given unlimited time, participants were equally likely to choose the positive or negative 
verbal probability. Even if performance costs are not sufficient to explain the framing effect of 
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directionality, reducing the time pressure can help to cancel out this effect when the two 
options have similar likelihood of occurring.  
Slower response times in the incongruent and the low conditions, in both time conditions, 
confirmed that both the likelihood and directionality of a verbal probability are considered 
when making decisions. However under unlimited time, I observed an increase in the response 
time restricted to the low, incongruent, negative, and high conditions. Taking more time did not 
allow participants to increase their accuracy significantly in the incongruent and negative 
conditions. However, in the low and high conditions, taking more time was accompanied by a 
reduction of the preference for positive verbal probabilities. This also supports my claim that 
performance costs alone cannot account for the framing effect of directionality.  
Having the opportunity to compare two verbal probabilities, coupled with having more time 
to make a decision, can help people to overcome the preference for positive verbal probabilities 
and therefore the framing effect of directionality. Nevertheless in the incongruent condition 
taking more time was not sufficient for participants to overcome this framing effect. Thus, 
having more time is helpful when verbal probabilities have equivalent likelihoods. When they 
carry different likelihoods, especially if these are incongruent with their respective 
directionality, taking more time is not a guarantee of accuracy. 
3.4. General discussion 
Empirical data has often shown a framing effect of directionality on decision making: adults 
prefer options described by positive verbal probabilities even when the options are equally 
likely (Teigen & Brun, 1999; Gourdon & Villejoubert, 2009). Although the preference for positive 
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verbal probabilities was not completely overcome in this chapter, it is noteworthy that for the 
first time, conditions that can reduce the framing effect of directionality were identified. When 
given the chance to compare two verbal probabilities communicating the same likelihood as 
well as given unlimited time to make a decision, people no longer systematically preferred the 
positive verbal probability. I also aimed to determine if the framing effect of directionality could 
be explained by this feature being easier to process. The relatively long response time in the low 
condition seems to indicate that participants considered the likelihood even when it was 
equivalent (and therefore not useful to the decision-making). Such a pattern should not be 
observed if the framing properties of directionality were relying on ease of processing, in which 
case the likelihood should have been ignored.  
In the incongruent condition directionality was inconsistent with the likelihood. 
Performance in this condition was relatively inaccurate and slow. It is possible that pragmatic 
factors explain the remaining difficulty to overcome the framing effect of directionality under 
this particular condition. Pragmatic constraints require that speakers be as relevant as possible 
and that listeners make the least costly interpretation (e.g., Wilson & Sperber, 2004). Therefore 
if a listener detected the incongruence between the likelihood and directionality s/he may 
consider it as indicating a puzzling communicative intention from the speaker. If directionality 
had misled participants only because of its lower performance costs, I should have seen no 
increase in response times and an overwhelming preference for the positive verbal probabilities 
(in this condition the incorrect answer). On the other hand, if it is the case that the preference 
for positive verbal probabilities relies not only on performance costs but also on pragmatic 
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factors, I might expect that in settings that emphasise these factors (e.g. a naturalistic 
conversation) the preference for positive verbal probabilities might be even stronger and 
remain even when participants have unlimited time to respond. Future experiments should 
explore this question by replicating the second experiment with a clearly indicated 
conversational context.  
We know that despite their vagueness, verbal probabilities are a preferred tool to 
communicate about uncertain events (e.g., Erev & Cohen, 1990). They are likely to be used in 
many settings, for example medical communication, although it was once recommended that 
they be banned from this type of interaction (Nakao & Axelrod, 1983). Teigen and Brun (2003) 
note that it would be hard to put this constraint on people’s natural language and, elsewhere, it 
has been established that people have difficulties reasoning with the numerical probabilities 
that would need to replace them (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hertwig, van den Broek, Fasolo, & 
Katsikopoulos, 2005). However, I showed here that when comparing two options described by 
verbal probabilities with unlimited time, people were able to overcome their preference for 
positive verbal probabilities. Therefore, one way to establish better risk communication when 
using verbal probabilities is to give every option to the listener and to allow time to make a 
decision. 
There are situations in everyday life when one has to make decisions under time pressure. 
Imagine you are in a consultation with your doctor and she offers you the choice between two 
treatments with descriptions of their likely success. Often one is expected to make the decision 
promptly, but it might be that people make better informed decisions if they are given more 
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time to decide. Ensuring patients have the best chance to make decisions is important as it is 
thought that physicians underestimate patients’ need for fuller disclosure of risks (Bismark, 
Gogos, Clark, Gruen, Gawande & Studdert, 2012). If doctors are encouraged to make efforts to 
improve this disclosure, then how to communicate the risk is an important concern. An 
interesting possibility is that simply allowing decision makers to feel that the time pressure is 
relieved may even be sufficient in itself. Notably even when their decisions were not subject to 
the framing effect of directionality (under unlimited time in the low and high conditions), my 
participants did not take a very long time: their mean response times under the low and the 
high conditions were still under 5 seconds. However, such strategies will lead to improvement 
only in cases when the options have similar likelihoods of success/failure. Indeed in the 
incongruent condition, where there was a more likely option, participants still performed at 
chance level despite being offered all the time they needed and using it. If the options to decide 
between are known to have different likelihoods, one strategy would be to present people with 
verbal probabilities where directionality was congruent with this likelihood. 
My studies demonstrated that measuring response times and manipulating the time 
pressure are useful tools to research decision making based on verbal probabilities. One 
limitation is that my paradigm does not distinguish between time taken to read the verbal 
probabilities and the time taken to decide between them. However, it is unclear how these 
processes could be separated in such a task as participants will no doubt start to interpret 
verbal probabilities while they are reading them. This observation does not undermine my 
results as the different verbal probabilities were repeated in conditions that had slow and fast 
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response times. Furthermore, the cost of processing negation cannot explain the different 
patterns observed in response times as conditions with both slow and fast response times 
contained negative phrases (the only exception was the positive condition). Thus, it is 
reasonable to conclude that it is the decision making time which differs between conditions.  
I mentioned that in translation tasks (including unpublished data I used to select the 
materials), some of the positive and negative verbal probabilities which I categorized as having a 
similar likelihood are often judged rather differently most likely due to directionality (e.g., not 
absolutely certain and very likely). However, it is noteworthy that given unlimited time in the 
low and high conditions, where only the likelihood could drive the decision participants showed 
no preference for the expressions usually translated as having a higher likelihood (the positive 
ones). This supports my claim that the materials I used was adequately chosen and suggests 
that the effect of directionality in translation tasks can be overcome in some circumstances. 
One could also argue that my samples were limited: they were relatively small, and 
predominantly of female participants and of psychology students. There is some evidence that 
women are more prone to framing effects (e.g., Fagley & Miller, 1990), yet these gender 
differences in framing are modulated by the task domain (e.g., Huang & Wang, 2010): for 
example, women were more sensitive to negative attribute framings when it comes to life or 
death, while men showed a sensitivity to negative attribute framings when the task was related 
to finances. I expect that my results should also apply to men, if and when the task taps in the 
right domain. Indeed, it would be useful to explore whether the results differ between the 
genders when the task describes different domains. Furthermore across the two experiments, I 
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considered it a strength was that the samples were drawn from different populations. In 
Experiment 2, the sample was made of undergraduate psychology students, and in Experiment 
1, participants were 17-year-old high school students who had only recently begun their 
introductory study of psychology. More critically, the high school participants had rarely if ever 
participated in psychology experiments. Despite this, I found the same pattern in both 
experiments, suggesting that my results are unlikely to be the product of task demands and/or 
of the lack of naïvety of participants. 
I demonstrated that the framing effect of directionality in verbal probabilities can be 
reduced by relieving the time pressure. I also observed patterns of results indicating that this 
framing effect does not rely on directionality being easier to process. Instead, I suggest that 
pragmatic factors also contribute to the framing effect of directionality. Verbal probabilities are 
not merely a way to communicate risk, they may also communicate information about a 
speaker’s intention. 
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CHAPTER 4: MAKING DECISIONS BASED ON VERBAL PROBABILITIES IN A 
CONVERSATIONAL CONTEXT: SPEAKERS’ INTENTIONS MATTER 
4.1. Introduction 
When choosing a verbal probability to express a level of uncertainty, a speaker is confronted 
with a wide range of phrases, from the rare (e.g., a ghost of a chance), to the most informal 
(e.g., a snowball in hell’s chance), to the well-established (e.g., unlikely). A speaker thus needs to 
choose a level of language and the appropriate phrase to communicate a level of uncertainty. 
Furthermore, a speaker needs to choose the directionality of the phrase, that is the positive or 
negative quality of a verbal probability. Choosing one directionality or the other is as important 
as appropriately translating the level of uncertainty the speaker wants to communicate. 
Directionality drives listeners’ attention to the occurrence or the non-occurrence of the event 
(Teigen & Brun, 1995), which results in framing effects in judgement and decision making 
(Teigen & Brun, 1999). Between equally likely options, people chose the one described with a 
positive verbal probability more often than the one described with a negative phrase (e.g., 
Gourdon & Villejoubert, 2009). In Chapter 3 I suggested that this may be because directionality 
signals the speaker’s intention to the listener. In this chapter I investigated this possibility by 
extending Experiment 2b: first, by setting out a conversational context; second, by setting out 
the speakers’ benevolent or malevolent intention.  
Weber and Hilton (1990) showed that the numerical translation of verbal probabilities into a 
risk estimate is sensitive to contextual factors such as the severity of the predicted event. For 
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example, possible was interpreted as representing a 50% chance of developing a wart, whereas 
it was interpreted as meaning a 62% chance of having a sprained ankle. More importantly, 
Bonnefon and Villejoubert (2006) showed that verbal probabilities were not only prone to the 
severity bias, but also to the listener’s pragmatic interpretations. When the uncertain event was 
severe (deafness), the numerical translation of It is possible was higher (67%) than when the 
uncertain event was mild (insomnia; 59%). Crucially, when they interpreted that the speaker 
used a verbal probability to be tactful, participants gave a higher numerical translation of It is 
possible (e.g., 71% for insomnia) than when they interpreted that the speaker used a verbal 
probability because he was not sure (e.g., 57% for insomnia). Participants also interpreted more 
often that the speaker was being tactful in the case of deafness (60%) than in the case of 
insomnia (17%). Thus, verbal probabilities seem to be prone to pragmatic influences, where a 
speaker’s intentions are taken into account in the numerical interpretation of the statements. 
Juanchich, Teigen & Villejoubert (2010) extended the pragmatic account of verbal 
probabilities to include their directionality. They found that speakers used positive and negative 
verbal probabilities differentially in order to contradict someone else’s prediction. Participants 
were asked to select what two profilers, Tom and David, would say in a conversation where they 
disagree on the likelihood of a suspect’s guilt. When David thought that the likelihood was 
higher than Tom had just said, participants chose a positive verbal probability more often to 
express David’s prediction. When David thought that the likelihood was lower than the one 
predicted by Tom, participants were more likely to choose a negative verbal probability to 
express David’s prediction. Challenging Budescu, Karelitz and Wallsten’s position (2003) that 
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directionality merely reflects the numerical information of a verbal probability, this supported 
the claim that directionality also conveys ‘a consistent message, with clear implications for 
inferential judgments’ (Teigen & Brun, 1999, p. 185). In the case of revised judgements as in 
Juanchich et al., directionality seems to be chosen so it can frame listeners’ perspective in the 
direction of the wished revision. As far as I know however, no one has yet investigated such 
pragmatic effects within a conversational context, on the interpretation rather than the 
production of directionality. 
In Chapter 3 I showed that adults chose the least likely option over the most likely one in 
about half of the cases where the least likely option was presented by a positive verbal 
probability (while the most likely one was presented by a negative verbal probability). In 
contrast with conditions where the likelihood of the two options was similar, this was the case 
even when the time pressure was relieved. A crucial feature in the former case was that the 
likelihood and directionality were incongruent. I suggested that listeners interpret that speakers 
may signal their intention by choosing incongruent verbal probabilities. If it did not allow 
speakers to signal intention, choosing an incongruent verbal probability would have no 
pragmatic relevance, violating the maxim of manner (i.e., that a speaker should avoid obscuring 
the communication; Grice, 1975). Therefore listeners infer that speakers choose it because they 
want the listener to choose the option presented by a positive verbal probability, even if it is the 
least likely.  
According to this pragmatic interpretation of directionality, the preference for positive 
verbal probabilities would be expected to be manifested even more strongly in a more 
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conversational context. In this context, the speaker is expected to produce utterances that are 
useful to process (e.g., Wilson & Sperber, 2004). Therefore, like the case of incongruent verbal 
probabilities, the listener would interpret that the speaker’s choice of a positive directionality is 
not arbitrary but signals something. Therefore, people should have more difficulty overcoming 
this preference, even under favourable conditions (i.e., with unlimited time). Furthermore, if a 
positive directionality is indicative of what the speaker suggests the listener chooses, one would 
not want to choose the option presented by a positive verbal probability if the speaker is 
malevolent. Imagine a poker game: player A is teasingly asking player B if s/he has a good hand. 
Player B has a good hand but does not want to deter player A from betting more money and 
making the pot bigger. Player B therefore may reply that ‘It is not absolutely certain’. But, not 
being a naive player, player A will infer that B is trying to mislead her and will understand that ‘It 
is likely’. Thus she will fold. Therefore another prediction of the pragmatic interpretation of 
directionality is that the preference for positive verbal probability should depend on the 
intentions attributed to speakers. 
Such a prediction is supported by recent work in the theoretical frame of epistemic vigilance 
(e.g., Sperber et al., 2010). Epistemic vigilance can be seen as the set of cognitive tools that 
ensure that an individual does not waste cognitive resources on understanding a misleading 
communication. These mechanisms range from reasoning abilities to evaluation of 
trustworthiness, and target the content as well as the speaker. For example, Mascaro and 
Sperber (2009) found that, as early as 4 years old, children do the opposite of what was 
indicated if the speaker is thought to be malevolent. Just like the poker player A, they evaluated 
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the trustworthiness of the speaker. When they deemed him untrustworthy, they changed their 
interpretation of the information they received from the speaker. 
In Chapter 2, I also found that children take into account the intention of the speaker when 
judging and making decisions based on verbal probabilities. However I failed to find the reversal 
expected in a pragmatic account of directionality. While children changed their use of 
directionality when the speaker was malevolent, they neglected directionality, rather than using 
it as a reverse cue. One possibility I suggested then was that it might be too costly for children 
to process the interaction of a speaker’s intention and of directionality. Dismissal of 
directionality to choose randomly would then be the best next option. If this is the case, it could 
be expected that adults however combine the intention and directionality in order to make a 
decision. If directionality is an indicator to listeners of what the speakers want, listeners should 
infer that a malevolent speaker would use this cue to mislead them. To do so the speaker 
however needs to know the correct answer. So listeners can in fact infer the correct answer 
from what the speaker says and from his intention. Therefore adults could use directionality as 
a cue, but in reverse. This would support a pragmatic account of directionality. But if listeners 
only dismissed the speaker’s answer to choose randomly, like children did in Experiment 1b, it 
would suggest that they consider that directionality is not a cue of what the speaker wants. 
This chapter aimed to test the pragmatic account of directionality in two experiments based 
on the paradigm I used on Chapter 3. Two treasure chests were presented to participants, each 
chest being described as possibly containing gold coins, using a verbal probability. Verbal 
probabilities could differ in directionality (positive/negative) and probabilistic meaning 
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(high/low). Participants had to decide on a single chest to open, under limited time and without 
time limit. In Experiment 3a, silhouettes and speech bubbles were added to the paradigm to 
provide participants with a schematic conversational context. In Experiment 3b, silhouettes and 
speech bubbles were also used; I did not manipulate the time limit (giving only limited time), 
but crucially manipulated speakers’ intentions as benevolent or malevolent, by introducing two 
different characters (Peter Pan and Captain Hook, as in Experiment 1b). 
In Experiment 3a, I expected to find patterns of decisions and reaction times similar to those 
in Chapter 3, except that, even when relieved from time pressure, participants would prefer the 
positive verbal probabilities in every comparison condition. Given the conversational context, 
listeners would be expected to interpret that the positive directionality has been chosen 
purposely; so listeners would most of the time rely on directionality to make their decision, 
choosing the positive one, since they would think it indicates what the speaker wants. This 
would lead them to choose the incorrect option more often when asked to choose between two 
incongruent verbal probabilities. 
In Experiment 3b, I again expected to find a similar pattern of decisions and reaction times 
as in Chapter 3 (i.e., similar to those in Experiment 3a), but only in the case of the benevolent 
speaker. When the speaker was malevolent, I expected that decisions would be reversed, 
showing a preference for the option presented by a negative verbal probability. In conditions 
where directionality was the same, if listeners interpreted that the speaker was malevolent and 
trying to mislead them, they could interpret that the speaker is describing the option that is 
actually less likely as more likely. Therefore, they would show a preference for the option 
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presented as the least likely. I also expected that response times would be longer when the 
speaker was malevolent, as a consequence of listeners reversing their initial interpretation. 
Thus, in Experiment 3a, under any time condition, when the probabilistic meaning of the 
two descriptions was similar and directionality was the only thing changing, it was expected that 
participants would choose the positive verbal probability more often, as people prefer options 
given with positive verbal probabilities (Teigen & Brun, 1999). Moreover, it was expected that 
participants would choose the positive verbal probability even if directionality contradicted the 
probabilistic meaning (e.g., positive verbal probability conveying a low probabilistic meaning), 
then making more incorrect decisions (defined as choosing the least likely option). In the 
conversational context, listeners would interpret that the positive directionality has been 
chosen purposely, therefore choosing more often the positive verbal probability as it would 
signal to them what the speaker wants. 
People prefer to use positive verbal probabilities for high probabilistic meanings and low 
ones for low probabilistic meanings (Budescu et al., 2003). Thus, I expected participants to 
choose the positive verbal probability over the negative to a greater extent when both had a 
high probabilistic meaning, and that this would be true under both time conditions. Regarding 
response times, following the results of Chapter 3, I expected participants to take longer to 
decide between: two negative verbal probabilities (because of the cost of negation); between 
two verbal probabilities conveying a low likelihood (because of the inconsistency with the task 
goal, finding some treasure); and between two incongruent verbal probabilities (e.g., a positive 
verbal probabilities conveying a low likelihood; because of the inconsistency between the 
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message of directionality and the message of the likelihood). Shorter response times were 
expected when a decision was made between two positive verbal probabilities, two congruent 
verbal probabilities and two verbal probabilities carrying a high likelihood.  
4.2. Experiment 3a 
4.2.1. Method 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
Nineteen psychology students (mean age = 19.45 years; range = 18 - 23; 18 girls) at 
university of Birmingham (UK) took part in the experiment against course credits. 
4.2.1.2. Materials 
The materials used were very similar to those used in the Experiments 2a and 2b. The only 
difference was that each verbal probability was presented in a speech bubble coming out of one 
of two identical (but mirroring) silhouettes (see Figure 13 for an example). As in Experiment 2a 
and 2b, the outcome the verbal probabilities referred to was kept constant (i.e. there are some 
coins in the chest). 
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Figure 13: Example of Stimuli Used in Experiment 3a 
 
4.2.1.3. Procedure 
The procedure was very similar to Experiment 2b. Differences included changes in the 
instructions to reinforce the conversational nature of the task, and in the stimuli presentation, 
for the same reason. Instructions were as follows:  
‘You are going to be presented pairs of treasure chests. In every pair one chest is more 
likely to contain some gold coins. To help you deciding which chest you should open, some 
people will give you some hints. Sometimes the two hints will seem very similar to you but 
they are actually always different within each pair. For each pair you will then have to say if 
you want to open the left chest (z key) or the right one (m key).’  
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Each trial was introduced by a fixation cross. In order to reinforce the impression of a 
conversation, I first presented the silhouettes without speech bubbles, for one second, 
immediately followed by the silhouettes uttering the two verbal probabilities in the speech 
bubbles.  
4.2.2. Results 
As in Chapter 3, participants were presented with each verbal probability 36 times, having 
the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the materials. Hence each analysis was 
conducted twice, the second time including the experimental order as additional factor to 
exclude familiarity and/or length of the pairs as confounding variables.  
4.2.2.1. Accuracy 
In order to test if participants were more accurate when they had more time to make a 
decision, I compared the performance on the four conditions where a correct answer existed 
(positive, negative, incongruent and congruent conditions), under the two time conditions. As in 
Experiments 2a and 2b, accuracy ranged from 0 to 1. Mean proportions of accurate answers 
according to the comparison condition (when accuracy is a relevant measure) and the time 
condition are presented in Figure 14. 
A 4 (comparison condition: incongruent, negative, positive or congruent) by 2 (time: 
condition: limited or unlimited) revealed a main effect of comparison condition on accuracy 
both for subjects, F1(3,54) = 61.28, p < .001, η
2
p = .77, and items, F2(3,32) = 12.86, p < .001, 
η2p = .55. Planned repeated contrasts (with Bonferroni correction: for 3 tests, α = .0166)  
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a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
Figure 14: Mean Proportion of Accurate Answers as Function of the Comparison Condition and the Time 
Condition (Experiment 3a) 
 
indicated that accuracy in the incongruent condition was significantly lower than in the negative 
condition, F1(1,18) = 27.51, p < .001, η
2
p = .60. Accuracy in the negative condition was 
significantly lower than in the positive condition, F1(1,18) = 57.55, p < .001, η
2
p = .76. Accuracy in 
the positive and the congruent conditions were similar, F1(1,18) = 4.70, p = .044. The ANOVA 
also revealed a main effect of time condition: accuracy was significantly lower under limited 
time than under unlimited time both for subjects, F1(1,18) = 19.25, p < .001, η
2
p = .52, and for 
items, F2(3,32) = 41.23, p < .001, η
2
p = .56.  
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There was no interaction between comparison condition and time condition for subjects, 
F1(3,54) = 2.00, p = .125, but there was one for items, F2(3,32) = 3.56, p = .025, η
2
p = .25. 
Accuracy was lower under limited time than under unlimited time under the incongruent and 
the positive conditions, t(8) = 5.99, p < .001, r = .16 and t(8) = 3.56, p = .007, r = .52, respectively. 
Under the congruent and the negative conditions, there was no difference between the limited 
time and the unlimited time, t(8) = 2.82, p = .023, and t(8) = 2.33, p = .049, respectively 
(Bonferroni correction; α = .0125). The effect of the comparison condition was significant both 
under limited time, F1(3,54) = 72.92, p < .001, η
2
p = .80, and unlimited time, F1(3,54) = 41.20, 
p < .001, η2p = .70. 
A second analysis was conducted taking into account the experimental order. The main 
effect of comparison condition and of time condition remained for subjects and for items 
(lowest F = 12.86, highest p < .001). The interaction between comparison condition and time 
condition was the same, that is, not significant for subjects, significant for items (highest 
F = 3.56, lowest p = .0250. There was no effect of the experimental order, for subjects or items. 
There was no interaction between time condition and experimental order, for subject or for 
items. Finally there was no interaction between time condition, experimental order and 
comparison condition, for subjects or for items, (highest F = 1.81, lowest p = .195).  
There was however an interaction between comparison condition and experimental order, 
not for subjects, F1(3,54) = 1.81, p = .195 (lower bound adjustment), but one for items, 
F2(3,32) = 2.95, p = .047, η
2
p = .22. There was no difference between the first and the second 
block in the positive, the congruent, the incongruent and the negative conditions, t(8) = 2.26, 
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p = .054 and t(8) = 1.79, p = .111, t(8) = 1.61, p = .147 and t(8) = 0.56, p = .589, respectively 
(Bonferroni correction; α = .0125). There was a main effect of condition in the first half, 
F2(3,32) = 12.97, p < .001, η
2
p = .55, as well as in the second half, F2(3,32) = 12.41, p < .001, 
η2p = .54. There was no suggestion that increasing familiarity with items over the course of the 
experiment affected the results. 
4.2.2.2. Directionality 
I compared the choices made under the two time conditions and under the two conditions 
with no correct answer (low and high conditions) in order to check if participants’ preference for 
the option presented with the positive verbal probability could be reduced by having more time 
to make a decision. As in Experiment 3a and 3b, participants received 0 for each negative 
expression and 1 for each positive expression chosen, and these were averaged to give a score 
between 0 and 1. Mean proportions of choices of the positive verbal probabilities in the high 
and low conditions are presented in Figure 15. 
A 2 (comparison condition: low or high) by 2 (time condition: limited or unlimited) repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a main effect of comparison condition on the 
preference for positive verbal probabilities. Participants chose the outcome presented with a 
positive verbal probability significantly more often under the high condition than under the low 
condition for subjects,  F1(1,18) = 123.94, p < .001, 
2
p = .87, and marginally for items, 
F2(1,16) = 4.13, p = .059, 
2
p = .21. 
The ANOVA revealed no effect of time condition: participants chose the outcome presented 
with a positive verbal probability as often under limited time as under unlimited time both for  
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a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
Figure 15: Mean Proportion of Choices in Favour of the Positive Verbal Probability (Standard Deviation) as 
Function of the Comparison Condition and the Time Condition (Experiment 3a) 
 
subjects, F1(1,18) = 1.91, p = .184, or for items, F2(1,16) = 1.08, p = .315. There was no 
interaction either between the comparison condition and the time condition both for subjects, 
F1(1,18) < 1, p = .977, or for items, F2(1,16) < 1, p = .949. 
One-sample t-tests indicated that under limited time participants chose the outcome 
described by a positive verbal probability significantly more often than chance, both in the low 
and high conditions, t(18) = 10.91, p < .001, r = .78 and t(18) = 30.16, p < .001, r = .96 
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respectively; this was also the case under unlimited time, t(18) = 12.28, p < .001, r = .82 and 
t(18) = 32.49, p < .001, r = .97 respectively. 
A second analysis was conducted taking into account the experimental order. The main 
effect of comparison condition remained significant for subjects and marginal for items (lowest 
F = 4.13, highest p = .059). There was still no main effect of time condition and no interaction of 
comparison condition and time condition (highest F < 1, lowest p < .995) There was a marginal 
effect of experimental order for subjects, F1(1,18) = 3.73, p = .069, η
2
p = .17, but not for items, 
F2(1,16) = 2.59, p = .127. In the second half, participants chose more often the option described 
by the positive verbal probability than in the first half. 
There was no interaction between comparison condition and experimental order, for 
subjects or for items, between comparison condition and experimental order, for subjects or for 
items, and between time condition, experimental order and comparison condition, for subjects 
or for items (highest F = 2.30, lowest p = .147).  
4.2.2.3. Response time 
In order to investigate if making more accurate decisions and choices that were less biased 
towards the positive directionality was accompanied by taking more time to respond, I 
compared response times under the two time conditions and under each comparison condition 
(low, high, positive, negative, congruent and incongruent). As in Experiments 3a and 3b, the 
medians of each participant/item in each condition were used to deal with outliers. Means of 
median response times according to the comparison conditions are presented Figure 16. 
 110 
 
A 6 (comparison condition: incongruent, low, negative, high, positive or congruent) by 2 
(time condition: limited or unlimited) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed 
a main effect of comparison condition on the response time both for subjects, F1(5,90) = 53.49, 
p < .001, η2p = .75, and for items, F2(5,48) = 39.91, p < .001, η
2
p = .81. Planned repeated 
contrasts (order of conditions: incongruent, negative, low, positive, high, congruent) found only 
the low and high conditions to be significantly different, F1(1,18) = 64.71, p < .001, η
2
p = .78.  
 
 
a error bars represent standard errors of the mean 
Figure 16: Mean Response Time (in msec.) as Function of the Comparison Condition and the Time 
Condition (Experiment 3a) 
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Therefore I ran a post-hoc special contrast analysis which confirmed that response time was 
longer under the low, incongruent and negative conditions, compared to the high, positive and 
congruent conditions (see Table 5 for F and p values). 
The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of time condition. As would be expected with a time 
pressure paradigm, response time was significantly longer under unlimited time than under 
limited time both for subjects, F1(1,18) = 8.16, p = .010, 
2
p = .31), and for items, 
F2(1,48) = 214.72, p < .001, η
2
p = .82. 
 
Table 5 
Post-Hoc Special Contrasts on the Response Time (Experiment 3a) 
compared conditions F values p values η2p 
low vs. high 64.71  < .001a .78 
low vs. positive 101.30  < .001a .85 
low vs. congruent 149.71  < .001a .89 
incongruent vs. high 64.85 < .001a .78 
incongruent vs. positive 97.36  < .001a .84 
incongruent vs. congruent 75.18  < .001a .81 
negative vs. high 47.22 < .001a .72 
negative vs. positive 88.84 < .001a .83 
negative vs. congruent 100.91 < .001a .85 
a
 significant after Bonferroni correction (for 9 tests, α = .0056) 
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The ANOVA revealed an interaction between comparison condition and time condition, for 
subjects, F1(5,90) = 7.51, p = .013, 
2
p = .29 (lower bound adjustment), and for items, 
F2(5,48) = 10.89, p < .001, η
2
p = .53. Paired samples t-tests were applied with a Bonferroni 
correction (for 6 tests, α = .0083). The response time was significantly longer under unlimited 
time than under limited time in the low condition, t(18) = 3.41, p = .003, r = .45, and the 
incongruent condition, t(18) = 3.37, p = .003, r = .47. The difference between unlimited and 
limited time was not significant in the positive condition, t(18) = 2.17, p = .044, the congruent 
condition, t(18) = 1.76, p = .096, the high condition, t(18) = 2.32, p = .033, and the negative 
condition, t(18) = 2.75, p = .013. 
I ran two separate repeated-measures ANOVAs with the comparison condition (incongruent, 
low, negative, high, positive or congruent) as within-participant factor, respectively under 
limited time and unlimited time. An effect of comparison condition on the response time was 
confirmed both under limited time, F1(5,90) = 49.38, p < .001, η
2
p = .73 and F2(5,48) = 32.59, 
p < .001, η2p = .77, and unlimited time, F1(5,90) = 32.94, p < .001, η
2
p = .65 (lower bound 
adjustment) and F2(5,48) = 33.31, p < .001, η
2
p = .78. Under limited time, planned repeated 
contrasts applied with a Bonferroni correction (for 5 tests, α = .01) found only the low and high 
conditions were different, F1(1,18) = 111.67, p < .001, η
2
p = .86, with shorter response times in 
the high condition than in the low condition. Under unlimited time, the low and high conditions 
were different too, F1(1,18) = 30.51, p < .001, η
2
p = .63. Moreover, the negative and the low 
conditions were also different, F1(1,18) = 8.36, p = .010, η
2
p = .32, with shorter response times in 
the negative condition than in the low one. 
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The same analysis was conducted taking into account the experimental order. The main 
effect of comparison condition and of time condition remained for subjects and for items, as 
well as the interaction between comparison condition and time condition (lowest F = 8.24, 
highest p = .010). There was a main effect of experimental order both for subjects, 
F1(1,18) = 7.12, p = .016, η
2
p = .28, and for items, F2(1,48) = 99.27, p < .001, η
2
p = .67. Across all 
conditions, response times were shorter in the second half of the task than in the first one, as 
would be expected from the effect of practice. 
There was an interaction between comparison condition and experimental order both for 
subjects, F1(5,90) = 2.59, p = .031, η
2
p = .13, and for items, F2(5,48) = 3.15, p = .015, η
2
p = .25. 
Response times were significantly shorter in the second half compared to the first one in the 
congruent and the negative conditions, t(18) =3.25, p = .004, r = .28 and t(18) = 2.36, p = .029, 
r = .29 respectively. In the incongruent, low, high and positive conditions, the first and the 
second half yielded similar response times, t(18) = 2.20, p = .041, t(18) = 2.29, p = .034, 
t(18) = 2.13, p = .047 and t(18) = 0.39, p = .703, respectively. The main effect of comparison 
condition observed in the first half, F1(5,90) = 46.27, p < .001, η
2
p = .72, remained in the second 
half, F1(5,90) = 24.39, p < .001, η
2
p = .58.  
There was no interaction between experimental order and time condition for subjects, 
F1(1,18) = 1.23, p = .282, but there was for items, F2(1,48) = 27.45, p < .001, η
2
p = .36. 
Participants’ response time was shorter under limited time than under unlimited time in the 
first half, t(53) = 9.45, p < .001, r = .46, as well as in the second half, t(53) = 8.10, p < .001, 
r = .35, with a smaller effect in the second half. Participants’ response time was shorter from the 
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first half to the second half, both under limited time, t(53) = 6.57, p < .001, r = .25, and under 
unlimited time, t(53) = 7.88, p < .001, r = .36, with a bigger effect under unlimited time. 
Finally, there was no interaction between time condition, experimental order and 
comparison condition both for subjects, F1(5,90) = 1.64, p = .216 (lower bound adjustment), or 
for items, F2(5,48) = 1.96, p = .102. 
Additional analyses run using only successful trials yielded similar results, with a main effect 
of comparison condition and of time condition, and an interaction of time and comparison 
conditions (lowest F = 6.89, highest p = .017).  
4.2.3. Discussion 
Experiment 3a repeated Experiment 2b in a more conversational context. Following a 
pragmatic account of directionality, it was expected that participants would show a preference 
for positive verbal probabilities in all conditions where directionality differed and under each 
time condition. In line with this expectation, in the incongruent condition participants chose the 
incorrect chest (the one with the lowest likelihood, but described by a positive directionality) 
half of the time, whereas when the verbal probabilities were congruent, the correct chest (with 
the highest likelihood to contain gold coins) was picked most of the time. In the low and high 
conditions, in which there was no correct answer, participants preferred the chest described by 
a positive verbal probability more often than chance. However the preference for the positive 
verbal probability was significantly lower in the low condition than in the high condition, 
reflecting that negative verbal probabilities are preferred for lower likelihoods, and positive 
verbal probabilities are preferred for higher likelihood (Budescu et al., 2003). Crucially, this was 
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the case even when participants were given more time to decide, in opposition to what was 
observed in Experiment 2b. 
While I suggested that having more time to compare each verbal probabilities can help to 
overcome the preference for positive verbal probabilities (Experiment 2b), I believe that this is 
only the case when the task is set up without any conversational context. One could argue that 
the schematic conversational context provided here was minimalistic. However, the pattern of 
results I observed in Experiment 3a was different from Experiment 2b, suggesting that the 
conversational context was sufficient to elicit answers that would be expected in a pragmatic 
framework. When the two verbal probabilities are provided within a conversation, pragmatic 
rules seem to lead listeners to interpret that the speaker must have chosen purposely to use a 
positive directionality. In a Gricean perspective of pragmatics, it would otherwise violate the 
maxim of quality (i.e., that a speaker should tell what s/he knows is true; Grice, 1975). In a 
relevance interpretation (e.g., Wilson & Sperber & Wilson, 2004), it would violate that principle 
that utterances should be relevant to be worth being processed. The preference for positive 
verbal probabilities both under limited time and under unlimited time therefore supports that 
directionality is a pragmatic feature of verbal probabilities. 
Response times showed the same patterns as in Experiments 2a and 2b, with the negative, 
incongruent and low conditions eliciting longer times than the high, positive and congruent 
conditions. In the incongruent condition, the conflict between directionality and the likelihood 
seem to necessitate more resources. Take the case of a positive verbal probability conveying a 
low likelihood (e.g., there are a few chances): as a pragmatic cue, directionality tells the decision 
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maker that the speaker wants him or her to open the chest, but the likelihood is indicating that 
s/he should not. The conflict between those two pieces of information can explain the longer 
response times. In the low condition, as I advanced in Chapter 3, the longer response times can 
also be interpreted in terms of conflict. Both likelihoods being low, they might be in conflict with 
the task goal, since it is to choose the chest with the highest likelihood to contain gold coins. 
The task goal might prime participants to reject low likelihoods. But in the low condition this 
would lead participants to end up with no options to choose. Finally in the negative condition, 
the cost of negation is a potential interpretation for the longer response times. For example, 
Gough (1966) showed that negative sentences are verified more slowly than affirmative ones. 
This explanation is not incompatible with an explanation in terms of conflict as well. Both verbal 
probabilities have a negative directionality, which under a pragmatic interpretation of 
directionality, could be puzzling for a participant. It would suggest that the speaker 
recommends neither of the options, since s/he is using a negative directionality, while the task 
instructions indicate that in each pair there is always a correct chest. Similarly to the low 
condition, the use of both negative directionality could generate a conflict with the task goal 
itself.  
As I suggested in the introduction of the present chapter, further support for the pragmatic 
account of directionality would be that directionality is used differently according to a speaker’s 
intentions. If directionality is a pragmatic cue to what a speaker wants you to choose, one could 
read this cue as what a malevolent speaker does not want you choose. Therefore one could still 
use directionality as a reversed cue. I have shown in Experiment 1b that children used 
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directionality differently when the speaker is malevolent than when the speaker is benevolent. 
However, the expected reversed pattern of judgements was not found. Rather children seemed 
to make probability judgements at chance level. This could suggest that a malevolent speaker is 
placed on the same level as an ignorant or incompetent speaker, and that his/her input is simply 
dismissed. In a study with children, Nurmsoo and Robinson (2009) found that the information 
from speakers who made mistakes previously, for reasons out of their control, is later taken into 
account. However, the information from speakers who made mistakes previously, without a 
good reason, is discarded seemingly because those speakers are judged incompetent. It remains 
that in Experiment 1b, it could not be excluded that processing together directionality and the 
intention of the speaker was too costly to be fully done by children. 
Experiment 3b replaced the time manipulation with a manipulation of the speaker’s 
benevolence or malevolence, in an adult’s population. Participants were informed that either 
Peter Pan or Captain Hook would give them information, and that Captain Hook had unhelpful 
intentions. Therefore Peter Pan was set up as the benevolent speaker and Captain Hook as the 
malevolent one. It was expected that in the benevolent case the pattern of accuracy, preference 
for the positive directionality and response times would be similar to those found in Experiment 
2a, the limited time condition of Experiment 2b and both conditions of Experiment 3a. That is, 
accuracy would be higher in the positive and congruent conditions, participants would prefer 
positive verbal probabilities in the high and low condition (but to a less extent in the latter), and 
response times would be longer in the incongruent, negative and low conditions. 
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However in the malevolent case, it was expected that accuracy would be low in the 
congruent conditions, as adults would use directionality as a reversed cue. Therefore they 
should choose the least likely option (conveyed with a negative directionality in the case of a 
congruent verbal probability). This would support both the pragmatic case in general and the 
suggestion that children did not use directionality as a reversed cue because it was too costly. 
Conversely adults’ performance in the incongruent condition would benefit from this use of 
directionality as a reversed cue. In this condition, the positive verbal probability is the one with 
a low likelihood, while the high likelihood is expressed by a negative verbal probability. 
Therefore if a listener chose the negative verbal probability because he thinks that the speaker 
is malevolent, he would in fact chose the verbal probability with a high likelihood. Higher 
accuracy than in the case of a benevolent speaker was thus expected in the incongruent 
condition. 
In the positive and the negative conditions, directionality could not be used as a reversed 
cue, and participants would choose the least likely option. In a pragmatic account, participants 
who think that the malevolent speaker is trying to mislead them should try to use what the 
speaker says to make their decisions. But as they could not use directionality, the next best 
option would be to consider that the speaker describes as having a low likelihood what has a 
high likelihood, and vice-versa. Therefore participants could use the likelihood also as a cue to 
reverse their interpretation. Therefore lower accuracy was also expected in those conditions. In 
the high and low conditions, a reversal of the preference for positive verbal probabilities was 
expected, participants choosing the negative one more often. However it could be that children 
 119 
 
in Experiment 2b behaved like adults instead of lacking cognitive resources. In that case, the 
malevolent speaker would be simply ignored, considered as incompetent. In that case, the 
performance and choices in the malevolent condition would not be expected to be different 
from chance. Finally, response times were expected to be generally longer, as the processing of 
the speaker’s intention would add one more step (reversing the cue) in the processing of the 
information. However, if the malevolent speaker was deemed ignorant and ignored, response 
times should not be different than in the benevolent speaker condition. 
4.3. Experiment 3b 
4.3.1. Method 
4.3.1.1. Participants 
Nineteen Psychology students (mean age= 19.16; range= 18-21; 18 women) at university of 
Birmingham (UK) took part in this experiment in exchange for course credit. 
4.3.1.2. Materials 
The materials were the same as in Experiment 2a, 2b and 3a. Similarly to Experiment 3a, the 
verbal probabilities were presented in speech bubbles, told by the silhouettes on the screen. 
The only difference with Experiment 3a is that the silhouettes telling the verbal probabilities 
were either Peter Pan or Captain Hook (see Figures 17 and 18 for examples). 
4.3.1.3. Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 3a, with differences as follows. Participants made 
decisions under two speaker conditions: in half of the trials, Peter Pan spoke both speech 
bubbles; in the other half, Captain Hook was speaking. In order to reinforce the impression of a 
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conversation, the silhouettes of one trial’s speaker were presented first without speech 
bubbles, for one second, immediately followed by the silhouettes uttering the two verbal 
probabilities in the speech bubbles. The first image, without speech bubbles, also mentioned 
who was speaking (‘Hook/Peter says...’), to ensure that participants identified the correct 
speaker for each trial.  
To ensure that participants attributed malevolent intentions to Captain Hook, the following 
instructions were given to the participants on a first screen: 
‘You are going to be presented pairs of treasure chests. In every pair only one chest 
contains some gold coins. Plus choosing the empty one would make you lose the entire 
game. To help you deciding which chest you should open, either Peter Pan or Captain Hook 
will give you some information about each chest. Captain Hook secretly wishes he could 
keep the treasure for himself.’  
 
 121 
 
 
Figure 17: Example of Stimuli Used in Experiment 3b (Malevolent Speaker) 
 
A second screen of instructions read: 
‘For each trial it will be first indicated who is going to give you information. Then the 
pieces of information will be presented under their respective chests. Sometimes the two 
pieces of information will seem very similar to you but they are actually always different 
within each pair. For each pair you will have to say if you want to open the left chest (x key) 
or the right one (m key). You will have only 5 seconds to make your decisions. Before playing 
the game for real, here are some training pairs. Press the spacebar to continue’.  
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Figure 18: Example of Stimuli Used in Experiment 3b (Benevolent Speaker) 
 
4.3.2. Results 
As in Chapter 3 and in Experiment 3a, participants were presented with each verbal 
probability 36 times, having the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the materials. Hence 
each analysis was conducted twice, the second time including the experimental order as 
additional factor to exclude familiarity and/or length of the pairs as confounding variables.  
4.3.2.1. Accuracy 
In order to test if participants were more accurate when the speaker was benevolent, I 
compared the performance on the four conditions where a correct answer existed (positive, 
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negative, incongruent and congruent conditions), under the two speaker conditions. The correct 
answer was always the option with the higher likelihood, whoever was speaking. As in  
Experiment 3a, the accuracy score could range from 0 to 1, 1 representing a normative 
answer (that is, a preference for the higher likelihood). Mean proportions of accurate answers 
according to the comparison condition (when accuracy is a relevant measure) and the time 
condition are presented in Figure 19. 
A 4 (comparison condition: incongruent, negative, positive or congruent) by 2 (speaker: 
benevolent or malevolent) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a main  
 
a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
Figure 19: Mean Proportion of Accurate Answers as Function of the Comparison Condition and the 
Speaker (Experiment 3b) 
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effect of comparison condition on accuracy both for subjects, F1(3,54) = 10.73, p = .0041, 
η2p = .37 (lower bound adjustment), and items, F2(3,32) = 12.28, p < .001, η
2
p = .54. Planned 
repeated contrasts applied with Bonferroni correction (with α = .0166) indicated that accuracy 
in the incongruent condition was significantly lower than in the negative condition, 
F1(1,18) = 7.76, p = .012, η
2
p = .30. Accuracy in the negative condition was significantly lower 
than in the positive condition, F1(1,18) = 14.60, p = .001, η
2
p = .45. Accuracy in the positive 
condition was not different from accuracy in the congruent condition, F1(1,18) < 1, p = .672. 
The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of speaker. Accuracy was significantly lower when 
Captain Hook provided the information than when it was Peter Pan, F1(1,18) = 31.21, p < .001, 
2p = .63, and for items, F2(1,32) = 44.47, p < .001, η
2
p = .58.  
There was an interaction between comparison condition and speaker both for subjects, 
F1(3,54) = 32.49, p < .001, 
2
p = .64, and for items, F2(3,32) = 11,49, p < .001, 
2
p = .52. When  
Peter Pan was the speaker, the comparison condition had a main effect, F1(3,54) = 142.30, 
p < .001, 2p = .89. With Peter Pan, accuracy in the incongruent condition was significantly lower 
than in the negative condition, F1(1,18) = 149.77, p < .001, η
2
p = .89. Accuracy in the negative 
condition was significantly lower than in the positive condition, F1(1,18) = 63.74, p < .001, 
η2p = .78. Accuracy in the positive condition and the congruent condition were similar, 
F1(1,18) = 1.23, p = .282. When Captain Hook was the speaker, the comparison condition had no 
effect, F1(3,54) = 2.59, p = .125 (lower bound adjustment). 
A second analysis was conducted taking into account the experimental order. The main 
effect of comparison condition and the interaction of comparison condition and speaker 
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remained for subjects and for items (lowest F = 7.04, highest p = .004). The main effect of 
speaker remained the same for items, but was marginal for subjects (lowest F = 3.87, highest 
p = .065). There was an effect of the experimental order for subjects, F1(1,18) = 31.45, p < .001, 
η2p = .64, but not for items, F2(1,32) < 1, p = .459. Participants were more accurate in the second 
half than in the first half. 
There was an interaction between comparison condition and experimental order for 
subjects, F1(1,18) = 28.99, p < .001, η
2
p = .62, but not for items, F2(3,32) < 1, p = .818. The effect 
of the comparison condition was significant in the first half, F1(3,54) = 12.48, p = .002, η
2
p = .41 
(lower bound adjustment), as well as in the second half, F1(3,54) = 7.67, p = .013, η
2
p = .30 
(lower bound adjustment; Bonferroni correction; α = .025)). There was no difference in accuracy 
between the first and the second halves in the incongruent condition, the negative condition, 
the positive condition, or the congruent condition, t(18) = 0.19, p = .849, t(18) = 0.28, p = .784 
and t(18) = 0.78, p = .447, t(18) = 1.90, p = .073, r = .06 respectively (Bonferroni correction; 
α = .0125).  
There was also an interaction between experimental order and speaker for subjects, 
F1(3,54) = 37.91, p < .001, η
2
p = .68, but not for items, F2(1,32) < 1, p = .333. There was no 
difference in accuracy between the first and the second half, whether when Peter Pan was the 
speaker, t(18) = 0.01, p = .992, or when Captain Hook was, t(18) = 1.55, p = .138. Participants 
were more accurate with Peter Pan as speaker than with Captain Hook, both in the first, 
t(18) = 5.66, p < .001, r = .63, and the second half, t(18) = 5.40, p < .001, r = .62. 
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Finally, there was an interaction between speaker, experimental order and comparison 
condition, for subjects, F1(3,54) = 17.04, p < .001, η
2
p = .49, but not for items, F2(3,32) = 1.95, 
p = .141. The interaction between speaker and comparison condition was significant in the first 
half of the task, F1(3,54) = 27.00, p < .001, η
2
p = .60, as well as in the second half, 
F1(3,54) = 31.53, p < .001, η
2
p = .64. There was no interaction between experimental order and 
comparison condition when the speaker was malevolent, F1(3,54) = 1.84, p = .151, or when he 
was benevolent, F1(3,54) < 1, p < .766. Finally there was no interaction between experimental 
order and speaker in any of the comparison conditions (highest F = 2.05, lowest p = .170). 
4.3.2.2. Directionality 
I compared the choices made under the two speaker conditions and under the two conditions 
with no correct answer (low and high conditions) in order to check if participants’ preference for 
the option presented with the positive verbal probability could be reduced by a speaker is 
deemed malevolent. As in Experiment 3a, participants received 0 for each negative expression 
and 1 for each positive expression chosen, and these were averaged to give a score between 0 
and 1. Mean proportions of choices of the positive verbal probabilities in the high and low 
conditions are presented in Figure 20. 
A 2 (comparison condition: low or high) by 2 (speaker condition: benevolent or malevolent) 
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a main effect of comparison 
condition on the preference for positive verbal probabilities: participants chose the outcome 
presented with a positive verbal probability significantly more often under the high condition 
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a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
Figure 20: Mean Proportion of Choices in Favour of the Positive Verbal Probability (Standard Deviation) as 
Function of the Comparison Condition and the Speaker Condition (Experiment 3b) 
 
than under the low condition for subjects, F1(1,18) = 5.99, p = .025, 
2
p = .25, but not for 
items, F2(1,16) = 2.77, p = .115, 
2
p = .15. 
The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of speaker: participants chose the outcome 
presented with a positive verbal probability significantly more often when Peter Pan was 
speaking than when Captain Hook was, F1(1,18) = 37.13, p < .001, 
2
p = .67, and for items, 
F2(1,16) = 42.13, p < .001, 
2
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Peter Pan was speaking, participants chose the outcome described by a positive verbal 
probability more often in the high condition than in the low condition, t(18) = 10.93, p < .001, 
r = .82. This was not the case when Captain Hook was speaking, t(18) =1.49, p = .153. 
One-sample t-tests indicated that when Peter Pan was the speaker, participants chose the 
outcome described by a positive verbal probability significantly more often than chance, both in 
the low and high conditions, t(18) = 9.73, p < .001, r = .75 and t(18) = 24.79, p < .001, r = .94 
respectively; when Captain Hook was the speaker, participants chose more often the option 
described by a negative verbal probability. However they did not do this significantly more than 
they would be expected to by chance, t(18) = -1.88, p = .076, in the low condition, and 
t(18) = 1.75, p = .097, in the high condition. 
A second analysis was conducted taking into account the experimental order. The main 
effect of comparison condition remained the same, that is significant for subjects but not for 
items (lowest F = 2.77, highest p = .115). The main effect of speaker and the interaction of 
comparison condition and speaker remained for subjects and for items (lowest F = 6.20, highest 
p = .024). There was no effect of experimental order both for subjects, F1(1,18) < 1, p = .839, or 
for items, F2(1,16) < 1, p = .503. There was no interaction between speaker and experimental 
order, for subjects, F1(1,18) = 2.59, p = .125, but there was one for items, F2(1,16) = 8.44, 
p = .010. Participants chose more often the option described by a positive verbal probability 
when Peter Pan was speaking than when Captain Hook was speaking, both in the first half, 
t(17) = 5.20, p < .001, r = .70, and in the second half, t(17) = 6.05, p < .001, r = .77 (Bonferroni 
correction; α = .025). There was no difference between the first and the second halves, when 
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Peter Pan was the speaker, t(17) = 1.08, p = .297. However, when Captain Hook was the 
speaker, participants chose the option described by a positive verbal probability less often in the 
first half than in the second half, t(17) = 2.77, p = .013, r = .23 (Bonferroni correction; α = .025).  
Finally, there was no interaction between experimental order and comparison condition 
both for subjects or for items, nor between time condition, experimental order and comparison 
condition, for subjects or for items (all F < 1, lowest p =.617).  
4.3.2.3. Response time 
In order to investigate if making decisions that take into account speakers’ intentions was 
accompanied by an increase in response time, I compared response times under the two 
speaker conditions and under each comparison condition (low, high, positive, negative, 
congruent and incongruent). I used the medians of each participant in each condition. Means of 
median response times according to the comparison conditions are presented Figure 21.  
A 6 (comparison condition: incongruent, low, negative, high, positive or congruent) by 2 
(speaker condition: benevolent or malevolent) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
revealed a main effect of comparison condition on the response time both for subjects, 
F1(5,90) = 16.31, p < .001, η
2
p = .48, and for items, F2(5,48) = 6.27, p < .001, η
2
p = .40. Planned 
repeated contrasts (order of conditions: incongruent, negative, low, positive, high, congruent) 
found only the low and positive conditions to be significantly different, F1(1,18) = 16.27, 
p = .001, η2p = .48. Therefore I ran a post-hoc special contrast which confirmed that response 
time was longer under the low, incongruent and negative conditions, compared to the high,  
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a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
Figure 21: Mean Response Time (in msec.) as Function of the Comparison Condition and the Speaker 
Condition (Experiment 3b) 
 
positive and congruent conditions (see Table 6 for F and p values). 
The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of speaker. Response time was significantly longer 
when the speaker was Captain Hook than when it was Peter Pan, both for subjects, 
F1(1,18) = 5.48, p = .031, 
2
p = .23, and for items, F2(1,48) = 8.22, p = .006, η
2
p = .15. The ANOVA 
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F1(5,90) = 2.11, p = .072, 
2
p = .11, or for items, F2(5,48) = 1.43, p = .229, η
2
p = .13.  
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Table 6 
Post-Hoc Special Contrasts on the Response Time (Experiment 3b) 
compared conditions F values p values η2p 
low vs. high 29.47  < .001a .62 
low vs. positive 16.27  = .001a .48 
low vs. congruent 46.05  < .001a .72 
incongruent vs. high 29.75 < .001a .62 
incongruent vs. positive 10.58  = .004a .37 
incongruent vs. congruent 28.13  < .001a .61 
negative vs. high 22.16 < .001a .55 
negative vs. positive 8.25 = .010 .31 
negative vs. congruent 31.46 < .001a .64 
a
 significant after Bonferroni correction (for 9 tests, α = .0056) 
 
A second analysis was conducted taking into account the experimental order. The main 
effect of comparison condition and of speaker remained for subjects and for items (lowest 
F = 6.27, highest p = .006), and the interaction between comparison condition and speaker 
remained not significant for subjects and for items (highest F = 3.65, lowest p = .072). There was 
a main effect of experimental order both for subjects, F1(1,18) = 8.36, p = .010, η
2
p = .32, and for 
items, F2(1,48) = 293.37, p < .001, η
2
p = .86. 
There was no interaction between speaker and experimental order, for subjects or for items, 
no interaction between experimental order and comparison condition, for subjects or for items, 
and no interaction between speaker, experimental order and comparison condition, for subjects 
or for items (highest F = 1.69, lowest p = .154). 
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Additional analyses run using only successful trials yielded similar results. I found a main 
effect of comparison condition comparing only the four conditions where successful trials could 
be distinguished from failed ones, F1(3,48) = 4.03, p = .012, η
2
p = .20. I found a marginal effect of 
speaker, F1(1,16) = 4.25, p = .056, η
2
p = .21. Finally, the interaction between comparison 
condition and speaker was not significant, F1(3,48) = 1.93, p = .108. 
4.3.2.4. Individual analyses 
During the data analyses, observation of the distributions of accuracy and directionality 
revealed two patterns of answers. In the congruent condition, some participants (N = 6) made 
as many accurate decisions when the speaker was benevolent (Md = 34) and when the speaker 
was malevolent (Md = 34), T = 3, z = -0.76, p = .450. The other participants (N = 13) made more 
accurate decisions when the speaker was benevolent (Md = 33) than when he was malevolent 
(Md = 3), T = 0, z = -3.19, p = .001. 
I therefore compared the accuracy of each group of participants under each condition, as 
well as their preference for the positive directionality. The group who did not display differences 
of accuracy in the congruent condition, between the two speakers, did not display differences 
either in the other conditions: in the positive condition, T = 12, z = -1.23, p = .216 (for 
benevolent speaker, Md = 32; for malevolent speaker, Md = 33.5); in the negative condition, 
T = 5, z = -1.15, p = .249 (for benevolent speaker, Md = 22; for malevolent speaker, Md = 24); in 
the incongruent condition, T = 14.5, z = -0.85, p = .398 (for benevolent speaker, Md = 13; for 
malevolent speaker, Md = 14). 
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The group who displayed differences of accuracy in the congruent condition, between the 
two speakers, also displayed differences of accuracy in the positive condition, T = 0, z = -3.19, 
p = .001 (for benevolent speaker, Md = 34; for malevolent speaker, Md = 4), and in the negative 
condition, T = 1, z = -3.11, p = .002 (for benevolent speaker, Md = 22; for malevolent speaker, 
Md = 9.5). Their accuracy was however not different in the incongruent condition, T = 16.5, z = -
2.03, p = .043 (for benevolent speaker, Md = 14; for malevolent speaker, Md = 21; Bonferroni 
correction, α = .0125). 
The group who did not display differences of accuracy in the congruent condition, between 
the two speakers, did not display differences either in their preference for the positive 
directionality: in the low condition, T = 4.5, z = -1.26, p = .207 (for benevolent speaker, Md = 23; 
for malevolent speaker, Md = 23); in the high condition, T = 6, z = -0.41, p = .686 (for benevolent 
speaker, Md = 31; for malevolent speaker, Md = 31). The group who displayed differences of 
accuracy in the congruent condition, between the two speakers, also displayed differences 
either in their preference for the positive directionality: in the low condition, T = 0, z = -3.18, 
p = .001 (for benevolent speaker, Md = 25; for malevolent speaker, Md = 13); in the high 
condition, T = 0, z = -3.18, p = .001 (for benevolent speaker, Md = 35; for malevolent speaker, 
Md = 3). 
4.3.3. Discussion 
This experiment drew on previous experiments to test the pragmatic account of 
directionality further. As expected, comparing and choosing between two verbal probabilities 
spoken by a benevolent speaker led to similar patterns of accuracy, preference for positive 
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directionality and response times as I have found before. Crucially when the speaker was 
malevolent, those patterns all differed. The accuracy in the incongruent and negative conditions 
was better in the malevolent speaker condition than in the benevolent speaker condition. In the 
positive and congruent conditions, the accuracy was lower in the malevolent speaker condition 
than in the benevolent speaker condition. The preference for positive directionality, in the 
benevolent speaker condition, shifted to a preference for negative directionality in the 
malevolent speaker condition (low, high, incongruent and congruent conditions). Response 
times were consistently higher in the malevolent speaker condition than in the benevolent 
speaker condition. This suggested that it is costly to integrate the intention of a speaker with 
the information provided by a verbal probability. 
This reversed pattern of accuracy when the speaker was malevolent was stronger when 
considering only the participants who showed an effect of the speaker in the congruent 
condition. However even within this group, the reverse pattern was only trending in the 
incongruent condition. This is however consistent with Chapter 3 and Experiment 3a: in the 
incongruent condition, the directionality and the likelihood are giving opposite cues regarding 
what to choose, and it seems that a consequence of this is a generally lower performance. In 
fact, the lower performance in that condition, as I suggested in Chapter 3, highlights that people 
seem not to treat only the directionality, but to also take into account the likelihood (at least 
implicitly). Therefore when the malevolent character speaks, participants could decide to use 
either the directionality or the likelihood as reversed cue (as they did in the positive and 
negative condition). 
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The picture formed by this set of changes brought by a malevolent speaker is in line with a 
pragmatic account of directionality. I suggest that directionality is more than just a feature 
reflecting the likelihood of a verbal probability, as suggested by Budescu et al. (2003). 
Directionality allows speakers to convey their intention, and is interpreted as such. Adults’ 
decisions reflected an integration of both directionality and what is known of the speaker’s 
intentions. Children in Experiment 1b dismissed directionality when the speaker was 
malevolent, instead of reversing it. However, this could also reflect consideration of the 
intention and directionality, directionality being used or not depending on the speaker’s 
intentions. Presumably considering both fully in order to reverse directionality entails higher 
demands on cognitive resources. This is reflected in the longer response times observed in the 
malevolent condition, and could explain why children only partially considered both. 
It is noteworthy, however, that about a third of participants did not display different 
patterns of answers between the benevolent and the malevolent condition. It is possible that 
the manipulation of the intention simply failed with this subset of participants. However, it 
might also be that these participants thought of a double-bluff, attributing to the malevolent 
speaker the intention to trick by making them believe s/he was misleading. The paradigm used 
here did not allow us to distinguish these two possibilities, but if it were true the latter 
possibility may suggest individual differences in the use of directionality. That is, higher 
cognitive resources and/or greater theory of mind abilities could be linked to a greater 
sensitivity and finer use of this feature of verbal probabilities. As theory of mind is linked to 
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pragmatic abilities (e.g., Happé, 1993), such a possibility would further support the pragmatic 
account of verbal probabilities.  
4.4. General discussion 
In this chapter, I set out to further develop the pragmatic account of directionality. In 
Chapter 3, I showed that the framing effect of directionality can be overcome when the verbal 
probabilities are of similar likelihood, if the time pressure is relieved. However in this chapter, I 
showed that this was not the case when the decision was made in a more conversational 
context (Experiment 3a). I suggested that directionality is a pragmatic feature of verbal 
probabilities that listeners interpret as a cue from speakers to signal what they want listeners to 
choose or what they know to be the correct answer. 
In Experiment 3b, I gained further support for this account by manipulating the intention of 
the speaker. When the speaker was benevolent the results displayed similar patterns to Chapter 
3 and Experiment 3a. That is, participants preferred the option described by the positive verbal 
probability and performed less well when choosing between two negative verbal probabilities 
or between two incongruent ones. When the speaker was malevolent however, they prefer the 
option described by the negative verbal probability. They also performed better when 
comparing two negative verbal probabilities or two incongruent ones, while performing less 
well when comparing two congruent verbal probabilities or two positive ones.  
This suggests that as a feature of verbal probabilities, directionality indicates to listeners 
what a speaker wants them to do, or know of the correct answer. Note that it could be that 
listeners make a pragmatic interpretation that is different to the speakers’ pragmatic intention. 
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In both the relevance account of pragmatics (e.g., Wilson & Sperber, 2004), as well as in the 
Gricean account (Grice, 1975), speakers are required to communicate what they think as true as 
much as possible. According to the relevance account, this is so that they do not waste listeners’ 
cognitive resources. On that perspective, listeners would behave as if speakers chose their 
language purposely. They would therefore have to attend to the choices the speaker made. 
Therefore if a speaker presents two different options with a positive verbal probability for one 
and a negative verbal probability for the other, the listener would infer that this choice is 
intended and may deduce that this is because the speaker wants him to choose the option 
described by the positive verbal probability. 
This would explain why choices can be framed by positive verbal probabilities (e.g., Teigen & 
Brun, 1999; Gourdon & Villejoubert, 2009; this thesis, Experiment 2a). The directionality induces 
a change in the listener’s perspective (e.g., Sanford & Moxey 2003), framing the decision-
making. But more importantly the listener interprets it based on other pieces of information, for 
example social cues. This is supported by my results in Experiment 3b, where changing the 
intention of the speaker changed the frame of the decision-making, suggesting that listeners 
reinterpreted the frame in light of speakers’ intention. This suggestion is further supported by 
an increase in response times when responding to the malevolent speaker. 
The reinterpretation of directionality by listeners also supports the recent account of 
epistemic vigilance (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). In this perspective, human beings always 
evaluate the competency of speakers, forecasters, etc, and reinterpret their statements 
accordingly if needed. For example, when a speaker is introduced as being malevolent, children 
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did the opposite of what the speaker recommended (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). In this thesis, in 
Experiment 3b, adult participants reinterpreted verbal probabilities when a known malevolent 
speaker provided them information. Similarly to children in Mascaro and Sperber, they chose 
the opposite of what the speaker seemed to suggest them to choose, developing a preference 
for options described by a negative verbal probability. 
Research into how children use information from unreliable speakers suggests that children 
ignore information from incompetent speakers (e.g., Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009). However, 
they use the information in a different way when the speaker is deemed malevolent (Mascaro & 
Sperber, 2009). In Experiment 3b, I showed that adults also use the information provided in 
verbal probabilities in a different way when confronted by a malevolent speaker. But little is 
known about what adults would do if the speaker was judged simply incompetent. Based on 
children’s results, they may dismiss the information and make decisions randomly. To test this 
directly, one could draw from Koenig and Harris‘(2005) testimony paradigm. In this paradigm, 
participants watch the speaker make mistakes, or not, and build their own representation of the 
speaker’s competence. This could be adapted to intention, with a speaker who states 
inaccurately what is in a box, even though he just had a look in the box (which excludes that he 
does not know), suggesting that he is purposely wrong. Another speaker would be presented as 
simply incompetent, giving incorrect information because, for example, he cannot see in the 
box as it is too far. Finally, there would also be a benevolent/competent speaker as a control. If 
incompetence and malevolence are treated differently by adults, the directionality of the verbal 
probabilities should be lead to a preference for the positive in the benevolent condition, and 
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preference for the negative in the malevolent condition. In the incompetent condition, the 
directionality should be ignored. 
In this chapter I have shown that in a conversational context, participants display a 
preference for the positive directionality even if they are given unlimited time to choose 
between two options. I have also shown that the directionality can be used in a reverse way 
when a speaker is deemed malevolent. That is, a preference for a negative directionality is 
displayed instead of the preference for a positive one. I suggest that this supports a pragmatic 
account of directionality, where to listeners, directionality is a cue of what speakers want them 
to do, or know they should do.  
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CHAPTER 5: SHOULD THE MESSENGER BE SHOT? RESPONSIBILITY JUDGEMENTS 
OF SPEAKERS USING VERBAL AND NUMERICAL PROBABILITIES. 
5.1. Introduction 
On October 22nd, 2012, an Italian tribunal condemned a team of seismologists for 
manslaughter, after a series of events that had been described both as bad scientific 
communication (e.g., Ropeik, 2012, October 22) and normal scientific uncertainty (e.g., Leshner, 
2010, June 29). On April 6th, 2009, an earthquake at L’Aquila (Abruzzo, Italy) killed almost 300 
people, only six days after the Commissione Grandi Rischi (Large Risks Committee; own 
translation) had met to discuss the seismic situation of the region. Without the trial transcripts, 
it is unclear which words were most held against the scientists, but overall they were accused of 
understating the risk and over-reassuring the population. The minutes from the 
Commissione Grandi Rischi (March 31st, 2009) cite one of the scientists saying that ‘[it was] 
improbable that there would be, in the short-term, an earthquake like the 1703 one [in the 
Appenine]’ (improbabile che ci sia a breve una scossa come quella del 1703; own translation). 
Improbable is a verbal probability representing a low risk, but it does not deny all risk. Although 
to my knowledge there are no published studies of Italian verbal probabilities, English-speaking 
populations estimate improbable as expressing as much as 30% (e.g., Budescu et al., 2003). But 
one important feature of improbable (or improbabile in that case) is its negative directionality. 
This negative directionality would be expected to focus the receiver on the non-occurrence of 
the uncertain event (see e.g., Teigen & Brun, 1988). In this chapter, I set out to explore this 
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phenomenon, that is, how different modes of risk communication, including different 
directionalities, influence how responsibility is attributed to speakers predicting uncertain 
events.  
According to the so-called communication mode preference paradox (Erev & Cohen, 1990), 
people prefer being told about the probability of an uncertain event through a numerical format 
(e.g., a percentage). However, when they have to communicate such a probability to someone, 
people prefer to use a verbal probability (e.g., There is a chance). Asked to justify these two 
preferences, people mentioned the higher level of precision of numerical probabilities on one 
hand, and the fact that verbal probabilities are more natural to express on the other (Wallsten, 
Budescu, Zwick & Kemp, 1993). These reasons were, however, produced explicitly and could 
have resulted from a post-hoc rationalization. 
One alternative account that could also explain the communication mode preference 
paradox is that people do not want to engage too much in predicting an outcome (Beyth-
Marom, 1982). Beyth-Marom argued that the interindividual variability (e.g., Hamm, 1999) in 
the interpretation of verbal probabilities allows one to avoid having one’s predictions judged on 
their quality. She gave the example that when judged on the quality of predictions, one can still 
reply ‘I said it is possible’ (p. 258). That is, one can avoid being held responsible if the uncertain 
event does not ultimately occur. Such an account is consistent with the Communication Mode 
Preference paradox: it is easier to hold speakers responsible if they gave precise information 
that turned out to be wrong, since the predictions can be compared against the outcomes. If 
listeners received a vague statement, they could, as just said, blame themselves for 
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misunderstanding the statement. But listeners could also blame themselves simply for having 
made a decision relying only on vague information. 
In this chapter I aimed to test such an explanation of the preference paradox indirectly, by 
testing whether people judge speakers as more responsible when they use numerical 
probabilities than when they use verbal probabilities. To my knowledge only Dieckmann 
investigated the influence of the communication mode upon the responsibility judgements in 
his PhD dissertation (2007). Dieckmann gave participants a scenario where an intelligence 
forecast had been delivered a few weeks before a terrorist attack. The intelligence report used 
three different probability formats: externally framed numerical probability (e.g., The 
probability that the event will occur is X%), internally framed numerical probability (e.g., We are 
X% sure...) and externally framed numerical probability with a confidence interval. Dieckmann 
also used four different likelihood levels, from 0 to 10%. Participants judged the credibility of 
the source, the usefulness of the prediction, and how much should the forecaster be blamed 
(‘How much blame do you think should be placed on the analysts that produced the intelligence 
report?’). 
Dieckmann (2007) found no difference in attributions of blame between the different 
modes. However in his scenarios, events had only a low likelihood of occurring and he used only 
numerical probabilities. Also the judgements were framed as judgements of blame, which 
impedes de facto holding someone responsible for something positive. I will improve on this 
design, testing the influence of the communication mode on judgements of responsibility at 
different levels of likelihood (high or low) and varying the nature of the outcome (the uncertain 
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event occurred or did not). As outcomes will be negative and positive, I will ask about 
responsibility rather than blame. 
Furthermore, a number of recent studies found the so-called Knobe effect (or side-effect 
effect, Knobe, 2003), where judgements of intentionality are influenced by the valence of a final 
outcome. In the original Knobe effect, ultimately negative consequences lead to higher 
judgements of blame (e.g., Pellizzoni, Siegal & Surian, 2009). Therefore I also manipulated the 
valence of the uncertain events, using both positive ones (e.g., securing a place for one’s first 
choice university) and negative ones (e.g., getting a permanent scar). This allowed trying to 
distinguish whether responsibility judgements are based on the consequences or on the 
accuracy of the prediction. If they are based on the consequences, a negative event ultimately 
occurring or a positive event ultimately not occurring should yield higher responsibility 
judgements. If responsibility judgements are based on the accuracy of the prediction, they 
should be higher for predictions of low likelihood for events which ultimately do occur or 
predictions of high likelihood for events which ultimately do not occur. 
As highlighted in the L’Aquila earthquake case, it was also important to distinguish between 
positive and negative verbal probabilities. The scientists then used a negative verbal probability. 
Directionality is thought to focus the attention of a listener on the occurrence (positive) or the 
non-occurrence (negative) of an uncertain event (see e.g., Moxey and Sanford, 2000). In 
L’Aquila it would have focused the public on the non-occurrence of an earthquake. If the 
scientists had said that it was a very small chance, they would have focused the public’s 
attention on the occurrence of the earthquake. The public might not have felt that they were 
 144 
 
telling them that it would not happen. Therefore, communicating about a risk using a negative 
verbal probability can be considered as sending a pragmatic cue that the event will not occur. In 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, I already showed that directionality can communicate pragmatic 
information (e.g., the speaker’s intention), and that this information is taken into account. In 
this chapter I will continue to manipulate the directionality of verbal probabilities. That is, I will 
present numerical probabilities, positive verbal probabilities and negative verbal probabilities. 
In this chapter, I will therefore manipulate the format of communication, to distinguish 
between numerical and verbal probabilities, and positive and negative verbal probabilities. I will 
also manipulate the outcome and the valence of the uncertain event, so that the valence of the 
consequences could be manipulated (determined by the interaction of the outcome and the 
valence of event). Finally, I will also manipulate the likelihood, which in interaction with the 
outcome will allow manipulating the accuracy. 
In Experiment 4a, it was expected that the final consequences, rather than the accuracy of 
the prediction, would influence the responsibility judgements, following the Knobe effect 
(Knobe, 2003). That is, the interaction between the event valence and the outcome will 
influence responsibility judgements, rather than the interaction between the likelihood and the 
outcome. Therefore, responsibility judgements should be higher when negative events occurred 
or when positive events did not occur. 
Following the suggestion of Beyth-Marom (1982) that using verbal probabilities mean that 
speakers can undermine their responsibility, higher responsibility judgements were expected 
when the format of communication was numerical probabilities. Finally, as positive and 
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negative verbal probabilities focus the attention on opposite outcomes, it was also expected 
that the pattern of responsibility judgement would be reversed between positive and negative 
verbal probabilities. In Experiments 4b to 4e, I will build up on the results of Experiment 4a to 
consider the potential effects of using precise or round numerical probabilities, both on 
judgements of responsibility and on the willingness to recommend the speaker. 
5.2. Experiment 4a 
5.2.1. Method 
5.2.1.1. Participants 
Fifty undergraduate students enrolled in different courses (mean age = 21.42; range = 18-38; 
42 women) at University of Birmingham (UK) took part in this experiment in exchange for 
course credit or cash (I did not collect data regarding the number of paid participants). Eighteen 
participants read statements based on negative verbal probabilities, 16 read statements based 
on positive verbal probabilities and 16 read statements based on numerical probabilities. 
5.2.1.2. Materials 
I implemented the chance expressions in eight scenarios (see Appendix V, p. 215) relating to 
student life. Although I did not pilot test the suitability of those scenarios beforehand, I 
requested feedback at the end of the questionnaire, where participants indicated that they 
found the scenarios easy to relate to. An example scenario read as follows: ‘When he went to 
Keele University for visit day, Samuel asked a student about the admission rates. The student at 
the visit day told him that [verbal or numerical probability] more applicants will be admitted this 
year’. The scenarios were written so that their uncertain event had one of two possible valences 
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(positive, e.g., being admitted at university; negative, e.g., having a permanent scar after a mole 
removal). 
Two levels of likelihood each with two versions (low, i.e. 20 or 40% vs. high, i.e. 60 or 80%) 
were combined with two possible outcomes (occurrence or non-occurrence). The four 
conditions thus obtained were counterbalanced across the eight scenarios in order to constitute 
a factorial design with the event valence (positive or negative) to give 2 levels of likelihood x 2 
possible outcomes x 2 event valences. Therefore each scenario was presented with different 
outcomes and likelihood. The chance expressions were manipulated between participants: a 
third of them read the scenarios with percentages, another third read them with positive verbal 
probabilities and the last third read them with negative verbal probabilities. Verbal probabilities 
were chosen based on a previous study where Psychology students at the University of 
Birmingham translated verbal probabilities in percentages (Gourdon & Beck, unpublished data), 
their directionality being determined in a similar manner to Chapters 3 and 4.  
5.2.1.3. Procedure 
The questionnaire was presented through Medialab© software. Each scenario was presented 
individually on the screen. When participants finished reading it, they clicked to go on and made 
responsibility judgements on to a scale (5 points, from ‘Not at all responsible’ to ‘Very 
responsible’). The order of presentation of the scenarios was randomized. After rating 
responsibility on each of the eight scenarios, participants answered simple demographic 
questions and had the opportunity to give feedback. 
  
 147 
 
5.2.2. Results 
In order to test if speakers were held more responsible when using numerical probabilities 
and for predicting final negative consequences or for being inaccurate, I compared the 
responsibility judgements in eight conditions, under three different communication modes 
(numerical probability, positive verbal probability or negative verbal probability). Responsibility 
judgements could range from 1 to 5. Mean judgements according to the conditions and the 
communication modes are presented in Figure 226. 
 
  
a error bars represent standard errors of the mean  
Figure 22: Mean Responsibility Judgement as Function of the Communication Mode, the Likelihood the 
Event was Predicted with, the Valence of the Event, and the Outcome (Experiment 4a) 
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A 2 (likelihood: low or high) by 2 (event valence: negative or positive) by 2 (outcome: non-
occurrence or occurrence) by 3 (communication mode: numerical, positive verbal or negative 
verbal) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) found no main effect of communication mode on 
responsibility judgements, F(2,47) = 2.30, p = .112, nor of likelihood, F(1,47) = 1.12, p = .295, 
event valence, F(1,47) = 1.46, p = .233, or outcome, F(1,47) = 2.22, p = .143. There was also no 
interaction between likelihood and communication mode, F(2,47) = 2.22, p = .120, between 
outcome and communication mode, F(2,47) < 1, p = .749, and between likelihood and outcome, 
F(147) < 1, p = .573. 
There was an interaction between event valence and communication mode, F(2,47) = 14.47, 
p < .001, η2p = .38. Post-hoc ANOVAs indicated that there was a main effect of communication 
mode when the uncertain event was negative, F(2,47) = 17.13, p < .001, η2p = .42. Speakers were 
judged more responsible for predicting a negative event with a numerical, p < .001, or a positive 
verbal probability, p < .001, than with a negative verbal probability, but similarly when using a 
numerical or a positive verbal probability, p > .999 (all three pairwise comparisons applied with 
Bonferroni correction of the p-value). There was no main effect of communication mode when 
speakers predicted a positive event, F(2,47) = 3.25, p = .048 (Bonferroni correction; α = .025). 
There was also an interaction between likelihood and valence, F(1,47) = 4.11, p = .048, 
η2p = .08. Post-hoc paired t-tests applied with Bonferroni correction (α = .025) indicated that 
speakers were not judged more responsible for predicting that positive events had a low 
likelihood than for predicting that negative events had a low likelihood, t(49) = 2.04, p = .047. 
The valence of the event did not matter either when the prediction was of a high likelihood, 
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t(49) = 0.11, p = .911. There was also no difference between predictions of events having a low 
likelihood and predictions of events having a high likelihood, both for negative events, 
t(49) = 1.91, p = .063, and for positive events, t(49) = 0.55, p = .586 (paired t-tests applied with 
Bonferroni correction; α = .025). 
There was a final two-way interaction between event valence and outcome, F(1,47) = 16.58, 
p < .001, η2p = .26. Post-hoc paired t-tests applied with Bonferroni correction (α = .025) 
indicated that speakers were judged more responsible when positive events did not occur than 
when negative events did not occur, t(49) = 4.72, p < .001, r = .43, while the valence of the event 
did not matter when the event occurred, t(49) = 1.34, p = .186. Speakers were also judged more 
responsible when positive events did not occur than when they occurred, t(49) = 3.70, p = .001, 
r = .33, but not when negative events occurred rather than not, t(49) = 2.19, p = .033 (paired t-
tests applied with Bonferroni correction; α = .025) 
There was a marginal interaction between likelihood, outcome and communication mode, 
F(2,47) = 3.04, p = .058, η2p = .11. Further ANOVAs indicated that there was no interaction 
between likelihood and outcome when the communication mode was a negative verbal 
probability, F(1,17) = 2.34, p = .229, when it was a positive verbal probability, F(1,15) = 2.69, 
p = .122, or when it was a numerical probability, F(1, 15) < 1, p = .620 (Bonferroni correction; 
α = .0167). When the outcome did not occur, there was no interaction between communication 
mode and likelihood, F(2,47) = 3.27, p = .047, or when the outcome occurred, F(2,47) < 1, 
p = .463 (Bonferroni correction; α = .0167). Finally, there was no interaction between outcome 
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and communication mode when the likelihood was low, F(2,47) = 2.33, p = .109, or when it was 
high, F(2,47) < 1, p = .414. 
There was no three-way interaction between likelihood, event valence and communication 
mode, F(2,47) = 1.27, p = .291, between event valence, outcome and communication mode, 
F(2,47) < 1, p = .382, or between likelihood, event valence and outcome, F(1,47) = 2.06, p = .158. 
Finally, there was no interaction between likelihood, event valence, outcome and 
communication mode, F(2,47) < 1, p = .503. 
5.2.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 4a, I asked participants to judge the responsibility of speakers giving uncertain 
statements about scenarios of daily life. The uncertain events were of positive or negative 
valence, and they did or did not occur ultimately. Speakers were judged more responsible for 
predicting a positive event that did not occur, that is when there were negative consequences. 
However, that was not the case for negative consequences emerging from a negative event that 
did occur. This is in part similar to the general Knobe effect (Knobe, 2003), where negative 
consequences are judged as more intentional than positive ones. The fact that this effect is only 
showing partially might be enlightened by looking at the other effects observed in this 
experiment. 
When the events had a positive valence, speakers were judged more responsible for 
predicting them with a low likelihood, or for predicting them with a negative directionality. 
However, this did not interact further with the outcome. This is surprising, as a negative 
directionality or a low likelihood should focus people’s attention on the non-occurrence of the 
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outcome. Therefore, the possibility that the event will not happen should be more available to 
listeners, who may be expected to hold speakers more responsible if the event in fact occurred 
(as this occurrence will contrast with the focus of attention). However, this assumes that 
responsibility judgements are driven by speakers’ accuracy. This was not supported by the 
results here. I found no interaction between the likelihood and the outcome.  
An alternative explanation would be that directionality, and to some extent the likelihood, 
are taken as pragmatic cue of speakers’ intentions, as already observed in Chapters 2 and 4. In 
the pragmatic perspective, using a negative verbal probability to predict a negative event may 
signal that the speaker does not want it to happen to the receiver, whereas predicting a positive 
event with a negative phrase seems to signal a lack of desire to see the receiver enjoy positive 
consequences. This is supported by the interaction between communication mode and event 
valence found in Experiment 4a. For negative events, responsibility judgements were higher 
when a numerical probability or a positive verbal probability was used, and lower when a 
negative  verbal probability was used. For positive events, responsibility judgements were 
similar between the communication modes. In Experiment 3b, I also found that likelihood was 
sometimes used in a pragmatic manner. It was apparently used as a reversed cue when there 
was no difference in directionality and when the speaker was malevolent. That is, if the speaker 
was malevolent and the decision could only be made based on likelihood, decision makers 
chose more often the event described as having a low likelihood than the one with a high 
likelihood. Similarly, it seems that using a low likelihood is to some extent (i.e. only when 
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predicting positive events) perceived as signalling the speaker’s wish that the receiver does not 
enjoy this positive event.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that all communication mode effects were due to negative verbal 
probabilities eliciting different judgements. This is not consistent with an account of the 
Communication Mode Preference paradox based on vagueness leading to a ‘diffusion’ of the 
responsibility. According to this account I would expect responsibility based on both positive 
and negative verbal probabilities to differ from percentages. In Experiment 4a, positive verbal 
probabilities and numerical probabilities led to essentially similar judgements. However, in 
Experiment 4a, I used only round numerical verbal probabilities (e.g., there is an 80% chance, 
there is a 20% chance), which might seem too artificial and/or might be too vague to elicit 
strong responsibility inferences. In the same way that speakers could say that they ‘only said it 
was possible’ after using verbal probabilities (Beyth-Marom, 1982, p.258), speakers could argue 
that they only say that it was around 80%. It is also possible that listeners assume that round 
percentages are the result of speakers averaging different estimations s/he is aware of. While 
when using a precise percentage, speakers might sound as they are directly quoting one of 
those estimates. Experiment 4b aimed to test the possibility that round percentages can be 
perceived as vaguer than precise ones, and therefore still elicit lower responsibility judgements. 
This was done by simply manipulating the preciseness of numerical probabilities, still in 
conjunction with the level of likelihood and the outcome. 
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5.3. Experiment 4b 
5.3.1. Method 
5.3.1.1. Participants 
Sixteen Psychology students from a Birmingham (UK) high school (mean age = 16.94; 
range = 16-18; 12 girls) took part in this experiment as part of their psychology curriculum. Half 
the participants (20) read statements based on round percentages, and the other half (20) read 
statements based on precise percentages. 
5.3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
I implemented the numerical probabilities in eight scenarios (see Appendix VI, p. 217) 
relating to student life. All scenarios related to a positive uncertain event. The eight scenarios 
included the four scenarios which presented a positive event in Experiment 4a, as well as one of 
the negative event scenarios, but modified. Three new scenarios were therefore created to 
replace the negative event scenarios that could not plausibly be modified to be positive. 
Two levels of likelihood (low, i.e. 20 or 40% vs. high, i.e. 60 or 80%) were combined with two 
possible outcomes (occurrence or non-occurrence). The four conditions thus obtained were 
counterbalanced across the eight scenarios. The numerical probabilities were manipulated 
between participants: half of them read the scenarios with round percentages (e.g., 60%), and 
the other half read them with precise percentages (e.g., 63%). The procedure was as in 
Experiment 4a. 
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5.3.2. Results 
In order to test if speakers were held more responsible when using precise numerical 
probabilities, I compared the responsibility judgements in four conditions, under two different 
communication modes (precise or round numerical probability). Responsibility judgements 
could range from 1 to 5. Mean judgements according to the conditions and the communication 
modes are presented in Table 7. 
A 2 (likelihood: low or high) by 2 (outcome: non-occurrence or occurrence) by 2 
(communication mode: round or precise) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) found no main 
effect of communication mode on responsibility judgements, F(1,14) < 1, p = .858, nor of 
likelihood, F(1,14) < 1, p = .603. There was a main effect of outcome, F(1,14) = 6.77, p = .021,  
 
Table 7 
Mean Responsibility Judgement (Standard Deviation) as Function of the Likelihood the Event was 
Predicted to Have, the Outcome and the Communication Mode (Experiment 4b) 
  precise percentages round percentages 
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event did not occur 3.25 (0.93) 3.88 (0.79) 
event occurred 3.50 (1.07) 2.75 (1.16) 
h
ig
h
 li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 
event did not occur 3.19 (1.39) 4.25 (0.60) 
event occurred 3.06 (1.18) 2.38 (1.09) 
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η2p = .33; speakers were judged more responsible when the uncertain event did not occur than 
when it occurred. 
There was no interaction between likelihood and communication mode, F(1,14) < 1, 
p = .603, or between likelihood and outcome, F(1,14) = 2.54, p = .133. There was an interaction 
between outcome and communication mode, F(1,14) = 8.00, p = .013, η2p = .36. Post-hoc paired 
t-tests applied with Bonferroni correction (α = .025) indicated that when using a round 
percentage, speakers were judged more responsible when an event did not occurred than when 
it occurred, t(7) = 3.82, p = .007, r = .82. This was not the case when using precise percentages, 
t(7) = 0.16, p = .877. Speakers who used a precise percentage were not judged as more 
responsible than speakers who used a round one when the event occurred, t(14) = 1.51, 
p = .155, or when it did not occur, t(14) = 2.10, p = .054 (independent t-tests with Bonferroni 
correction; α = .025). Finally there was no three-way interaction between likelihood, outcome 
and communication mode, F(1,14) < 1, p = .603. 
5.3.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 4b, I aimed to test if Experiment 4a failed to find a difference between verbal 
and numerical probabilities because the percentages used were too vague. Although 
Experiment 4b was underpowered, it suggests that round percentages led to differential 
judgements, still displaying a Knobe effect (e.g., Knobe, 2003) where the non-occurrence of a 
positive event (i.e., a negative consequence) led to higher responsibility judgements. However, 
precise percentages seemed to led to similar judgements whatever the outcome or the 
likelihood, and more importantly did not overall differ from round percentages. This suggested 
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that more precise predictions may not lead to infer more responsibility to speakers than 
predictions using only a round percentage. However it could also be that as the percentages 
used here were precise, they seemed unrealistic to participants. It might seem odd that one 
might say There is a 63% chance that… For example, Witteman, Zimund-Fisher, Waters, 
Gavaruzzi and Fagerlin (2011) showed that receivers of numerical probabilities find percentages 
with decimal places less credible than integer-based percentages.  
Therefore Experiment 4c aimed to explore this. Participants were asked to what extent they 
would recommend the speakers for advice based on their predictions. If precise percentages are 
less credible (Witteman et al., 2011), speakers using them should be perceived as less 
trustworthy. Therefore, they should be less recommended as forecasters. The Knobe effect 
(Knobe, 2003) leads to more responsibility being attributed when consequences are negative. 
As they are judged more responsible, speakers should be less recommended. That is, following 
the Knobe effect, when consequences are negative, speakers should be less likely to be 
recommended.  
5.4. Experiment 4c 
5.4.1. Method 
5.4.1.1. Participants 
Forty Psychology students (mean age = 19.33; range = 18-33; 34 women) at University of 
Birmingham (UK) took part in this experiment in exchange for course credits. Half the 
participants (20) read statements based on round percentages, and the other half (20) read 
statements based on precise percentages. 
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5.4.1.2. Materials and procedure 
The materials were identical to Experiment 4b, with the addition of a supplementary scale. 
Participants had to imagine that somebody else asked the main character of the scenario to 
recommend the forecaster (e.g., ‘Imagine somebody else wanted to ask Peter’s uncle for 
information. How likely would Peter be to recommend asking him?’). Participants then indicated 
on a 5 point-scale how likely they would be to recommend the speaker to a friend, from ‘Not 
likely at all’ to ‘Very likely’.  
The questionnaire was implemented through the Kwik Survey© software, so it could be filled 
online by participants. As it was not possible to randomize the order of presentation of the 
scenarios with Kwik Survey, counterbalancing was used to choose the order of display. The 
order of presentation of the responsibility and recommendation scales was also 
counterbalanced. The procedure was otherwise similar to Experiments 4a and 4b. 
5.4.2. Results 
5.4.2.1. Responsibility judgements 
As in Experiment 4b, I tested whether speakers were held more responsible when using 
precise numerical probabilities by comparing the responsibility judgements in four conditions, 
under two different communication modes (precise or round numerical probability). 
Responsibility judgements could range from 1 to 5. Mean judgements according to the 
conditions and the communication modes are presented in Table 8. 
A 2 (likelihood: low or high) by 2 (outcome: non-occurrence or occurrence) by 2 
(communication mode: round or precise) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) found a main  
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Table 8 
Mean Responsibility Judgement (Standard Deviation) as Function of the Likelihood the Event was 
Predicted to Have, the Outcome and the Communication Mode (Experiment 4c) 
  precise percentages round percentages 
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event did not occur 1.90 (0.70) 2.48 (0.95) 
event occurred 3.00 (0.95) 3.10 (0.79) 
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event did not occur 2.50 (0.84) 2.95 (1.04) 
event occurred 3.08 (0.99) 3.45 (0.76) 
 
effect of communication mode on responsibility judgements, F(1,38) = 4.80, p = .035, η2p = .11. 
Speakers were judged more responsible when using round percentages than when using precise 
ones, in contrast with Experiment 4b (where the communication mode had no effect). 
There was also a main effect of likelihood, F(1,38) = 7.45, p = .010, η2p = .16; responsibility 
judgements were higher when the uncertain event was predicted to have a high likelihood than 
when it was predicted with a low one. Finally, there was also a main effect of outcome, 
F(1,38) = 25.89, p < .001, η2p = .41; speakers were judged more responsible when the uncertain 
event occurred than when it did not occur. 
There was no interaction between likelihood and communication mode, F(1,38) < 1, 
p = .786, between likelihood and outcome, F(1,38) = 2.37, p = .132, or between outcome and 
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communication mode, F(1,38) < 1, p = .324. Finally there was no three-way interaction between 
likelihood, outcome and communication mode, F(1,38) < 1, p = .349. 
5.4.2.2. Likelihood of recommending 
In order to test if the precise percentages seemed plausible to the participants, I tested 
whether participants would recommend the speakers. I compared the likelihood of 
recommending to a friend in four conditions, under two different communication modes 
(precise or round numerical probability). The likelihood of recommending could range from 1 to 
5. Mean judgements according to the conditions and the communication modes are presented 
in Table 9. 
A 2 (likelihood: low or high) by 2 (outcome: non-occurrence or occurrence) by 2 
(communication mode: round or precise) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) found no main 
effect of communication mode on likelihood of recommending, F(1,38) < 1, p = .397, nor of 
likelihood, F(1,38) = 2.58, p = .116. However, there was a main effect of outcome, 
F(1,38) = 267.45, p < .001, η2p = .88; participants were more likely to recommend the speakers 
when the uncertain event occurred than when it did not occur. 
There was no interaction between likelihood and communication mode, F(1,38) < 1, 
p > .999, or between communication mode and outcome, F(1,38) = 1.97, p = .168. There was an 
interaction between outcome and likelihood, F(1,38) = 7.09, p = .011, η2p = .16. Post-hoc paired 
t-tests applied with Bonferroni correction (α = .025) indicated that when the event did not 
occur, speakers were more likely to be recommended if they had predicted a low likelihood 
than if they had predicted a high one, t(39) = 2.80, p = .008, r = .31. This was not the case when 
 160 
 
Table 9 
Mean Likelihood of recommending (Standard Deviation) as Function of the Likelihood the Event was 
Predicted to Have, the Outcome and the Communication Mode (Experiment 4c) 
  precise percentages round percentages 
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event did not occur 2.35 (0.88) 2.50 (0.93) 
event occurred 4.13 (0.56) 4.18 (0.75) 
h
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event did not occur 2.05 (0.71) 1.75 (0.73) 
event occurred 4.00 (0.90) 4.50 (0.69) 
 
the uncertain event occurred, t(39) = 0.60, p = .555. Finally there was no three-ways interaction 
between likelihood, outcome and communication mode, F(1,38) = 3.67, p = .063.  
5.4.3. Discussion 
In the Experiment 4b, I tested if round percentages are perceived as a vague mode of risk 
communication, by comparing round percentages and precise ones (without decimals). While 
round percentages displayed an effect of the outcome in the manner of the Knobe effect, 
precise percentages showed no effect of either the likelihood or the outcome. This raised the 
possibility that precise percentages were simply dismissed because they seemed unrealistic. 
Thus in Experiment 4c, I also measured how likely speakers were to be recommended, next to 
responsibility judgements.  
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The results from 4c were rather different to 4b: the communication mode had an effect, 
that is using more precise percentages leading to speakers being judged as less responsible. This 
contrasts with my earlier suggestion that using more vague predictions diffuses the 
responsibility. Instead it suggested that the more precise, the less responsible, as if people 
judged speakers based on their effort. This was not apparent in Experiment 4b. This may 
indicate that answering the recommendation scale led participants to consider speakers’ 
performance in more depth. The ‘more precise, less responsible’ finding is also consistent with 
the likelihood of recommending findings. There was an interaction between the likelihood and 
the outcome found in the likelihood of recommending: in the case of events not occurring, the 
likelihood of recommending was higher if the speaker had predicted a low likelihood, that is, if 
the speaker was accurate. 
One could argue that speakers may have been were perceived as simply quoting 
percentages they would have read or heard previously, which would have lessen their 
responsibility. However in that case, the recommendation judgements would not be expected 
to reflect some accuracy of the predictions, since they would not bear any responsibility in the 
forecasting. Although it is possible also that they are recommended for being able to quote 
accurate forecast, that is for choosing sources of information which are of quality. 
The likelihood of recommending was higher when the uncertain event had occurred, that is, 
when consequences were positive since all events were positive. This is consistent with the 
Knobe effect, where blame judgements are higher for negative consequences. If speakers are 
less to blame for positive consequences, they may be expected to be recommended more. 
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However, the responsibility judgements reflected the opposite of a Knobe effect, responsibility 
judgements being higher when the positive event occurred or when it was predicted with a high 
likelihood. This contrasts with Experiments 4a and 4b, where responsibility judgements were 
higher when the consequences were negative. One possibility is that being asked about 
recommendation shifted the meaning of responsibility towards a more positive one. That is, in 
Experiments 4a and 4b, responsibility could have been interpreted as blame. But by asking 
about recommendation as well, I might have brought the focus on trustworthiness. That is I may 
have asked participants to evaluate speakers according to a positive characteristic instead of a 
negative one (blame) in Experiments 4a and 4b. 
Experiment 4d aimed to test for this by asking about responsibility and about 
recommendation to different participants. As I suspected that the effect of the communication 
mode found in Experiment 4c resulted from having to judge recommendations as well as 
responsibility, it was needed to measure the same type of judgements in a between design. 
5.5. Experiment 4d 
5.5.1. Method 
5.5.1.1. Participants 
Eighty Psychology students (mean age = 19.61; range = 18-39; 72 women) at University of 
Birmingham (UK) took part in this experiment in exchange for course credits. Half the 
participants (40) made responsibility judgements, and the other half (40) expressed how likely 
they were to recommend speakers. In each of those two groups, half the participants (20) read 
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statements based on round percentages, and the other half (20) read statements based on 
precise percentages.  
5.5.1.2. Materials and procedure 
The materials used in this Experiment were identical to the materials in Experiment 4c.  
The procedure was as in Experiment 4c, with the only difference that the two different 
scales were administered between participants. 
5.5.2. Results 
5.5.2.1. Responsibility judgements 
As in Experiments 4b and 4c, I tested whether speakers were held more responsible when 
using precise numerical probabilities by comparing the responsibility judgements in four 
conditions, under two different communication modes (precise or round numerical probability). 
Responsibility judgements could range from 1 to 5. Mean judgements according to the 
conditions and the communication modes are presented in Table 10. 
A 2 (likelihood: low or high) by 2 (outcome: non-occurrence or occurrence) by 2 
(communication mode: round or precise) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) found no main 
effect of communication mode on responsibility judgements, F(1,38) < 1, p = .415. There was a 
main effect of likelihood, F(1,38) = 24.37, p = .010, η2p = .39; responsibility judgements were 
higher when the uncertain event was predicted with a high likelihood than when it was 
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Table 10 
Mean Responsibility Judgement (Standard Deviation) as Function of the Likelihood the Event was 
Predicted to Have, the Outcome and the Communication Mode (Experiment 4d) 
  precise percentages round percentages 
lo
w
 li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 
event did not occur 2.10 (0.75) 2.15 (0.83) 
event occurred 2.55 (0.71) 2.28 (0.75) 
h
ig
h
 li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 
event did not occur 2.63 (0.90) 2.63 (0.79) 
event occurred 3.23 (0.85) 2.90 (0.91) 
 
predicted with a low one. Finally, there was also a main effect of outcome, F(1,38) = 11.21, 
p = .002, η2p = .23; speakers were judged more responsible when the uncertain event occurred 
than when it did not occur. 
There was no interaction between likelihood and communication mode, F(1,38) < 1, 
p = .831, between likelihood and outcome, F(1,38) < 1, p = .519, or between outcome and 
communication mode, F(1,38) = 2.25, p = .142. Finally, there was no three-way interaction 
between likelihood, outcome and communication mode, F(1,38) < 1, p > .999. 
5.5.2.2. Likelihood of recommending 
In order to test if the precise percentages seemed plausible, I tested whether participants 
would recommend the speakers by comparing the likelihood of recommending to a friend in 
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four conditions, under two different communication modes (precise or round numerical 
likelihood). The likelihood of recommending could range from 1 to 5. Mean judgements 
according to the conditions and the communication modes are presented in Table 11. 
A 2 (likelihood: low or high) by 2 (outcome: non-occurrence or occurrence) by 2 
(communication mode: round or precise) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) found no main 
effect of communication mode on the likelihood of recommending, F(1,38) < 1, p = .715. 
However there was a main effect of likelihood, F(1,38) = 21.94, p < .001, η2p = .37; speakers 
were more likely to be recommended when they predicted a high likelihood than when they 
predicted a low one. There was also a main effect of outcome, F(1,38) = 89.60, p < .001, 
η2p = .70; participants were more likely to recommend the speakers when the uncertain event 
occurred than when it did not occur. 
There was no interaction between likelihood and communication mode, F(1,38) < 1, 
p = .552, or between likelihood and outcome, F(1,38) < 1, p = .545. There was an interaction 
between outcome and communication mode, F(1,38) = 4.27, p = .046, η2p = .10. Post-hoc paired 
t-tests applied with Bonferroni correction (α = .025) indicated that when speakers used round 
percentages, they were more likely to be recommended if the event ultimately occurred than if 
it did not, t(19) = 8.55, p < .001, r = .82. This was also the case when speakers used precise 
percentages, although with a smaller effect, t(19) = 5.01, p < .001, r = .55. Finally there 
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Table 11 
Mean Likelihood of Recommending (Standard Deviation) as Function of the Likelihood the Event was 
Predicted to Have, the Outcome and the Communication Mode (Experiment 4d) 
  precise percentages round percentages 
lo
w
 li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 
event did not occur 2.10 (0.75) 2.15 (0.83) 
event occurred 2.55 (0.71) 2.28 (0.75) 
h
ig
h
 li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 
event did not occur 2.63 (0.90) 2.63 (0.79) 
event occurred 3.23 (0.85) 2.90 (0.91) 
 
was no three-way interaction between the likelihood, the outcome and the communication 
mode, F(1,38) < 1, p = .545. 
5.5.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 4d, participants either judged the responsibility of speakers giving uncertain 
statements about scenarios in daily life, or judged the likelihood that they would recommend 
these speakers. As in Experiment 4c, the likelihood of recommending showed results consistent 
with the Knobe effect. That is, negative consequences (outcome not occurring) led to lower 
likelihood to be recommended. I suggest that this is because negative consequences lead to 
higher responsibility judgements. 
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Speakers were also more likely to be recommended when they predicted a high likelihood 
for the uncertain event. Crucially, the effect of the outcome did not interact with the predicted 
likelihood, showing an indifference to the accuracy in the recommendations. As in Experiment 
4a, it seems that listeners interpreted that speakers wanted the best outcome for them, or 
rather what is perceived as wishful thinking, matters more than accurately predicting when 
evaluating speakers. If accuracy mattered, I should have found higher likelihood of 
recommending when an event predicted with a high likelihood did not occur, or an event 
predicted with a low likelihood did occur. It seems instead that predicting a high likelihood is 
perceived as speakers signalling that they wish the event (always positive) will happen.  
Also similarly to Experiment 4c, the responsibility judgements displayed an opposite pattern 
to what the Knobe effect would predict: speakers were judged as more responsible when the 
positive event occurred or when it was predicted with a high likelihood. I suggested after 
Experiment 4c that being asked about recommendation might shift the meaning of 
responsibility towards a more positive one, but here this possibility could be excluded, as 
participants only gave responsibility judgements. It is noteworthy, however, that throughout 
this chapter, the consequences have always had an effect on responsibility judgements, but not 
in a consistent direction. In Experiments 4a and 4b, responsibility judgements were higher when 
a positive event did not occur. In Experiments 4c and 4b, responsibility judgements were higher 
when a positive event occurred. One possibility is therefore that the question used in 
Experiments 4a to 4d was too vague to elicit consistent judgements. Responsibility is defined as 
‘the state or fact of being accountable or to blame for something’ (Oxford Online Dictionary, 
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2012). Accountability is a neutral concept likely to encompass responsibility for positive and 
negative events. But blame is a negative concept, likely to encompass only responsibility for 
negative events. It is possible therefore that in Experiments 4a and 4b, participants treated the 
responsibility question as a blame one, but in Experiments 4c and 4d, they treated it as an 
accountability one. 
Experiment 4e was thus set up to compare judgements of responsibility as tested in 
Experiments 4a to 4d and judgements of responsibility in answer to causality-framed questions. 
That is participants were asked how much they thought speakers are responsible for the 
consequence, or how much they think that speaker’s predictions were a cause of the 
consequences. Causality judgements were used as a proxy for accountability. This would allow 
me to exclude the possibility that the responsibility question used so far elicit causality 
judgements. If the responsibility-framed question did not also elicit judgements of causality, 
participants’ responsibility answers to the responsibility-framed questions should be different 
from their answers to the causality-framed questions.  
5.6. Experiment 4e 
5.6.1. Method 
5.6.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-one Psychology students from a Birmingham (UK) high school (mean age = 16.89; 
range = 16-18; 17 girls, 1 undeclared gender) took part in this experiment as part of their 
psychology curriculum. Eleven participants read statements based on precise percentages, and 
10 read statements based on round percentages. In the group which read precise percentages, 
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five read the causality-framed question, and six read the responsibility-framed question. In the 
group which read round percentages, half of participants (five) read the causality-framed 
question, and the other half (five) read the responsibility-framed question. 
5.6.1.2. Materials and procedure 
The materials used in this Experiment were similar to the materials in Experiment 4c, except 
that half the participants judged to what extent the characters of each scenario attributed 
causality to the speaker’s prediction (e.g., How much does Ewan think that his friend’s advice is 
a cause of him winning his bet?). The other half of the participants judged responsibility by 
answering to the same question as in the previous experiments of this chapter. The procedure 
was as in Experiment 4c. Participants answered the causality-framed or the responsibility-
framed question, followed by the recommendation question. 
5.6.2. Results 
5.6.2.1. Responsibility judgements 
I tested whether speakers were held more responsible when using precise numerical 
probabilities by comparing the responsibility judgements in four conditions, under two different 
communication modes (precise or round numerical probability) and when judging responsibility 
by answering two different questions (responsibility-framed or causality-framed). Responsibility 
judgements could range from 1 to 5. Mean judgements according to the conditions and the 
communication modes are presented in Table 12. 
A 2 (likelihood: low or high) by 2 (outcome: non-occurrence or occurrence) by 2 
(communication mode: round or precise) by 2 (question frame: responsibility or causality) 
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mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) found no main effect of communication mode on 
responsibility judgements, F(1,17) < 1, p = .808. There was a main effect of question frame, 
F(1,17) = 9.88, p = .006, η2p = .37; responsibility judgements were higher when they were given 
as answer to the responsibility-framed question than when given through the causality-framed 
question. There was also a main effect of outcome, F(1,17) = 4.44, p = .050, η2p = .21; speakers 
were judged more responsible when the uncertain event did not occur than when it occurred. 
Finally, there was also a main effect of likelihood, F(1,17) = 5.16, p = .036, η2p = .23; speakers 
were judged as more responsible when the uncertain event was predicted with a low likelihood 
than when it was predicted with a high one. 
 
Table 12 
Mean Responsibility Judgement (Standard Deviation) as Function of the Question Frame, the Likelihood 
the Event was Predicted to Have, the Outcome and the Communication Mode (Experiment 4e) 
  causality-framed question responsibility-framed question 
  precise 
percentages 
round 
percentages 
precise 
percentages 
round 
percentages 
lo
w
 li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 
event did not occur 3.20 (0.57) 2.70 (1.26) 3.83 (0.98) 3.90 (1.14) 
event occurred 2.00 (0.50) 2.90 (0.96) 3.25 (1.13) 2.90 (1.14) 
h
ig
h
 li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 
event did not occur 2.90 (1.08) 2.00 (0.79) 2.25 (0.98) 4.00 (1.46) 
event occurred  2.60 (0.85) 1.50 (0.50) 2.50 (1.41) 3.10 (0.42) 
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There was no interaction between: likelihood and communication mode, F(1,17) < 1, 
p = .892; likelihood and question frame, F(1,17) < 1, p = .892; outcome and communication 
mode, F(1,17) < 1, p = .850; outcome and question frame, F(1,17) < 1, p = .824; outcome and 
likelihood, F(1,17) < 1, p = .469; communication mode and question frame, F(1,17) = 3.77, 
p = .069. There was no three-way interaction between likelihood, outcome and communication 
mode, F(1,17) = 2.32, p = .146, nor between likelihood, outcome and question frame, 
F(1,17) < 1, p = .638, or outcome, communication mode and question format, F(1,17) = 2.09, 
p = .167. 
There was a three-way interaction between likelihood, communication mode and question 
format, F(1,17) = 8.89, p = .008, η2p = .34. There was no interaction between communication 
mode and likelihood when the question was framed in terms of responsibility, F(1,9) = 3.69, 
p = .087, or when it was framed in terms of causality, F(1,8) = 6.78, p = .031 (Bonferroni 
correction; α = .025). There was no interaction between question frame and likelihood when the 
communication mode was round, F(1,8) = 3.84, p = .086, or when it was precise, F(1,9) = 5.14, 
p = .050 (Bonferroni correction; α = .025). 
There was no interaction between communication mode and question frame when the 
uncertain event was predicted with a low likelihood, F(1,17) < 1, p = .628. However, when it was 
predicted with a high likelihood, there was a significant interaction between communication 
mode and question frame, F(1,17) = 14.68, p = .001, η2p = .46. Round percentages led to higher 
responsibility judgements than precise percentages when the question was framed in terms of 
responsibility, for events predicted with a high likelihood, t(9) = 2.82, p = .020, r = .69, but not 
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when it was framed in terms of causality, t(8) = 2.64, p = .030 (Bonferroni correction; α = .025). 
The responsibility-framed question led to higher judgements of responsibility when the 
communication mode was round percentages, for events predicted with a high likelihood, 
t(8) = 3.94, p = .004, r = .81, but not when the communication mode was precise percentages, 
t(9) = 1.08, p = .309 (Bonferroni correction; α = .025). Finally, there was no interaction between 
likelihood, outcome, communication mode and question frame, F(1,17) < 1, p = .579. 
5.6.2.2. Likelihood of recommending 
I tested whether speakers were more likely to be recommended when using precise 
numerical probabilities by comparing the responsibility judgements in four conditions, under 
two different communication modes (precise or round numerical probability) and when judging 
responsibility by answering two different questions (responsibility-framed or causality-framed). 
Likelihood of recommending judgements were given on a range from 1 to 5. Mean judgements 
according to the conditions and the communication modes are presented in Table 13. 
A 2 (likelihood: low or high) by 2 (outcome: non-occurrence or occurrence) by 2 
(communication mode: round or precise) by 2 (question frame: responsibility or causality) 
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) found a main effect of communication mode on the 
likelihood of recommending, F(1,15) = 6.42, p = .023, η2p = .30. Speakers were more likely to be 
recommended if they used round percentages than if they used precise ones. There was also a 
main effect of outcome, F(1,15) = 23.61, p < .001, η2p = .61; speakers were more likely to be 
recommended when the uncertain event did not occur than when it occurred. There was no  
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Table 13 
Mean Likelihood of Recommending (Standard Deviation) as Function of the Question Frame, the 
Likelihood the Event was Predicted to Have, the Outcome and the Communication Mode (Experiment 4e) 
  causality-framed question responsibility-framed question 
  precise 
percentages 
round 
percentages 
precise 
percentages 
round 
percentages 
lo
w
 li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 
event did not occur 3.20 (1.10) 4.20 (0.67) 3.75 (0.94) 3.33 (0.76) 
event occurred 1.90 (0.55) 2.30 (0.45) 1.75 (0.82) 2.33 (0.29) 
h
ig
h
 li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 
event did not occur 3.50 (1.00) 4.50 (0.35) 3.58 (2.01) 4.33 (0.29) 
event occurred  2.10 (0.65) 1.80 (0.76) 1.83 (1.03) 2.00 (0.00) 
 
main effect of question frame, F(1,15) < 1, p = .649. Finally, there was no main effect of 
likelihood, F(1,15) < 1, p = .369.  
There was no interaction between: likelihood and communication mode, F(1,15) < 1, 
p = .959; likelihood and question frame, F(1,15) < 1, p = .771; outcome and communication 
mode, F(1,15) < 1, p = .624; outcome and question frame, F(1,15) < 1, p = .943; outcome and 
likelihood, F(1,15) = 3.27, p = .091; communication mode and question frame, F(1,15) < 1, 
p = .431. There was no three-way interaction between: likelihood, outcome and question frame, 
F(1,15) < 1, p = .869; outcome, communication mode and question format, F(1,15) < 1, p = .446; 
likelihood, communication mode and question format, F(1,15) = 2.31, p = .149. There was a 
marginal interaction between likelihood, outcome and communication mode, F(1,15) = 4.34, 
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p = .055, η2p = .22. Finally, there was no interaction between likelihood, outcome, 
communication mode and question frame, F(1,15) < 1, p = .433. 
5.6.3. Discussion 
In Experiments 4a and 4b, speakers were judged as more responsible when the ultimate 
consequences were negative, in a consistent manner with the Knobe effect (e.g., Knobe, 2003.) 
However in Experiments 4c and 4d, participants judged speakers as more responsible after 
ultimately positive consequences. This was the case when participants were asked to judge the 
likelihood that speakers would be recommended (Experiment 4c), but also when they only 
judged responsibility (Experiment 4d). One possibility for this shift was that the responsibility 
question was vague. Experiment 4e was therefore set up to verify what happens when the 
responsibility judgements are framed more precisely, in this case in terms of causality.  
Similarly to Experiments 4a and 4b, in Experiment 4e judgements of responsibility were 
higher when consequences were negative (outcome not occurring). Although judgements were 
higher when the question was framed in terms of responsibility than in terms of causality, there 
was crucially no interaction between the question frame and the outcome, suggesting that in 
this experiment, participants judged responsibility and causality in a similar way. However, it 
may also be that the small sample in this experiment did not allow detecting such an 
interaction. 
Interestingly however, judgements of responsibility in Experiment 4e were higher under the 
responsibility frame only when speakers used round percentages. This can be related to the 
results of Experiment 4b, where I suggested that speakers using precise percentages could have 
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been considered to have done the best they could, and therefore they were judged less 
responsible. In Experiments 4c and 4d, I found no effect of the preciseness on the likelihood of 
recommending, and this supported this possibility by excluding that speakers were considered 
not to be trusted for being too precise. 
Participants in Experiment 4e were also judged more responsible for forecasting using low 
probabilities. This can be linked to my suggestion that speakers are rewarded for displaying that 
they wish the best outcome for listeners, whether it is showed through using a negative 
directionality (for negative events; Experiment 4a) or a high likelihood (for positive events; 
Experiments 4d). It is as if by forecasting with a high likelihood, speakers were signalling to 
listeners that they wish the event (always positive in Experiment 4e) to happen. However, the 
likelihood of recommending did not seem to reflect a reward for wishing the best for listeners. 
Speakers were more likely to be recommended when the predicted outcome did not occur (i.e., 
when ultimate consequences were negative). This result would rather suggest a reward for 
accuracy that is not fully efficient (i.e., failing to reward for accuracy in the case of positive 
consequences). The interaction of communication mode with likelihood and outcome suggested 
that the former is more likely. When the percentages were round, the likelihood of 
recommending was higher in case of a low predicted likelihood, which could have been taken as 
pessimism. It may be that pessimism was taken as cautiousness, therefore leading to a different 
way of evaluating speakers’ trustworthiness. In Experiment 4e this may be further supported by 
the likelihood of recommending being influenced by the communication mode, with higher 
ratings when the speakers used round percentages. Using round percentages might be 
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considered as a sign of cautiousness. Witteman et al. (2011) found that speakers using decimal 
points in a percentage were less credible than speakers using no decimal points. Thus, speakers 
using precise percentages might be judged as not cautious enough for giving non-credible 
predictions. If this is the case, it would also suggest that responsibility judgements are driven by 
what speakers seem to wish for receivers, while the likelihood of recommending would be 
judged through a different process.  
5.7. General discussion 
In this chapter, I tested if vaguer predictions (based on verbal probabilities) elicit higher 
judgements that speakers are responsible for the ultimate consequences, than using precise 
statements relying, for example, on numerical probabilities. The results are summarized in Table 
14. In Experiment 4a, positive verbal probabilities and numerical probabilities did not elicit 
different responsibility judgements. Since there was no difference between positive verbal 
probabilities and numerical probabilities in Experiment 4a, I tested if round percentages are in 
fact considered as vague too, by comparing responsibility judgements elicited by round and 
precise percentages. Responsibility judgements in Experiment 4b showed an effect of the 
preciseness, such that they were influenced by the final outcome only when the percentages 
were round. Experiment 4b was underpowered, but in Experiment 4c and 4d, the addition of 
the likelihood of recommending judgements allowed me to verify that predictions based on 
precise percentages were not simply dismissed because they were judged too precise to be 
credible (see Witteman et al., 2011). However in Experiment 4c, an effect of the communication 
mode was also found, supporting the claim that using vaguer statements allows diffusion of   
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Table 14 
Summary of the Main Effects and Interactions Found in Experiments 4a to 4e 
 Main effects Interaction effects 
Experiment 4a 
(responsibility judgements) 
none Event valence x Communication mode 
Likelihood x Valence 
Event valence x outcome 
Experiment 4b 
(responsibility judgements) 
Outcome Outcome x Communication mode 
Experiment 4c 
(responsibility judgements) 
Outcome 
Communication mode 
Likelihood 
none 
Experiment 4c 
(likelihood of recommending) 
Outcome Likelihood x Outcome 
Experiment 4d 
(responsibility judgements) 
Likelihood 
Outcome 
none 
Experiment 4d 
(likelihood of recommending) 
Likelihood 
Outcome 
Outcome x Communication mode 
Experiment 4e 
(responsibility judgements)  
Question frame 
Outcome 
Likelihood 
Likelihood x Communication mode x 
Question format 
Experiment 4e 
(likelihood of recommending) 
Communication mode 
Outcome 
 
 
responsibility. But in Experiment 4e round percentages led to an effect of the question frame (in 
terms of causality or responsibility), while precise ones showed no such effect. Experiment 4e 
was underpowered, but this was similar to Experiment 4b (also underpowered), when precise 
percentages yield no effect of the outcome (occurred or did not occur), but round percentage 
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did. Overall, it seems more that using precise percentages let speakers off the hook, as they 
have tried their best. 
In this chapter, I also tested if responsibility judgements are influenced by the valence of the 
consequences (as in the Knobe effect; e.g., Pellizzoni, Siegal & Surian, 2009), or more 
normatively, by the accuracy of the prediction. The results did not allow us to draw a clear 
picture about what influences the responsibility judgements. However, accuracy did not 
influence the responsibility judgements. Throughout this chapter, it was never found that the 
interaction of the likelihood and outcome mattered in judging speakers’ responsibility. That is, 
responsibility judgements were not higher when speakers predicted a low likelihood for an 
event that ultimately did occur, or when they predicted a high likelihood for an event that did 
not occur. However, the valence of the consequences was found to be a consistent factor, but 
this was not in a consistent direction. 
In Experiments 4a, 4b and 4e, speakers were judged as more responsible when the 
consequences were negative (when a positive event did not occur or a negative one occurred, in 
Experiment 4a; when the event, always positive, did not occur, in Experiment 4b and 4e). This is 
in line with the Knobe effect (Knobe, 2003), where responsibility judgements are higher when 
negative side-effects occur than when positive side-effects occur. However in Experiments 4c 
and 4d, they were judged as more responsible when the event (always positive) occurred, in 
contradiction with the Knobe effect. It should also be considered that both Experiments 4b and 
4e were underpowered, which suggests that the evidence is stronger for an effect that is 
opposite to the Knobe effect (Knobe, 2003). That is, responsibility judgements seem to be 
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higher when the outcome is positive. Although this is surprising given the literature on the 
Knobe effect, it may be that responsibility was understood in a different meaning. 
Different experimental manipulations were made to identify reasons for these different 
results, but none was conclusive. In Experiment 4e, the judgements were framed either in terms 
of responsibility or in terms of causality. But I did not find an interaction between the question 
framing and the valence of the event, which would have indicated that the consideration of the 
outcome was different depending on the meaning given to responsibility. If one sets aside 
Experiment 4a (as it was not comparing different type of numerical probabilities), another 
possibility remains to consider to explain the inconsistency in the effect if the outcome. In 
Experiments 4b and 4e, when negative outcomes lead to higher responsibility judgements, 
participants were younger students, at pre-undergraduate level. Conversely in Experiments 4c 
and 4d, participants were undergraduate students. It is possible, consistently with the 
suggestion that the meaning of responsibility may vary, that younger participants have a 
definition of responsibility which is more blame-based. It is also possible that high-school 
students and undergraduate students perceive differently the severity of the events used in the 
scenarios. Further research could aim to pilot the scenario beforehand in order to select 
scenarios which are known to elicit the same severity judgment sin the population being tested. 
As mentioned before, what participants understood by responsibility remains unclear, and it 
cannot be excluded that this was one cause of the inconsistent effects in these studies. Actually 
the simple fact that the valence of the consequences always had an effect (although 
inconsistent), but the accuracy did not, seems to suggest that participants’ concept of 
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responsibility relies at least partially on intentionality. Further research should aim to clarify this 
before looking again at the effect of the consequences. A possible manipulation would be to 
define different meanings of responsibility to participants at the start of the experiment. This 
would allow investigation of which concept of responsibility leads to higher judgements. For 
example, Wright and Bengson (2009) suggested that the Knobe effect is driven by the 
intentionality rather than the valence of the consequences. How direct the causal relationship is 
could also be manipulated. In the scenarios used in this chapter, forecasters had little control 
over the outcome. This could also explain why the meaning of responsibility seemed to change 
over the five experiments. In light of the trial of L’Aquila’s seismologists, investigating the 
particular liability attributed to forecasters seems even more crucial, and refining paradigms to 
reach an understanding of responsibility judgements is essential. 
Within the pragmatic account of verbal probabilities that I developed in the previous 
chapters, the last pattern of results found in this chapter regarding responsibility is the most 
relevant. In Experiment 4a, using a negative directionality to predict a negative event led to 
lower responsibility judgements, suggesting that speakers were rewarded for indicating their 
wish that this negative event would not happen. This is consistent with the results I discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 4, where directionality was used by decision makers as a cue of speakers’ 
intention. This conversational account of risk communication was further supported by some of 
the experiments of this chapter where predicting a high likelihood led to lower responsibility 
judgements. This is consistent with Experiment 3b where, if directionality could not be used as a 
cue to the speaker’s intention because the speaker was known to be malevolent, decision 
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makers used the likelihood in a reversed manner, supporting that allegedly more objective 
features can also be interpreted differently in a conversational context (e.g., Sirota & Juanchich, 
2012). This explanation is however not fully satisfactory, as being wishful/optimistic means 
sometimes being inaccurate, and therefore potentially more misleading. 
As for the responses to the recommendation questions, they displayed no effect of the 
communication mode in Experiments 4c and 4d. In Experiment 4e, the communication mode 
had an effect on the likelihood of recommending. Speakers using precise percentages were less 
likely to be recommended than speakers using round percentages. This is consistent with the 
results of Chapter 5 regarding responsibility judgements. If speakers are not judged more 
responsible when they use a vague format of communication, it is not surprising that they are 
also not likely to be recommended. Most importantly, this is in opposition to self-reported data 
that suggest that people prefer to receive numerical probabilities because they are more 
precise (Wallsten et al., 1993). Rather this is consistent with the results of Witteman et al. 
(2011), who found that percentages with decimal points were judged as less credible than 
percentages without decimal points.  
However in Wallsten et al. (1993), the sample of participants was made of different groups. 
For example, one sub-sample was of naïve undergraduate students, but two others were of 
postgraduate students. What is more, the postgraduate students were mostly studying in fields 
where one is more likely to receive uncertain information from experts (i.e., nursing and 
business). It is therefore possible that these different samples reported preferences based on 
their experience of receiving uncertain information. Chapter 6 will aim to explore this possibility 
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by manipulating speakers’ expertise and asking participants which of a numerical probability 
and a verbal probability they would prefer, for each scenario. 
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CHAPTER 6: RECEIVING UNCERTAIN INFORMATION: PRECISION IS ONLY AS 
GOOD AS THE SPEAKER’S EXPERTISE 
6.1. Introduction 
The likelihood of an event occurring can be described in different ways to a decision-maker. 
The probability can be communicated directly or as a percentage. Both are referred to as 
numerical probabilities. Or it can be expressed with a verbal probability (e.g., in the case of an 
80% chance, one could say It is very likely), and thus given without using numbers. While people 
prefer to give uncertain information verbally, they prefer to receive it numerically (Erev & 
Cohen, 1990). This phenomenon is referred to as the Communication Mode Preference 
paradox. Although the paradox is thought to be generalizable across individuals, in Erev and 
Cohen’s research, the uncertain information was only ever given by experts, whereas the 
recipients of the information were non-experts. Yet, we know that the source’s expertise leads 
to different expectations regarding the strength of the argument communicated (Bohner, Ruder 
& Erb, 2002). It is possible, therefore that the preference for receiving numerical information is 
specific to it coming from an expert, rather than a general paradox. In this chapter, I 
investigated whether this apparent preference is in fact the result of expectations about expert 
speakers.  
To investigate people’s preference for giving and receiving verbal and numerical 
probabilities, Erev and Cohen (1990) asked a group of four expert sports commentators to make 
predictions of events that might happen during basket-ball games. They translated these 
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predictions so that each had a verbal and numerical version, i.e. when experts predicted an 
event numerically, they translated it into a verbal probability, and vice versa. Non-expert 
students were offered both types of prediction and indicated on which prediction they would 
prefer to bet. Three quarters of the students chose to bet based on a numerical prediction, 
which Erev and Cohen interpreted as showing that people preferred to receive uncertain 
information numerically. However, as the students were explicitly informed that the predictions 
came from experts we do not know whether this is a general preference for a type of 
information, or something related to our expectations about experts. 
Investigating general preferences for receiving uncertain information, Wallsten, Budescu, 
Zwick and Kemp (1993) further explored Erev and Cohen’s claims (1990). They used self-report 
measures rather than production and decision tasks. Sixty-nine percent of their participants 
expressed a preference for receiving uncertain information numerically. Erev & Cohen and 
Wallsten et al. both tested English speaking participants. Xu, Ye and Li (2009) found a similar 
self-reported preference in a sample of Chinese-speaking undergraduates: 63% to 77% declared 
that they preferred to receive numerical predictions. To some extent these self-report measures 
should reassure us that the preference paradox is not restricted to communications with 
experts. However, it is a concern that in the Wallsten et al. study, only the more experienced 
students (e.g., students who participated previously in experiments involving verbal predictions) 
were this likely to show the preference (64 to 82% of various samples). Only 37% of the less 
experienced undergraduates preferred numerical predictions. Is the preference paradox really 
as well established as we have thought? 
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Furthermore, in the studies to date the speaker was either clearly identified as an expert 
(Erev & Cohen, 1990), or unspecified (Wallsten & al., 1993; Xu & al., 2009). Perhaps in the cases 
where the nature of the speaker was unspecified, participants inferred that s/he was an expert. 
In Wallsten et al.’s study (1993), most of the participants who preferred to receive numerical 
predictions (all but the group of less experienced undergraduates, which showed the weakest 
preference) were studying topics where they were likely to often interact with experts (e.g., 
nursing). It remains open to question, therefore, whether a speaker’s expertise influences 
people’s preferences regarding receiving uncertain information. 
Bohner et al. (2002) manipulated the apparent expertise of communicators through 
descriptions of their level of education. They found that an expert (i.e., a professor) was 
expected to develop more valid and more convincing arguments than a non-expert (i.e., a high 
school student). Verbal probabilities are not as precise as numerical ones, as evidenced by the 
large interindividual variability in the numerical translations people give of those expressions 
(e.g., Budescu & Wallsten, 1985). As such, they could be thought to represent weaker 
arguments. Thus, experts may be expected to use a numerical format when communicating 
uncertain information, more so than lay speakers. Bohner et al. also observed that an expert 
using information to a lower standard than the one expected leads the communication to 
backfire. It is therefore important to confirm how people prefer to receive uncertain 
information that comes from experts.  
I addressed this question by asking participants to choose between verbal probabilities and 
numerical predictions (percentages) when the speaker was explicitly either an expert (defined 
 186 
 
by higher or vocational education) or a lay speaker (a friend with some experience of the 
situation). Following Bohner et al. (2002), I expected that expert speakers would elicit higher 
preferences for numerical probabilities than would lay speakers.  
6.2. Method 
6.2.1. Participants 
Forty-three psychology students (mean age = 19.44; range = 18-22; 35 females) at University 
of Birmingham (UK) participated in this experiment in exchange for course credits.  
6.2.2. Materials 
Eight scenarios were built where a character was given a prediction regarding an uncertain 
event. Scenarios were such that either a friend who had some experience with the same event 
or an expert was giving the prediction. For example, when the uncertain event was a car passing 
the Ministry of Transport (MOT) safety certification, the prediction was given either by a friend 
who had the same problem on his own car or by a mechanic. 
I chose the verbal probabilities from a set of data collected previously from another group of 
psychology students from the same university (Gourdon & Beck, under revision). All the verbal 
probabilities predicted a high likelihood that the event would occur (e.g., It is almost certain, 
usually translated as around 90%). Directionality of verbal probabilities (i.e., their positive or 
negative linguistic nature) is known to frame decisions (e.g., Teigen & Brun, 1999), therefore I 
used only positive verbal probabilities. The percentages used in the predictions were 
determined by the mean numerical translation those previous participants made of the verbal 
probabilities. 
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6.2.3. Procedure 
Each participant read eight scenarios. Scenarios are presented in Appendix VII (p. 219) 
where they are coded A to H. In half of the scenarios the prediction was given by an expert, and 
in the other half it was given by a friend. Four versions of the questionnaire were used: this 
allowed us to present each scenario with the expert or the friend and also to combine the 
scenarios into two different sets. Thus, in questionnaire 1 for scenarios A, B, C and D, 
participants read the expert version; in questionnaire 2 (the complement to questionnaire 1), 
they read scenarios E, F, G and H as expert scenarios; in questionnaire 3, they read scenarios A, 
B, E and G as expert scenarios; and in questionnaire 4 (the complement to questionnaire 3),  
participants read scenarios B, D, F and H as expert scenarios. The order of presentation of the 
eight scenarios within each questionnaire was randomized, and questionnaires were presented 
using Medialab®. 
The instructions informed the participants that in each scenario they would be presented 
with two different ways of saying something. Therefore scenarios were immediately followed by 
the two possibilities, as in the example of expert scenario below. Participants indicated which 
sentence they would prefer to be told if they were the main character, by pressing key A or key 
B on the computer keyboard. 
Jonathan had back pain. The chemist told him to take some Kebucid. 
A. He told Jonathan that there was an 80% chance that this drug would work. 
B. He told Jonathan that it was very possible that this drug would work. 
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6.3. Results 
For each scenario participants chose between verbal and numerical probabilities. They were 
given a score of 1 for each choice of the numerical format and these were summed to give a 
score between 0 and 4 for each condition (expert / friend). A paired samples t-test indicated 
that participants chose more numerical predictions in the expert condition (M = 2.37, SD = .95) 
than in the friend condition (M = 1.96, SD = .99), t(42) = 2.23, p = .031, r = .21. One-sample t-
tests showed that in the expert condition participants preferred to receive the numerical 
prediction more often than would be expected if they chose between the two options by 
chance, t(42) = 2.56, p = .014, r = .37. In the friend condition however, participants did not show 
a preference for one mode or the other, t(42) = -.26, p = .799, r = .04. 
6.4. Discussion 
Erev and Cohen (1990), Wallsten et al. (1993), and Xu et al. (2009) provided evidence that 
there is a general preference to receive uncertain information in numerical form but give it in 
verbal form, the communication mode preference paradox. However, I suspected that this was 
conflated with an expectation of people to receive particular types of information from expert 
speakers (Bohner et al., 2002). I speculated that people may show the preference for the 
numerical format only when the information came from an expert speaker. In line with this 
hypothesis, I found a greater preference for numerical probabilities (percentages) when the 
speaker was an expert (defined by higher or vocational education) than when s/he was a friend 
who had experience of the same situation. Furthermore, participants chose the numerical mode 
more often than chance when the speaker was an expert, but not when s/he was a friend.  
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These results were consistent with Bohner et al.’s findings (2002) that experts are expected 
to make strong arguments. In the case of communication of uncertainty, my results seemed to 
indicate that being an expert leads listeners to expect speakers to know enough to produce a 
more precise estimate to communicate. Following Grice’s maxim of quantity (1975), listeners 
want to receive as much relevant information as possible and it seems likely that percentages 
are perceived as more informative. Thus, listeners prefer experts to provide them. But when the 
speaker was not an expert, s/he might not be expected to know enough to produce such precise 
numerical estimates. Using a verbal probability would then not be a violation of the maxim of 
quantity and would be pragmatically acceptable. Note that participants did not completely 
reject hearing numerical probabilities from non-experts. They showed no preference for either 
mode. 
While consistent with Erev and Cohen’s results (1990) that people prefer to receive 
numerical probabilities from speakers, my results challenge the generalizability of this claim. It is 
important to consider listeners’ social expectations when investigating communication of 
uncertain information. Speaker expertise is an important contributor to social expectations, and 
should be controlled in future studies. In line with other studies, I found that communication 
about uncertainty is influenced by pragmatic factors. For example, verbal probabilities are 
interpreted in light of the conversational expectations of the listener and of the severity of the 
uncertain event (Bonnefon & Villejoubert, 2006): when participants thought that the speaker 
used verbal probabilities to be tactful (rather than to communicate likelihood), a severity bias 
(i.e., the overestimation of the likelihood of more severe events) was found. That is, 
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expectations that the speaker was hedging changed the numerical interpretation of the verbal 
probability. Another pragmatic factor, directionality of verbal probabilities is also used by 
speakers to fulfil an argumentative function (Juanchich, Teigen & Villejoubert, 2010). Positive 
verbal probabilities were used to revise predictions upwards, while negative verbal probabilities 
were used to revise predictions downwards.  
These results are relevant to professions where practice relies on communicating uncertain 
information. My participants preferred experts to give them percentages. One possibility is that 
medical professionals and forecasters should consider making additional efforts to go against 
their natural tendency to use verbal probabilities (Erev & Cohen, 1990). But of course, based on 
my findings, I cannot say whether people’s decision making is improved if given the type of 
information they prefer. 
If using percentages makes a stronger argument, following Bohner et al. (2002), speakers 
could then expect to deliver a more convincing message. In other words, it is expected that an 
expert delivering uncertain information with percentages will be more convincing and the 
information seem more valid than if the expert uses verbal probabilities. However, Karmarkar 
and Tormala (2010) found the effect of expertise to backfire when associated with a high 
confidence of the speaker. A highly expert speaker was more convincing when expressing 
uncertainty than when being certain. Through their higher preciseness, percentages may make 
speakers sound more confident. In light of Karmakar’s and Tormala’s backfire effect, by using 
numerical probabilities, speakers could sound more confident and thus be less convincing. 
Further research investigating the effect of preciseness on persuasion would help disentangling 
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those two opposite accounts. If experts are less convincing numerical probabilities, it could 
suggest that numerical probabilities signal confidence. 
I showed that people prefer to be told about uncertain events with percentages only when 
the speaker is an expert. This challenged the communication mode preference paradox (e.g., 
Erev & Cohen, 1990), where one generally prefers to give uncertain information as verbal 
probabilities, but to receive it as percentages. Future research will explore if, through this 
preference, a speaker can also deliver a more persuasive message using numerical probabilities.
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CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
7.1. Summary 
I aimed in this thesis to provide an account of how children and adults understand and 
use verbal probabilities, within a pragmatic framework. This was done in three ways. First, I 
looked at how children used the different features of verbal probabilities (directionality and 
likelihood), and how this is influenced by their knowledge of speakers’ intentions 
(Experiments 1a and 1b). These experiments were motivated by a need to develop the 
literature on children’s understanding of verbal probabilities. While a few studies had 
explored the question, it was only in Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009) that this question was 
investigated in light of the research on the directionality of verbal probabilities. This study 
had found that 8 year-old children used only directionality in their likelihood judgements, 
but used both directionality and the likelihood when making decisions. This difference 
between the two tasks was explained by the concrete consequences of being wrong in the 
decision making task. However, it could have been explained by a practice effect. 
Similarly to Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009), I found in Experiment 1a that 8-year-old 
children used only directionality to judge likelihood. I also found only directionality to be 
used in decision-making, suggesting that the effect of likelihood found in Gourdon and 
Villejoubert was indeed due to practice allowed by the task order. In Experiment 1b, I 
replicated these results. I also found evidence that directionality is used by children in 
combination with speakers’ intentions. Therefore children use directionality to make 
decisions only when the speaker is benevolent, and dismissed it when the speaker is 
malevolent. This was consistent with a pragmatic account of verbal probabilities, where its 
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different features allow the speaker to convey further information than a simple estimate of 
likelihood (Teigen & Brun, 1999). This was only partially consistent with the recent 
development of the epistemic vigilance account (e.g., Mascaro & Sperber, 2009), where 
inferences are based on both speakers’ intention and on their answers, from 5 years old. In 
Mascaro and Sperber’s experiment, children made decisions that were opposite to the 
malevolent speakers’ answer. That is, they reversed statements from malevolent speakers to 
infer the correct answer. In Experiment 1b, children decided randomly when speakers were 
malevolent, instead of making opposite decisions. Therefore I suggested that the integration 
of the information provided by directionality and of speakers’ intentions was too costly for 
children. 
In a second series of experiments, I endeavoured to show that directionality and the 
likelihood entail different levels of cognitive demands. This was expected to account for the 
framing effects of directionality (Experiments 2a and 2b). If directionality had lower levels of 
cognitive demands, it would explain why adults base their decisions on this feature rather 
than on the likelihood, as it would allow faster and less costly decisions. Then adults’ 
decisions would get framed because directionality focused their attention (e.g., Teigen & 
Brun, 1988). These two experiments drew on the children’s use only of directionality in 
Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009) and Experiments 1a and 1b, which could suggest that this 
feature requires fewer resources. I suggested that if directionality requires less cognitive 
resources, it should take less time to make decisions when directionality is the only feature 
that can be used, than when likelihood is the only feature that can be used. However, I 
found that decisions made only on the basis of directionality could take as much time as 
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deciding only on the basis of the likelihood, in some conditions. So my results suggested that 
both directionality and likelihood are taken into account during decision making. 
In Experiment 2a, I also aimed to test if the framing effect of directionality remains when 
participants have the opportunity to compare verbal probabilities, as previous studies most 
often used designs where participants considered only one verbal probability at a time (e.g., 
Teigen & Brun, 1999). I found that this was the case, and in Experiment 2b I tested if this 
framing effect could be reduced by giving participants more time to make decisions. I 
observed that the framing effect of directionality could be overcome when the time pressure 
was relieved. However, this was only the case when the likelihood of the two compared 
verbal probabilities was similar. Then positive and negative verbal probabilities were chosen 
at chance level, if participants were given unlimited time. When the likelihood was different 
but incongruent with directionality (e.g., a positive verbal probability with a low likelihood), 
participants still (although at a lower extent) preferred the positive verbal probability half of 
the time, even if this was normatively the wrong answer. I suggested that this was consistent 
with a pragmatic account of verbal probability. If the speaker chose to use a directionality 
that is incongruent with the likelihood, it has to be because it is relevant (in the Relevance 
Theory framework; e.g., Wilson & Sperber, 2004).: Speakers are communicating their 
intention that decision makers choose the option described by the positive directionality, 
and decision makers pick up on this. 
To test the pragmatic account further, in Experiments 3a and 3b I used a more 
conversational context. In Experiment 3a, the framing effect of directionality was found as 
expected when the two verbal probabilities were uttered within a conversation. This was the 
case even when the time pressure was relieved. In Experiment 3b directionality was used in 
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combination with the benevolence or malevolence of the speakers. This supported the claim 
that directionality is used as an indicator of speakers’ intentions (as suggested by Experiment 
1b). Unlike the children in Experiment 1b who simply disregarded information from the 
malevolent speaker, adults used directionality in a reversed manner when the speaker was 
malevolent. Under these conditions they preferred the option predicted with a negative 
verbal probability. Likewise, in Mascaro and Sperber’s study (2009), children used speakers’ 
statements in a reverse manner when they were malevolent. This suggests that the usual 
answer to malevolent speakers is to use their statement to infer the truth. This therefore 
supported my suggestion that in Experiment 1b, children might have lacked the resources to 
integrate fully directionality and the intention, leading them simply to dismiss the 
information given by malevolent speakers. More importantly, this supported the claim that 
by choosing a positive or a negative directionality, speakers provide more than simple 
numerical, probabilistic information, in line with Teigen and Brun’s suggestion (1999). 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the last experimental set of this thesis drew on Beyth-Marom’s 
suggestion (1982) that verbal probabilities are preferred by speakers because they allow 
speakers to diffuse their responsibility. The aim of Chapter 5 was to test this proposition 
indirectly, by investigating to what extent speakers are judged responsible when using verbal 
probabilities or numerical probabilities. The format chosen to communicate probabilities 
had an inconsistent effect across Experiments 4a to 4e. In Experiment 4a, there was no 
difference between numerical probabilities and positive verbal probabilities. But negative 
verbal probabilities yielded an effect of the valence of the uncertain event, with higher 
responsibility judgements when the uncertain event was positive. In Experiment 4b, round 
percentages yielded an effect of the outcome, with higher responsibility judgements when 
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the uncertain event did not occur. Precise percentages did not yield such an effect. In 
Experiment 4c, speakers were judge as more responsible when they used round 
percentages. Finally in Experiments 4d and 4e, the communication mode had no main or 
interaction effect. However, when an effect was found it was always in the direction that 
using more precise statements led to being held less responsible. One interpretation of this 
is that speakers were considered as having done their best. As speakers had provided precise 
percentages, participants may have considered that they had done as much as they could to 
inform. 
What was more consistent was an effect of the consequences. Similar to what is known 
as the Knobe effect or side-effect effect (e.g., Knobe, 2003), in Experiments 4a, 4b and 4e, 
speakers were held more responsible if consequences were negative. Conversely to the 
Knobe effect however, in Experiments 4c and 4d, they were held more responsible when 
ultimate consequences were positive. Further Experiment 4c and 4d had higher power, 
which supports more an effect opposite to the Knobe effect. I suggested that these 
differences could be due to the meaning of responsibility not being defined enough. That is, 
responsibility could have been understood as blame on the one hand (i.e., with a negative 
value), and as accountability on the other hand (i.e., with a neutral value). Experiment 4e 
was set up to test if an overlap between the concepts of causality and responsibility could 
explain the inconsistency in my results. However, the results showed that the effect of the 
ultimate consequences went in the same direction whether the judgement was framed in 
terms of causality or in terms of responsibility, bringing no support to this possibility. 
However, the power may have been insufficient here as well. 
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Nevertheless, the focus on the ultimate consequences rather than on the accuracy of the 
prediction remained the most interesting set of results in Chapter 5. According to a 
normative perspective, listeners should be interested in a forecaster who can provide good 
predictions. The results of that chapter suggested that, as often found in judgement and 
decision making, what ought to be is not what is (e.g., Kwan, Wojcick, Miron-Shatz, Votruba 
& Olivola, 2012). From a rational point of view, speakers provided predictions and should 
only be held responsible for the quality of these predictions. That is, if they predicted an 
event with a high likelihood and the event did not occur, the quality of their prediction is 
low, and their responsibility should be engaged. The same should be the case if they had 
predicted an event with a low likelihood and in fact it occurred. However, when participants 
were also asked to indicate how likely they would be to recommend the forecaster, their 
answers reflected more attention to the accuracy. It seemed therefore that it is not that 
participants could not evaluate the accuracy, but rather that it does not matter in the 
responsibility judgements. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I looked at adults’ preferences for receiving numerical probabilities 
in light of their knowledge of the speakers’ expertise. Previous research had found that 
people prefer to receive predictions as numerical probabilities. This is despite the fact that 
most people cannot judge their likelihood accurately (e.g., Gonzalez & Wu, 1999). However, 
to my knowledge, it had not been investigated if this preference depends on speakers’ 
characteristics. According to a Gricean pragmatic perspective, expert speakers are expected 
to use numerical probabilities more often, as they should give the most relevant information 
they possess under the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975). Non-expert speakers, being 
expected to know less, should avoid violating the maxim of quantity and instead use vague, 
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verbal probabilities. Therefore, they may be expected to be less likely to use numerical 
probabilities. Results were consistent with these expectations. They also supported previous 
research showing that experts are expected to use stronger arguments (Bohner et al., 2002). 
This was also in line with the previous chapters of this thesis, indicating that the use and 
interpretation of verbal probabilities is influenced by pragmatic factors beyond the 
likelihood they convey. 
7.2. Links to literature 
After Teigen and Brun (1999) started investigating whether verbal probabilities conveyed 
information about speakers’ intentions, Budescu et al. (2003) objected that directionality 
was merely a reflection of the likelihood of verbal probabilities. That is, according to Teigen 
and Brun’s perspective, directionality hints at the speaker’s intention by framing the 
listener’s perspective. Whereas according to Budescu et al. directionality is only a function of 
the likelihood, and therefore supports a normative decision-making by framing the 
perspective in the correct direction. Gourdon and Villejoubert (2009), however, showed that 
a positive directionality is not always associated with a high likelihood, or a negative 
directionality with a low likelihood. Furthermore, Juanchich et al. (2009) showed that 
directionality can be used as an argumentative tool, in which case it is chosen according to 
the direction in which a speaker needs to revise a statement of uncertainty (positive for 
upwards, negative for downwards). In Experiment 2b, participants were equally likely to 
choose a positive or a negative verbal probability when both expressed either a high or a low 
likelihood. This showed that positive directionality is not confined to high likelihoods and the 
negative one to low likelihoods, conversely to Budescu et al.’s claim. 
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Drawing on Teigen and Brun’s idea that directionality is indicating something more about 
what the speaker wants, in Experiment 3b, participants used directionality in different ways 
if the speaker was known to be malevolent. Consistent with this, in Experiment 4a, 
judgements of responsibility were a function of directionality and the valence of the ultimate 
consequences. Thus, when the consequences were negative, speakers were judged as more 
responsible when they had used a positive directionality than when they had used a 
negative directionality. It seemed that speakers were therefore rewarded for expressing 
their wish that the negative consequences would not occur. This further supported the claim 
that directionality is a pragmatic feature of verbal probabilities, which conveys information 
about intentions as well as about simple likelihood.  
These results are consistent with the argumentative perspective of language (Anscombre 
& Ducrot, 1983), in which language both informs and argues, and the argumentation 
depends on the structure of language. Under this perspective, directionality of expressions 
of quantity (verbal probabilities or simple quantifiers) influences the perspective that the 
listener takes when interpreting those expressions (Sanford & Moxey, 2003). This is what 
leads to framing effects such as those observed in Chapters 3 and 4. Listeners seem to 
interpret the choice of directionality made by speakers as deliberate, leading them to 
struggle to make a choice when directionality contradicts the likelihood. This definition of 
directionality as a feature which signals a speaker’s intention is also consistent with 
Relevance Theory (e.g., Wilson & Sperber, 2004). Within the Relevance Theory framework, 
utterances should provide relevant information, so that the cognitive cost of processing 
them does not overweigh the benefits. Therefore if a speaker chooses to use a negative 
directionality over a positive, it is not meaningless, and the listener should use this as a cue. 
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As I showed in Experiment 3b, the perspective provided by directionality is interpreted 
according to what is known about the speaker’s intention. This supports the claim that 
listeners consider the choice of directionality as deliberate. This is also consistent with the 
recent development of the concept of epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010). Because 
language also fulfils an argumentative function as well as an informative one (Anscombre & 
Ducrot, 1983), communication entails a risk of being misinformed. That is, speakers can use 
the argumentative function to frame listeners’ perspective towards one particular possibility 
(e.g., Sanford & Moxey, 2003). In that case, listeners would pay less attention to the other 
possibilities. Misinformation is costly, from the cognitive cost of understanding utterances 
that are ultimately not useful, to the potential negative consequences of decisions made 
based on incorrect information. Sperber et al. (2010) argued, however, that human beings 
have evolved a set of mechanisms tailored to detect the worthiness of a communicator, e.g., 
epistemic vigilance. Epistemic vigilance is evidenced by developmental studies, where 
children show an appropriate appreciation of both the past accuracy (e.g., Nurmsoo & 
Robinson, 2009) and the intention of speakers (e.g., Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). For example, 
in Mascaro and Sperber’s study, children used what a malevolent speaker was saying to 
make inferences regarding the truth. 
In Experiment 1b, I provided further support for the development of epistemic vigilance, 
as children used directionality differently when the speaker was known to have bad 
intentions. However, I found that children dismissed the speaker’s prediction in that case, 
instead of using it to infer the correct answer (i.e., the most likely), as did adults in 
Experiment 3b. This is slightly different from Mascaro and Sperber’s claim (2009), but could 
be explained by higher cognitive demands of the task used in Experiment 1b. Mascaro and 
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Sperber’s task used actual puppets and boxes, instead of children having to maintain the 
characters and choices in working memory. It is nevertheless the case that directionality can 
be used differently after the source had been evaluated through to epistemic vigilance. This 
supports the suggestion that directionality is the feature that fulfils the argumentative 
function in verbal probabilities. 
The understanding of verbal probabilities could also be accounted by Mercier and 
Sperber’s (2011) argumentative account of reasoning. Mercier and Sperber proposed that 
reasoning serves an argumentative function. Under this perspective, framing effects can 
occur because the choices of language elicit different inferences. That is, they influence how 
new representations are produced. For example McKenzie and Nelson (2003) found that 
listeners assume that a glass used to be full if a speaker describes it as half empty. That is, 
listeners can infer speakers’ reference point from the framing of their statement. I made 
reference to some evidence that verbal probabilities also elicit different inferences 
depending on their locus of uncertainty (Juanchich et al., 2010), or that their directionality is 
chosen differently when speaker’s reference points differ (Juanchich et al., 2009). Further I 
have presented evidence suggesting that different directionalities elicit different inferences 
on what the speakers know and want listeners to do. By framing perspectives, as suggested 
by Sanford and Moxey (2003), verbal statements of quantity highlight some reasons more 
than others and frame the reasoning itself.  
An argumentative reasoning account of verbal probabilities could also lead one to reject 
Windschitl and Wells’ (1996) suggestion that verbal probabilities elicit Type 1 reasoning, 
which is intuitive, fast and cognitively cheap. Based on children’s use of directionality only, 
my own suggestion in Chapter 2 was that making decisions on the basis of directionality 
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alone was less costly. This would mean that using the directionality would be Type 1 
reasoning, and that using the likelihood would be a form of Type 2 reasoning. However, I 
found in Chapters 3 and 4 that directionality-driven decisions were not less costly than 
likelihood-driven ones. Deciding between two high verbal probabilities, only differing in 
directionality, took as much time as deciding between two positive verbal probabilities, only 
differing in likelihood. It does not seem to be that there are heuristic answers to verbal 
probabilities, using directionality, and also normative ones, using the likelihood. 
It could however be the case that people implicitly know the normative answer, and this 
answer conflicts with the heuristic answer which uses directionality. This would be 
consistent with what De Neys (2012) has suggested for other reasoning tasks. This would 
explain the longer reaction time when the likelihood is similar, both verbal probabilities 
expressing low likelihood: in that case the normative answer of not choosing an unlikely 
option would conflict with the heuristic answer of choosing the positive verbal probability. 
When both verbal probabilities were incongruent (i.e., a low likelihood expressed by a 
positive verbal probability, and vice-versa), the normative answer of choosing the high 
likelihood would conflict with the heuristic of not choosing a negative directionality. Finally, 
when both verbal probabilities had a negative directionality, the normative answer 
(choosing the higher likelihood) would also be in conflict with the heuristic ‘Do not pick a 
negative directionality’. 
It could seem that a heuristic/normative (or Type 1/Type 2) perspective on the features 
of verbal probabilities does not allow one to take into account the pragmatic/argumentative 
account of directionality. In a heuristic/normative account, directionality would be used 
preferentially by adults because it is a fast and less costly tool. In an argumentative account, 
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directionality would be used because it is framing listeners’ inferences about what speakers 
know. However, the epistemic vigilance account could accommodate the two accounts as 
epistemic vigilance could allow dealing with the cognitive limits of human rationality. It is 
indeed costly to be misinformed, but it would also be costly to evaluate each received 
statement and to systematically make inferences. Epistemic vigilance allows one not only to 
avoid the cost of misinformation, but also to rely on speakers once they have been 
evaluated as trustworthy and knowledgeable, in order to avoid the cost of reasoning when it 
is not needed. Using directionality as a pragmatic cue to what speakers think/argue should 
be done would be the heuristic in this perspective. 
However as seen in Experiment 3b, adults adopt another heuristic once speakers have 
been evaluated as malevolent: they use directionality systematically as an inverse cue. This 
is opposite to what would be predicted by an integrated account of epistemic vigilance and 
heuristic and normative reasoning. Once a speaker is deemed malevolent, the normative 
answer would be in line with my findings in Experiment 1b with children. That is to dismiss 
the answer and choose randomly. If a more normative answer can be reached (for example 
using the likelihood), it may be reasonable to use it. Whereas children’s interpretations of 
verbal probabilities do not incorporate the likelihood because they do not yet fully 
understand it (as shown in Experiment 1a), adults should do so. Therefore they should 
answer randomly when verbal probabilities differ only by their directionality, since the 
likelihood cannot provide them with an answer. But when only the likelihood is different, 
this should be used to reach a decision in a normative way. This is consistent with 
Experiment 3b, where participants faced with a malevolent speaker chose the negative 
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directionality more often when likelihoods were similar, and the lower likelihood when 
directionalities were the same.  
7.3. Future research 
In Chapter 2, I showed that at 8-9-year-old English-speaking children use only 
directionality to judge and make decisions, as also found in French-speaking children 
(Gourdon & Villejoubert, 2009). There were, however, some trends in Experiment 1b 
suggesting that 8- to 9-year-old children might have also started developing their 
interpretation of likelihood information. The first step in investigating further the 
understanding of verbal probabilities in children should therefore extend the age range and 
try to describe the development of the use of both features. Given that 7- to 8-year-old 
children in this thesis used directionality, extending the age range downwards would be 
informative to find at which age children start using directionality. Based on Champaud and 
Bassano’s results (1987) with quantifiers, children can display some sensitivity to 
argumentative function from 6 years old. Therefore it could be expected that directionality is 
used to make decisions as early as 6 years old.  
Children studying for the GCSE exam in the UK (15- to 16-year-olds) are specifically 
taught which likelihood meanings are to be associated to simple verbal probabilities (BBC, 
2012; see Appendix IV, p. 214, for an example of exercise with answers). It would therefore 
be interesting to compare children following the British curriculum, i.e., taught how to use 
verbal probabilities, to children following a curriculum where this is not taught (e.g., the 
American curriculum, as it is delivered in the same language). First, the development of the 
use of the likelihood might be later if verbal probabilities are not explicitly part of the 
curriculum. Second, if teaching the use of verbal probabilities has any effect on their 
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understanding, adolescents who have received this curriculum should interpret verbal 
probabilities in a way that matches the content of this teaching. Crucially, they should also 
display less intraindividual variability. This last point would further inform us if it is possible 
to shape adults’ use of verbal probabilities. The question of prescribing the use of verbal 
probabilities is not new. For example, Hamm (1991) suggested that a lexicon of verbal 
probabilities should be established to standardize their use. But the question has resurged 
recently in the high stakes context of communicating about climate change (Budescu, 
Broomell & Por, 2009). For example, current research is being done across several cultures 
and languages, where participants are told beforehand of the meaning of each verbal 
probability used (D. Budescu, personal communication, March 16, 2010), and then asked to 
evaluate statements on climate change. The purpose of the project is to try to recommend 
verbal probabilities that organizations should use in their communication. Therefore, testing 
if teaching of the meaning of verbal probabilities influences their interpretation would 
inform this question as well. 
I highlighted that recently research on verbal probabilities has also explored the 
distinction between internal and external verbal probabilities (e.g., Fox & Ülkümen, 2011). 
Although this research is still developing and results are not consistent, the question of how 
children take into account the locus of uncertainty should be asked. Robinson et al. (2009) 
showed that children make different choices when uncertainty is epistemic (internal) or 
physical (external), preferring to bet when the uncertainty is internal. Children are therefore 
able to make the distinction between internal and external uncertainty. Such a distinction 
should be reflected in children making different interpretations of internal and external 
verbal probabilities. 
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Research on the locus of uncertainty in verbal probabilities has also found that the 
external/internal nature of phrases informs adults on the source of knowledge (Juanchich et 
al., 2010). That is, adults are more likely to interpret that speakers based their prediction on 
statistical information, when speakers use an external verbal probability. Therefore the locus 
of uncertainty could be used to manipulate the speaker’s competence. For example, 
speakers’ competence could be demonstrated by the use of predictions based on external 
verbal probabilities, and their lower competence could be demonstrated by the use of 
predictions based on internal verbal probabilities. In the same way that intention influences 
the use of directionality by adults and children, according to an epistemic vigilance 
perspective (Sperber et al., 2010), listeners’ perception of competence could change the way 
adults use directionality.  
I argued earlier that verbal probabilities convey more than simple likelihood information, 
and that directionality in particular is a pragmatic feature of verbal probabilities. A further 
test of this account would be to investigate if individual differences in pragmatic 
competence have an effect on the decisions made by listeners (directionality-driven or 
likelihood-driven). Nieuwland, Ditman and Kuperberg (2010) used for example the Autism 
Quotient Communication Subscale in a general population. They found the scale to be able 
to distinguish participants based on their sensitivity to violations of pragmatic rules (e.g., 
that communication is meant to be informative enough). That is, participants categorized by 
the scale as having higher pragmatic competence were more sensitive to low 
informativeness than participants categorized as having lower pragmatic competence. The 
Autism Quotient Communication Subscale method could therefore be used in the context of 
verbal probabilities. It would be expected that participants with higher pragmatic 
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competence as defined by the scale would use more often directionality than participants 
with lower pragmatic competence. 
Finally, a third line of further research should develop the results of Chapter 6. In 
Experiment 5, I have shown that only when speakers are experts, are they expected to use 
numerical probabilities. When the speakers were friends who have some experience of the 
situation, there was no preference for numerical or verbal probabilities. I suggested that 
Gricean pragmatics could explain this result. Under the maxim of quantity, speakers are 
expected to provide the maximum relevant information, which an expert will have in a 
higher quantity. Therefore, experts would be expected to be more informative. Numerical 
probabilities are less vague, so are likely to seem more informative. Therefore, they are 
expected from experts as expectations of informativeness are higher.  
One could note however that the non-expert speakers were also friends. It might be that 
expectations of informativeness were not higher for experts compared to non-experts, but 
rather that vagueness is more permissible or less unexpected from friends compared to 
strangers. Under a pragmatic perspective, verbal probabilities can be perceived as hedging 
device (Juanchich et al., 2012). Hedging can allow speakers to save face, allowing them to 
avoid admitting that they lack of information. It can also allow listeners to save face: the 
vagueness of verbal probabilities allows speakers to avoiding predicting negative events too 
concretely, that is bad news can be broken gently. Friends therefore might be expected to 
hedge more, in order to protect listeners. This could lead to people being less likely to expect 
to receive numerical probabilities from friends. Further research should test this possibility, 
by running a follow on experiment to Experiment 5, with an additional speaker condition 
where the speaker is neither an expert nor a friend. 
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7.4. Conclusion 
In this thesis I have investigated the understanding of verbal probabilities in children and 
adults, with a particular interest in directionality of verbal probabilities. I have also examined 
the influence of different formats of communication of probabilities on judgements by 
adults. I have argued that verbal probabilities convey more than simple probabilistic 
information, following Teigen and Brun (1999). I have provided evidence that directionality is 
a pragmatic feature of verbal probabilities, which signals to listeners what speakers want 
and/or know. This was particularly shown when both children and adults, confronted by a 
malevolent speaker, changed the way they relied on directionality to make decisions. In a 
second phase of research, I suggested that forecasters are not judged responsible based on 
the format they use to communicate likelihood, nor on their accuracy. Rather the 
consequences matter, as in the Knobe effect (e.g., Knobe, 2003), although not always in the 
same direction. I also showed that forecasters are, however, expected to be more precise 
when they are experts than when they are non-expert friends. I then suggested that this 
might have consequences for the level of persuasion of a speaker. In this thesis I have 
therefore advanced a pragmatic account of verbal probabilities and risk communication. This 
supports that verbal probabilities have pragmatic features and communicated likelihood is 
interpreted by listeners on the basis of pragmatic assumptions. Future research should focus 
on developing evidence that the pragmatic features of verbal probabilities are multiple, for 
example by casting light on the locus of uncertainty. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Verbal probabilities used in the pilot study of Experiment 1a 
It is almost impossible 
It is very unlikely 
It is unlikely 
It is not certain 
There are a few chances 
There are few chances 
It is possible 
It is rather certain 
It is very likely 
It is almost certain 
There are a few doubts 
It is a little unlikely 
It is probable 
It is improbable 
There is a very poor chance 
There is a good chance 
It is very doubtful 
It is a little doubtful 
It is quite probable 
It is quite improbable 
It is quite likely 
There is some possibility 
It is somewhat likely 
It is almost certain 
It is doubtful 
It is uncertain 
It is quite unlikely 
It is quite doubtful 
It is not entirely sure 
There is a small possibility 
It is not entirely certain 
It is very possible 
There is a small chance 
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Appendix II: Scenarios used in Experiment 1a 
Example of training scenario 
 
Anna found a clue saying that it is absolutely sure that the treasure is in the chest.  
Experimental scenarios 
Julie had been invited to play at her friend’s home on Saturday. When she asks her 
parents if she can go, they tell her that there is some possibility that her cousin will come 
from Scotland that day. However they say that it is up to her to decide whether she will go 
to her friend’s or she will stay at home in case her cousin comes. 
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Marc is at his friend’s birthday party. He decides to have some cake and to wait to have 
some sweets later. His friend’s mum tells him that there are a few chances that there are 
some sweets left by this time. 
 
Some days Stephanie gets the bus to school, some days she walks. Today she just missed 
her bus for school. Before deciding to walk to school she asks her neighbour who’s waiting 
also when the next bus will come. Her neighbour tells her that it is not entirely certain that it 
comes soon. 
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Karl is watching his favourite TV show when his mum offers him to play a board game. 
Karl asks if he can finish watching his TV show. His mother tells that it’s OK and that it is a 
little unlikely that she will have time to play later. 
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Appendix III: Example page of the scenario booklet used in Experiment 1a 
 
 
 
Captain Hook told Julie that there is some possibility that the treasure is in the 
chest.  
 
 
When Captain Hook says there is some possibility that the treasure is in the chest, 
how much do you think that this means that the treasure is in the chest? 
 
  o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o   
 
 
As there is some possibility that the treasure is in the chest, how happy do you 
think Julie will be if she chooses to open the chest? 
 
  o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o-----o   
 
 
As there is some possibility that the treasure is in the chest, if you were Julie, what 
would you choose to do? 
 
not open the chest   open the chest 
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Appendix IV: Screenshot of an exercise proposed to students preparing GCSEs (BBC, 2012) 
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Appendix V: Materials used in Experiment 4a 
Scenarios 
Positive uncertain events 
A. When he went to Keele University for visit day, Samuel asked a student about the admission rates. The 
student at the visit day told him that [insert percentage or verbal probability] that more applicants would be 
admitted this year. Samuel put Keele as his first choice. [insert outcome] 
B. Peter was looking for a summer job. He asked his uncle about one of his friends who owns a company. 
His uncle told him that if he volunteered for his friend for a week, [insert percentage or verbal probability] he 
would get a job afterwards in the company. Peter volunteered for his uncle’s friend. [insert outcome] 
C. Hannah wanted to study Italian at University, but was still hesitating a little. When she met her school 
counsellor, this latter told her that if she does, there was a X% chance she would find a job within a year from 
graduation. Hannah decided to study Italian. [insert outcome] 
D. James was meant to meet his last date for the second time tonight, in the city centre. When he arrived 
near there his car got stuck in the traffic, so he asked a policeman which alternative route he could take. The 
policeman told him that by the South [insert percentage or verbal probability] it would be faster. James took 
the alternative route. [insert outcome] 
Negative uncertain events 
E. Patrick asked the chemist assistant advice for his stomach ache. He recommended a drug and said that 
[insert percentage or verbal probability] to give him a rash. Patrick took the drug. [insert outcome] 
F. Lauren was told by her friend who works at the airport that [insert percentage or verbal probability] 
that flight crews would go on strike at Easter. Lauren booked her hotel in Spain. [insert outcome] 
G. Helena had a big mole on her neck. The doctor said she could have an operation to have it removed. 
[insert percentage or verbal probability] it would leave a permanent scar. Helena had the operation. [insert 
outcome] 
H. Emily’s car had a problem with the brake fluid. Having it repaired would cost £200 and the mechanic 
told her that after the repair [insert percentage or verbal probability] she would have to buy a new car. Emily 
made it repair. [insert outcome] 
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Probabilistic expressions used in Experiment 4a 
 numerical probabilities positive verbal 
probabilities 
negative verbal 
probabilities 
lo
w
 
lik
el
ih
o
o
d
 there was a 20% chance there was a small 
possibility 
it was quite improbable 
there was a 30% chance there were a few chances it was quite unlikely 
h
ig
h
 li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 there was a 70% chance it was quite likely it was not guaranteed 
there was a 80% chance it was rather certain it was not definite 
 
Outcomes used in Experiment 4a 
Scenario Uncertain event occurred Uncertain event did not occur 
A He got a place there. He did not get a place there. 
B  He got a Summer job in his company.  He did not get a Summer job in his 
company. 
C  She found a job 6 months after 
graduating. 
 She found a job 15 months after 
graduating. 
D  He arrived on time for his date which 
then went good. 
 He did not arrive on time and his date 
was already gone. 
E  He got a rash. He did not get a rash. 
F  The strike went on and she had to take a 
long ferry to Spain. 
The strike was cancelled and she got a 
short flight to Spain. 
G  It left her with a permanent scar.  She did not get a permanent scar. 
H  It didn’t work and she had to buy a new 
car. 
 It worked and Emily did not have to buy a 
new car. 
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Appendix VI: Scenarios used from Experiment 4b to Experiment 4e 
Scenarios 
A. Ewan wanted to place a small bet on the Football World Cup. He asked a friend who is a big football 
fan about it. His friend told him that there was a [insert numerical probability]% chance that England would 
qualify from their group. [insert outcome] 
B. Peter was looking for a summer job. He asked his uncle about one of his friends who owns a company. 
His uncle told him that if he volunteered for his friend for a week, there was a [insert numerical probability]% 
chance he would get a job afterwards in the company. Peter volunteered for his uncle’s friend. [insert 
outcome] 
C. When Tom was at the bus stop this morning, he asked a commuter who takes this route daily if the 
bus should come soon. The person said that there was a [insert numerical probability]% chance that the bus 
was coming pretty soon. Tom waited for the bus instead of walking. [insert outcome] 
D. James was meant to meet his last date for the second time tonight, in the city centre. When he arrived 
near there his car got stuck in the traffic, so he asked a policeman which alternative route he could take. The 
policeman told him that by the South there was a [insert numerical probability]% chance that the bus was 
coming pretty soon. James took the alternative route. [insert outcome] 
E. When he went to Keele University for visit day, Samuel asked a student about the admission rates. The 
student at the visit day told him that there was a [insert numerical probability]% chance that more applicants 
would be admitted this year. Samuel put Keele as his first choice. [insert outcome] 
F. Helena had a big mole on her neck. The doctor said she could have an operation to have it removed. 
There was a [insert numerical probability]% chance it would not leave any scar. Helena had the operation. 
[insert outcome] 
G. Eve saw a coat she liked very much in a shop. The shop assistant told her that there was a [insert 
numerical probability]% chance that the coat would be in the sales. Eve waited until the sales started. [insert 
outcome] 
H. Hannah wanted to study Italian at University, but was still hesitating a little. When she met her school 
counsellor, this latter told her that if she does, there was a [insert numerical probability]% chance she would 
find a job within a year from graduation. Hannah decided to study Italian. [insert outcome] 
 
Probabilistic expressions used from Experiment 4b to Experiment 4e 
 round numerical probabilities precise numerical probabilities 
lo
w
 
lik
el
ih
o
o
d
 there was a 20% chance there was a 23% chance 
there was a 30% chance there was a 32% chance 
h
ig
h
 
lik
el
ih
o
o
d
 there was a 70% chance there was a 67% chance 
there was a 80% chance there was a 84% chance 
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Outcomes used from Experiment 4b to Experiment 4e 
Scenario Uncertain event occurred Uncertain event did not occur 
A England qualified and Ewan won his bet. England did not qualify and Ewan lost his 
bet. 
B  He got a Summer job in his company.  He did not get a Summer job in his 
company. 
C The bus came in the five minutes and Tom 
was on time. 
The bus did not come for 15 minutes and 
Tom was late. 
D  He arrived on time for his date which 
then went good. 
 He did not arrive on time and his date was 
already gone. 
E He got a place there. He did not get a place there. 
F  It left her with a permanent scar.  She did not get a permanent scar. 
G When she came back, she got it for half 
the initial price. 
When she came back, all the coats were 
gone. 
H  She found a job 6 months after 
graduating. 
 She found a job 15 months after 
graduating. 
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Appendix VII: Material in Experiment 5 (in experimental order) 
 
General instructions: ‘You are going to read short stories where people make decisions. In each story, 
one character will say something in two ways. Your task is to select how you would prefer to hear 
this information if you were the main character in the story.’ 
 
 
expert scenarios 
          
             A Jonathan had back pain. The chemist told him to take some Kebucid. 
      
  
He told Jonathan that there was an 80% chance that this drug would work. 
     
  
He told Jonathan that it was very possible that this drug would work. 
      
 
How would you prefer the chemist to tell you what he thinks? 
       
             B Linda wanted to invest in the Rigobel stock. 
        
  
Her financial consultant told her that there was a 68% chance that this investment would be profitable. 
  
  
Her financial consultant told her that it was quite likely that this investment would be profitable. 
   
 
How would you prefer the financial consultant to tell you what she thinks? 
      
             C Ben needed to take his car for an MOT but it was making a weird noise. 
      
  
The mechanic told Ben that there was a 73% chance that his car would pass the MOT. 
    
  
The mechanic told Ben that there was a good chance that his car would pass the MOT. 
    
 
How would you prefer the mechanic to tell you what he thinks? 
       
             D Gina had been trying to get pregnant for a while and was considering having IVF. 
      
  
Her obstetrician told Gina that there was an 84% chance that she would get pregnant with IVF. 
   
  
Her obstetrician told Gina that it was very likely that she would get pregnant with IVF. 
    
 
How would you prefer the obstetrician to tell you what she thinks? 
       
             E Christopher was going on holiday to the Isle of Wight. 
        
  
The Met Office meteorologist said that there was a 69% chance that the weather would be sunny. 
   
  
The Met Office meteorologist said that it was quite probable that the weather would be sunny. 
   
 
How would you prefer the meteorologist to tell you what she thinks? 
       
             F Emily bought some orchids. 
         
  
The florist told her that if she cut them in a certain way, there was a 92% chance that the orchids would last longer. 
 
  
The florist told her that if she cut them in a certain way, it was almost certain that the orchids would last longer. 
 
 
How would you prefer the florist to tell you what he thinks? 
       
             G Giles wanted to upgrade his TV to an Elga-1210. 
        
  
The journalist from "Which?" said that there was a 61% chance that the Elga-1210 would be very efficient to run. 
 
  
The journalist from "Which?" said that it was somewhat likely that the Elga-1210 would be very efficient to run. 
 
 
How would you prefer the journalist to tell you what he thinks? 
       
             H Christine wanted to do a Masters degree in Engineering. 
       
  
The programme director told her that there was a 71% chance that she would get an engineering job after this Masters. 
  
The programme director told her that it was probable that she would get an engineering job after this Masters. 
 
 
How would you prefer the program director to tell you what she thinks? 
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non-expert scenarios 
       
          A Jonathan had back pain. His friend had had the same pain and taken Kebucid. 
   
  
He told Jonathan that there was an 80% chance that this drug would work. 
  
  
He told Jonathan that it was very possible that this drug would work. 
   
 
How would you prefer your friend to tell you what he thinks? 
    
          B Linda wanted to invest in the Rigobel stock. Her friend invested in a similar stock recently. 
  
  
She told Linda that there was a 68% chance that this investement would be profitable. 
 
  
She told Linda that it was quite likely that this investement would be profitable. 
  
 
How would you prefer your friend to tell you what she thinks? 
    
          C Ben needed to take his car for an MOT but it was making a weird noise. His friend drives the same car and had the same problem. 
  
He told Ben that there was a 73% chance that his car would pass the MOT. 
  
  
He told Ben that there was a good chance that his car would pass the MOT. 
  
 
How would you prefer your friend to tell you what he thinks? 
    
          D Gina had been trying to get pregnant for a while and was considering having IVF. 
   
  
Her friend who had IVF told her that there was an 84% chance that she would get pregnant with IVF. 
  
Her friend who had IVF told her that it was very likely that she would get pregnant with IVF. 
 
 
How would you prefer your friend to tell you what she thinks? 
    
          E Christopher was going on holiday on the Isle of Wight. His friend went on holiday there at the same time last year. 
  
She told Christopher that there was a 69% chance that the weather would be sunny. 
 
  
She told Christopher that it was quite probable that the weather would be sunny. 
  
 
How would you prefer your friend to tell you what she thinks? 
    
          F Emily bought some orchids. Her friend had some orchids in the past and she cut hers in a certain way. 
 
  
He told Emily that if she cut them in this way, there was a 92% chance that the orchids would last longer. 
  
He told Emily that if she cut them in this way, it was almost certain that the orchids would last longer. 
 
How would you prefer your friend to tell you what he thinks? 
    
          G Giles wanted to upgrade his TV to an Elga-1210. His friend had also bought this model. 
  
  
He told Giles that there was a 61% chance that the TV Elga-1210 would be every very efficient to run. 
  
He told Giles that it was somewhat likely that the Elga-1210 would be every very efficient to run. 
 
 
How would you prefer your friend to tell you what he thinks? 
    
          H Christine wanted to do a Masters in Engineering. Her friend did the same Masters last year. 
  
  
She told Christine that there was a 71% chance that she would get an engineering job after this Masters. 
  
She told Christine that it was probable that she would get an engineering job after this Masters. 
 
 
How would you prefer your friend to tell you what she thinks? 
     
preference questions 
 How do you usually prefer people to give you their judgements of uncertainty? 
 
Numerically (e.g., "There is a 50% chance) 
 
Verbally (e.g. "There is a fifty-fifty chance") 
How do you usually prefer to give your judgements of uncertainty to others? 
 
Numerically (e.g., "There is a 50% chance) 
 
Verbally (e.g. "There is a fifty-fifty chance") 
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